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Abstract

Throughout the history of the United States
individuals and groups have used education as a means to
improve their status in America— economically, politically,
and socially. When slaves gained their freedom between 1862
and 1865, they, too, looked to education as a way to
ameliorate the harmful effects of over two hundred years of
slavery.

In New Orleans freedmen and those free before the

war viewed education almost as a panacea to the many
problems within the black community.

Black New Orleanians

realized, of course, that the gains derived from education
would take time to filter throughout the entire community.
During the antebellum period New Orleans' free blacks
had accumulated a certain degree of wealth and supported
educational attainment for its members, and beginning in
Reconstruction, led in the struggle for improved education
for the entire black population.

During Reconstruction

blacks won inclusion into the public school system, and for
several years many blacks attended desegregated schools.
The end of Reconstruction, however, brought eventual
disfranchisement and the triumph of a racial ideology that
sought to impose on blacks the status of second class
citizenship.

This view found expression in the type of

education whites thought blacks should receive.
This study suggests that many blacks in New Orleans
refused to accept the permanency of limited education or
v

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

white supremacy.

Devoid of political power, however,

blacks used a strategy of petition and protest to school
officials to gain educational improvements for the black
community.

Between 1900 and 1945 that strategy produced

improvements, but by the end of World War II, black
education still lagged behind the educational opportunities
given ;.*hites.

In 1948 black leaders abandoned the strategy

of protest and petition and decided to use the federal
courts to gain educational parity within a separate school
system. Their goals shifted again in 1952, and they filed
suit to end school desegregation in New Orleans.

The legal

assault to desegregate the schools was part of the larger
black effort for racial equality.
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Introduction

With the growth of cities during the first half of the
nineteenth century, public education assumed a greater
degree of importance in America.

From its origins in New

England, the idea of public education spread west and
south. Massachusetts, with its eminent educator Horace
Mann, led the way and sent many educators to distant cities
and towns to start public school systems.

Throughout the

nation, community leaders came to view education as a means
to produce better workers and more informed citizens, as
well as Americanize the immigrants.
In 1841 the crusade gained its first victory in
Louisiana.

During a period of relative prosperity, the

Louisiana legislature appropriated $7,500 for public
education in New Orleans with the stipulation that the city
expend an equal amount.

After agreeing to accept the

offer, city leaders turned to the task of selecting a
person to administer the proposed school system.

They

asked John Shaw, a friend and colleague of Horace Mann, to
assume the job of starting a public school system.
Although he knew the difficulties he would face, Shaw
accepted the challenge and arrived in 1841 to begin his new
duties.

Many New Orleanians would benefit from his effort,

despite the initial reluctance of many of them to support
the idea of public education because of its association
vii
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with the idea of "charity."

Two groups of New Orleanians,

however, could not participate in the pioneering
effort— free blacks and slaves.
Blacks, some as slaves, others as free men, had been
among the first settlers in the New Orleans area.

The

city's population increased during the colonial and
antebellum periods, and slavery grew as well.

In that

sense, New Orleans was a typical southern city.

New

Orleans differed, however, because in addition to an
increase in slaves, the city had experienced an increase in
its free black population.

The

racial policies of the

French and Spanish contributed to the growth of the free
black population; the granting to them of certain
privileges not given to slaves then produced color and
class divisions within the black population.
But the transfer of Louisiana to American control and
the arrival of Anglos and immigrants between 1820 and 1850
led to a decline in the privileged position of free blacks.
When the public school law went into effect, free blacks
along with slaves were excluded.

Nevertheless, both slaves

and free blacks knew that city leaders had taken an
important step toward progress.

Two decades later they

would have a chance for inclusion.

Their struggle for

inclusion, of course, had to await the Civil War and the
liberating guns of Union soldiers.

viii
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New Orleans' brief participation in the Civil War
provided blacks with an early opportunity to seek that
which had been denied to most of them during slavery—
education. They possessed few doubts that public education
was crucial to black advancement.

During federal

occupation, beginning in April 1862, Union soldiers started
teaching black soldiers and civilians.

The Army increased

its role in 1863 and 1864 and established schools for
blacks.

In 1865

the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and

Abandoned Lands assumed the task of coordinating black
education.

Two years later Bureau officials transferred

most of the Freeedmen's Bureau schools to the New Orleans
public school system.

Over the next century black

education in New Orleans became inextricably linked to
questions of race and politics.
The New Orleans black community was fortunate that it
contained a large number of blacks who had been free before
the Civil War.

The antebellum free black community already

had a tradition of education and, after the war, provided
leadership in the black struggle for education in New
Orleans.

That leadership, along with the fervent desire

of the freedmen to learn, helped to establish an
educational tradition within the entire community.

In

addition to the indigenous members of the black population,
blacks from other cities and rural parishes settled in New
Orleans after 1863.

Although largely poor and uneducated,
ix
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many of these new immigrants possessed leadership qualities
and some formal education. With enfranchisement following
the 1868 Constitutional Convention and the subsequent
increase in political participation, the aspirations and
expectations of the black community soared. Blacks existed
in an environment, however, that remained hostile to their
complete civil and political emancipation.

Even in a less

threatening setting blacks would have labored under severe
handicaps. They had to contend with the emotional and
psychological adjustment to freedom and their new
independence.

Their status remained unclear; white leaders

continued their attempts to prevent them from voting.
Moreover, with little political tradition, or experience to
call on, blacks seldom translated voting strength into
political power.

Nonetheless, political participation,

economic advancement, improved race relations, and
educational opportunity formed the crux of their agenda for
progress, and they pursued it assiduously.
Their four-point agenda revolved around access to
quality education.

Sharing the larger community's belief

that education was important for advancement, black leaders
adopted strategies to increase the educational
opportunities of the black community.

They formed various

organizations to promote improved education.

The

educational campaign also served as a cohesive element in
the black community.

Tactics and strategies changed over
x
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time, and in part, reflected the tenor of race relations
within the city.

But the struggle for educational

opportunity remained constant for over a century.

In

improved education resided the hopes and aspirations of the
New Orleans black community.
Although some blacks in New Orleans attended private
or parochial schools, the vast majority attended public
schools. Between 1862 and 1960 blacks experienced
exclusion, segregation, and integration within the public
school system. Several distinct stages and themes
characterized black education in New Orleans between 1862
and 1960.

In the first stage, from 1862 to 1869, blacks

sought inclusion into the public school system, but
primarily relied on the Union Army and the Freedmen's
Bureau for education.

During the second stage, 1869 to

1877, blacks gained suffrage, and used their new political
power to demand and receive improved, as well as,
desegregated schools.

The next stage, though not well

defined, lasted from 1877 until the turn of the century.
In this period blacks lost suffrage and had to return to
petitioning officials for educational improvements.

The

fourth stage spanned the years 1900 to 1945 and started
with the familiar petitions.

As the period progressed,

however, the number of petitions increased and featured
more assertive language.

Black leaders and parents also

organized themselves in an effort to win concessions from
xi
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school officials.

During the fifth and final phase of this

study, from 1945 to 1960, blacks abandoned mere petition
and persuasion and resorted to the federal courts to gain a
quality education for blacks.
This study will essentially focus on the century long
attempt by black New Orleanians to acquire a public
education that would enable them to combat racism,
oppression, and develop their community.

It is a study of

people and a community and their reasons for and attempts
to receive a quality education.

It is a study more about

black aspirations and organized resistance to racism and
discrimination than it is about the legal and extra-legal
efforts by whites to keep blacks in a subordinate position
in society.

It will also examine the endurance of black

protest in New Orleans and advance the argument that black
New Orleanians never fully accepted the inferior status
that whites attempted to assign them.
Efforts by white leaders to deny blacks an adequate
education were symptomatic of the larger effort to define
the appropriate position for blacks in the city's social
order. Therefore

race relations and their impact on black

education will also form a part of this study, as well as,
how blacks perceived education as the foundation for a
strong and viable black community.

Blacks made important

educational and community gains by surmounting adverse
conditions brought on by slavery and discrimination.
xii
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chapter One
Education and the Politics of Race, 1862-1877

On 26 April 1862, a year after the start of America's
Civil War, Union military forces under the command of
Commodore David G. Farragut captured the important
Confederate port city of New Orleans.

The brevity of their

city's participation in the war chagrined New Orleans
whites and astonished its blacks.

One of the city's

leading newspapers perhaps best captured the sentiments of
white New Orleanians:

"We have devoted freely of our men,

our substance, and our exertions, to the defense of our
beloved city, and have nothing wherewith to reproach
ourselves, in the way of dereliction or neglect of duty, to
accomplish that object.

We have not succeeded."1

The entire fabric of the New Orleans community would
eventually experience the transforming effects of the
victorious Yankees, who condemned not just slavery but all
facets of southern life.

The northern critique of the

South extended to its economy, which they considered
stagnant; the social structure, which they considered
rigid; and its politics, which they believed the bastion of
a slaveowning elite.2 Moreover, northerners charged that
the South's agrarian economy and reliance on slave labor
contributed to a neglect of education.

They noted that

1
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poor, uneducated whites retarded the South's growth as much
as the uneducated slave.3 The increased urbanization of
New Orleans during the antebellum period, however, meant
the city diverged from the common southern pattern.
established a public school system in 1841.

It had

Under the

energetic leadership of John A. Shaw, an educator
recommended by Horace Mann, the system overcame initial
apathy, hostility, and financial problems, and by the start
of the Civil War its stability and permanency were no
longer in doubt.4 Thus, when reform-minded northern
soldiers and, later, missionaries arrived in New Orleans,
they found a system of public education modeled after the
idea of universal education prevalent in many northern
cities, especially those in New England.

The problem in

New Orleans, unlike other southern cities, was not
entrenched widespread opposition to public education, but
rather whether support for public education could be
extended to include blacks.
Before the fall of New Orleans in 1862, the
institution of slavery precluded any debate or
consideration of public education for free blacks and any
education for slaves.

Although it was true free blacks

enjoyed many privileges in antebellum New Orleans— the
right to own property, enter contracts, inherit and will
property, and legally marry— they could not attend public
schools.5 Free blacks in New Orleans managed to amass a
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certain amount of wealth and supported several private
academies.

Additionally, some free blacks sent their

children to study in France or hired tutors.6 Many less
prosperous free blacks benefited from the generosity of
Madame Bernard Couvent.

A free woman of color, Madame

Couvent willed several thousand dollars for the formation
of a school for impoverished free black children.

This

school eventually became the Institution Catholique des
Orphelins Indigents.

Other free blacks

received

instructions from a small group of black nuns, the
congregation of the Sisters of the Holy Family, as well as
at a school run by Carmelite nuns.7
Many slaves in the New Orleans area risked their
safety in an attempt to gain an education.

Since education

remained a dangerous, furtive enterprise, it is difficult
to assess accurately how many slaves achieved a degree of
education.

In New Orleans the limited autonomy that came

with city life probably facilitated the black quest for an
education.8 Scholars estimate that at least five percent
of the South's slave population had learned to read by
1860, although the historian Eugene Genovese suggests that
the number exceeded five percent.9 Given the greater
freedom of New Orleans slaves and their interaction with
the area's free blacks, slave literacy in New Orleans
probably did surpass five percent.

But as another scholar
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4
concluded, "the overwhelming majority of the Negroes in New
Orleans during this period were illiterate.1,10
Such figures and an environment hostile to black
education meant that in the spring of 1862 black New
Orleanians faced a daunting task.11 Although after the
fall of New Orleans whites accepted the termination of
slavery, they remained resolutely determined to preserve a
social order erected on the rock-solid foundation of white
supremacy.

The quantity as well as the quality of black

education became an important issue in determining the
shape and texture of post-Civil War New Orleans.

Despite

the obstacles, blacks embraced the challenge with vigor and
optimism.
Beginning in 1862 black New Orleanians embarked on
their lengthy, trouble-filled journey to acquire an
education.

Although some free blacks had supported and had

been exposed to education before 1862, the number of
illiterate blacks seeking education far surpassed the
ability of the black community to provide it.

The small

private schools continued to exist and even increased in
number after the federal occupation, but public education
quickly became more important than private schools in
meeting the educational needs of the black community.

The

reason was simple; most blacks could not afford to pay the
tuition required by private schools.

Black education in

New Orleans during occupation and Reconstruction benefited
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5
first from the initiatives of the Army and the Freedmen's
Bureau and

later from inclusion into the public schools.12

Almost immediately after their arrival in April 1862
Union soldiers joined the movement to provide education for
blacks.

The effort lacked direction and structure until

Union officials, responding to the requests of Army Chaplin
Thomas Conway and black leaders, began to consider the
etablishment of black schools.

A decision by Union

officials in September 1863 to allocate 3,000 dollars to
defray the cost of educating 250 indigent students marked
the start of direct financial involvement in black
education.

In October 1863 and March 1864 Major General

Nathaniel P. Banks gave black education a significant boost
by first authorizing the creation of black schools and
later by ordering creation of a Board of Education to take
charge of black education.13 The chairman of the Board of
Education, B. Rush Plumly, voiced satisfaction with the
initial start and believed, "the aptitude to these Colored
children to learn is equal to that of the men of color for
the act of war.

Neither of them is excelled in their

respective places, by any race on record."14 Black parents
shared Plumly's enthusiasm; the number of students
continued to increase.

In all, 3,220 blacks attended

school by December 1864, only nine months after Bank's
initial decree.

Clearly blacks had taken advantage of this

educational opportunity.15
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6
The schools established by the Union Army represented
the first organized attempt by a public agency to educate
southern blacks.

And Plumly would not be the last official

to speak glowingly of the freedmen's determined capacity to
learn.

A year later, another Board of Education official,

Mortimer A. Warren, wrote favorably about an advanced
grammar school class.

"I wish that this room of the

Lincoln School might have a visit from all scoffers of
Negro education.

I shrink from no comparison with any

other school of children, of the same age of any other
color, of any other city, of any other clime or time."16
Warren did not reserve his comments only for some budding
educational elite.

Capturing the educational mood of the

black community, Warren noticed:

"A thirst for knowledge

has been kindled in young and old which will not soon die
out.

It is talked of at home, it is preached from the

pulpit....

In passing along the streets one not

infrequently hears groups of dusky children rehearsing to
one another, or to delighted parents their progress...."17
During the first year of operation most of the schools
were single classrooms in rented houses.

They usually bore

the name of the teacher who had started them:

Miss

Strong's School, Miss Buggie's School, Miss Clarkson's
School, or Mr. Williams' School.

Most of the teachers

labored alone as teacher and principal.

Enrollment,

attendance, and classroom decorum varied tremendously
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7
during the first year of operation.

Few, if any, of the

students had been exposed to the structure of a formal
classroom.

Nonetheless, the rod, a fixture in nineteenth

pedagogy, and the threat of dismissal soon produced
acceptable classroom behavior.18 “The children are
remarkably attentive in class and making progress,"
reported J.H. Ford, one of the school site inspectors.19
Ford, a school inspector hired by the Board of
Education, continued to dutifully submit his weekly
reports, commenting on such things as the instructional
program, attendance, behavior, and school needs.

He was

generous with his praise and unsparing in his suggestions
and criticisms.

Overcrowding remained a concern at some

schools, but apparently Board of Education officials
managed to alleviate the worst of it by opening additional
schools.

Board records fail to reveal what officials

believed represented an acceptable class size.

The

prevailing wisdom, however, seemed to have been influenced
by the dimension of the classroom.

Cramped quarters,

rather than a predetermined teacher-pupil ratio, indicated
overcrowded conditions.20
The schools visited by Ford during that typically hot
New Orleans summer stressed the traditional three "Rs",
reading, writing, and arithmetic.

The classes were

ungraded, coeducational, and often included students who
ranged in age from six to eighteen.21 Individual student
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performance cannot be gleaned from the reports of Ford or
other officials.

Only statements such as "The pupils know

their lessons well" and "Mr. Williams' school is in a
flourishing condition," indicate the students' educational
progress.

On one occasion, Ford noted, "at no time during

the last three months have they been doing so well as this
week.

The teachers are constantly on the alert, order

generally prevails, and the drowsiness which invaded many
of the schools at the commencement of the warm season, has
been succeeded by a lively activity.

The progress of the

pupils is very satisfactory."22
Not all students progressed, unfortunately.

To obtain

a more objective assessment of student performance, the
Board of Education for Freedmen directed school officials
to administer a common examination.

School officials held

the examination on 24 September 1864, but chose to test not
all of the students, but only a randomly selected sample.
Through misinformation, incompetence, or unavoidable
circumstances, some of the students scheduled for testing
missed the exams.

Moreover, one teacher "had performed her

duty so remissly during the three months preceding the
examination, that not one of her scholars was sufficiently
qualified to take part in the proceedings of the day.1,23
Still, in the opinion of Ford, who compiled the report, the
"result of this first exhibition was deemed highly
satisfactory by the Examiner.1,24 One hundred and seventy-
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five students took the exam, which tested their knowledge
in reading, writing, arithmetic, and geography.

Several

teachers and their students garnered specific praise, among
them Mr. P. M. Williams, a black principal and his wife.
Ford expressed some concern with the achievement in writing
and arithmetic and targeted those subjects for increased
emphasis in Board of Education schools.

On the other hand,

many students scored well in reading, spelling, and
geography.

Considering the substantial handicaps under

which students, teachers, and school officials labored, the
September exams were cause for praise.

If queried, many

blacks would have undoubtedly shared Ford's conclusion
that, "notwithstanding the many drawbacks and difficulties
with which the schools have had to contend during the
year...the first exhibition must be regarded as highly
successful, honorable alike to teachers and pupils,..."25
After the Civil War ended in April 1865, the Board of
Education became a part of the Bureau of Refugees,
Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands.26 A significant consequence
of the absorption of the Board of Education was a complete
reorganization of the schools.

The reorganization occurred

in September 1865 just before the start of the 1865-1866
school year.

Three of the changes involved the creation of

the Office of the Superintendent, graded classrooms, and
the establishment of school districts.

School principals

reported to the City Superintendent, who in turn reported
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10
to the General Superintendent of Education in Louisiana.
Instead of the previous practice of many small schools in
close proximity to each other, under the district plan
school officials consolidated the small schools into large
units in the hopes of gaining greater efficiency and
control.27
New Orleans comprised one of the state's seven
divisions and possessed nineteen schools after the
completion of the September reorganization.

The

overwhelming majority of students received instruction at
the primary and intermediate levels, which generally
consisted of grades one through five.

Indeed, only four

schools— Garrison, Lincoln, Sumner, and Douglas— had
grammar school students, a total of 167.

Three of the

schools, Conway, Lincoln, and Banks, offered night classes,
although they only accounted for a small percentage of
total enrollment.

The Bureau also sponsored a Normal

School to train teachers and a school for industrial
training.

Two hundred and sixty students attended the

Industrial School.28 Instructors continued to emphasize
reading, writing, arithmetic, and geography.

In the main,

students made satisfactory progress, drawing praise from
teachers and school officials.
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Table l
Freedman's Bureau Sponsored Schools
in

New Orleans Area After Reorganization.
Schools

Lloyd Garrison
Conway
Sumner
Lincoln
General Howard
Frederick Douglass
General Banks
General Butler
Bayou Bridge
Chase
McDonogh
Durant
Horner
Soule Asylum
Industrial
Gretna
LA Avenue
Cadiz Street
Greenville
Totals

Number of Students

534
798
155
762
376
691
609
186
40
270
197
82
48
51
260
217
119
181
48
5624

29

Number of Teachers
+ Principals

10
13
3
14
7
12
11
5
1
5
4
2
1
1
4
4
3
3
1
104
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Between April 1864 and November 1865 schools for
blacks in Louisiana had cost the federal government 333,165
dollars.30 Reorganization, satisfactory progress, nor
lavish praise, however, prevented the enactment of a
measure calling for a monthly tuition fee.

The new tuition

policy, adopted by the board in January 1866, went into
effect on 1 February amidst concern that enrollment might
drop by more than fifty percent.31 Money to finance the
schools had come from a five percent state tax on assessed
property.32 The tax, imposed and collected by the federal
occupying forces, encountered determined opposition from
whites who resented taxes that financed black schools.33
Whites also believed that the withholding of tax payments
would undermine the federal occupation and hasten the
departure of the federal troops.

The failure of Bureau

officials to collect sufficient taxes to pay for the
schools doomed the idea of free education.
Under the tuition plan each principal received a
monthly allotment of tickets priced at $1.50 each.

In

theory, students unable to purchase tickets were to be
excluded from school.

In actuality, many teachers with

kind hearts allowed students who paid part or even none of
the tuition to remain in class.

For example, the principal

of the General Banks School sold a ticket for a dollar "to
a poor boy who could get no more."34 Such generosity was
not an isolated incident.

In the month of June, the
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Frederick Douglass School had an average attendance of
eighty-six, yet only seventy-five students paid tuition.33
The tuition policy, as well as the practice of allowing
students to evade it, continued until the local public
school system absorbed the Bureau schools.

Nevertheless,

as some had feared, the tuition policy did contribute to a
marked decrease in enrollment, only 1,359 students attended
schools in February 1866 compared to 5,330 in December
1865.36 The decrease in enrollment convinced black leaders
and Bureau officials that black education would not grow
without inclusion into the city's public school system.37
The New Orleans public school system had somehow
managed to remain in operation during the war years and the
peace that followed.

Although the school house doors

remained open, the school system did experience some
problems.

In September 1862 the city council approved an

ordinance that authorized the establishment of a Board of
Education comprised of the mayor, the chairman of the
Bureau of Finance, the chairman of the Bureau of Streets
and Landings, and the City Treasurer.

The Bureau of

Education exercised complete control over the public
schools and delegated responsibility to four Boards of
Visitors, each representing one of the four city
districts.38
By August 1866 the school system had experienced three
more reorganizations.

In June 1864, a city ordinance
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abolished the Bureau of Education and created a 13 member
Board of Directors elected by the city council.

A

subsequent ordinance, approved in August 1865 created a
twenty-four member Board of Directors appointed by the
mayor.

Half of the members received one year appointments;

the remaining twelve served for two years.

Not satisfied

with this plan, the council in July 1866 passed an
ordinance that provided for still another structural
change.

Board membership remained at twenty-four, but now

six members had to come from each district.

The

Commisssion Council, rather than the mayor, received the
power to appoint all of the members.

One constant remained

throughout the several organizations— city coffers financed
the school system.39 That arrangement created conflicts
between the Board of Directors and city officials regarding
school expenditures, maintenance, and construction.

Only

on rare occasions did the Board of Directors receive the
appropriations they thought necessary to manage the school
system.

The successive reorganizations and budget battles

had little direct effect on blacks.

From 1862 to 1867

black New Orleanians remained outside the public school
system. Their exclusion, of course, represented the will of
the white community, not the choice of blacks.
Blacks used subterfuge and petitions in seeking
inclusion in the city's school system.

Some fair-skinned

blacks simply attended all white schools and returned after
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school to their black communities.

Some blacks of lighter

hue passed undetected and permanently into white society.
"Passing" to gain access to public education had its
perils.

White New Orleanians in general and school

officials in particular remained vigilant in their efforts
to keep their world and schools free from black
encroachment, despite the fact that some blacks were fairer
than those who protected the bastions of white supremacy.
School board minutes for the 1860s revealed several
references to school children suspected of "passing."

In

September 1862 the Board of Directors, by nine to one,
voted that principals should forward cases of doubtful race
to the board.

Two weeks later the board reversed itself,

fearing the number of cases would be too high.

Instead

they gave principals the authority to determine the racial
status of students suspected of "passing."

Some principals

still referred specific cases to the entire board for
cons ideration.40
The practice of "passing" was only available to a
small number of blacks. The majority of the black
population needed a more direct and effective method to
attain public education.

Then, too, "passing" no matter

how laudable the purpose, represented a rejection of a
black identity.

And black leaders in the 1860s took pains

to stress the dignity and worth of the black race and
strenously denounced attempts to label blacks as inferior.
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Blacks were in an assertive mood and wanted, as well as
expected, to share fully in New Orleans' social order.

For

them the Civil War marked a new departure; they wanted
change and opportunity, not later in some distant land, but
immediately and in New Orleans.
Among other things, blacks wanted inclusion in the
public school system.

During the state Constitutional

Convention of 1864 it appeared that blacks would indeed
receive a public education.

The delegates voted to

establish a dual public school system but refused to
stipulate the manner of funding.

A plan based on

allocating the taxes each race paid to the separate school
systems encountered opposition from black leaders and
General Banks.41 The delegates decided to leave the matter
of funding to the legislature, but the legislature refused
to act.

In New Orleans the local school board also

rebuffed appeals by blacks for public funds to assist
private educational efforts. In September 1865 black
representatives of the Colored Indigent's School asked the
board for $4,000 to help meet expenses for the 1865-1866
school year.

After referring the request to the Committee

on Finance, the board voted no, maintaining it had "no
right to appropriate funds for any purpose other than the
support of the public schools proper of this city."42
The board's and the state's refusal to finance black
education occurred, in part, because of the continued
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political powerlessness of blacks.

Black leaders like Dr.

Louis C. Roudanez, publisher of L 1Union and the New Orleans
Tribune. had fought without success for suffrage.

They

even presented their case in person to President Abraham
Lincoln who later privately expressed the opinion that
educated blacks with property and military service should
receive the vote.43 Black suffrage remained a request
unanswered because most whites shared the view of J. P.
Montanot, a state representative from New Orleans.

"I am a

native of Louisiana," Montanot asserted, "and when this
state extends to the Negroes the right of suffrage, I shall
leave it forthwith and go to China."44 But the
Congressional elections of 1866 brought more enlightened
men to national office, the political climate changed
perceptively, and both affected black education.
On 3 April 1867 the Board of Directors passed a motion
to establish a five member committee to study the
possibility of providing public education to black
students.45 Board members also agreed to petition the
Commission Council for authority and sufficient funds to
establish black schools. Having refused for several years
to provide any financial assistance for black education,
why did the board change its position?

The November 1866

Congressional elections sent a clear but unheeded message
to local and state officials that the moderate, pro-South
phase of Presidential Reconstruction had run its course.
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The Reconstruction Acts in March 1867 sent a signal that
Louisiana white leaders could no longer ignore.

The state

legislature responded with a law authorizing the
establishment of separate public schools for blacks.

By

April 1867, black leaders were not only discussing
inclusion, but integrated education as well.

Therefore,

the board's action represented an attempt to at once follow
a legislative mandate but also preempt the integrationists
and gain control of black education.46 The ploy worked, at
least for a time.
Nevertheless, the board's proposal immediately became
embroiled in a political tempest.

The Commission Council

approved the school board's request to establish separate
black schools, but Mayor Edward Heath vetoed the measure.47
He did so because he considered it "unjust to a very large
number of citizens of New Orleans."

Heath wanted the

membership of the board increased to include blacks, "or a
new board elected in which they should be fairly
represented by their own race."

He also maintained that
•

•

*

the Council's 70,000 dollar appropriation was inadequate.

48

The Council managed to override the mayor's veto, and after
both sides reached a compromise, the Council gave the
school board authority to establish black schools and
appropriated $70,000 for the effort.
The action of the Commission Council represented the
time-worn gesture of closing the barn door after the horses
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had escaped.

The Council vote in October 1867 merely

acknowledged what had transpired over the previous two
months.

In August school officials had agreed on a plan to

incorporate black schools.

The board passed a motion

empowering its president to appoint a committee composed of
two men from each district "for the object of opening
schools for the education of Colored children."
passed by the slim margin of eight to six.

The motion

Some of those

who voted against it explained that they opposed the motion
because they doubted whether the board had the legal
authority to establish black schools.49
Further support for the conclusion that the board's
decision to educate blacks stemmed from a desire to
forestall a drive for integrated schools came later.

On 4

September the board passed a resolution authorizing an
investigation of "all the schools now in operation for the
education of Colored children in the city to ascertain and
report to this board the number and location of said
schools; the number and salaries of teachers; the number of
pupils; [and] how said schools are supported."

To conduct

this study the president selected a committee, "the
Committee of Colored Schools."

The committee received the

additional task of determining what black school
supporters— teachers, parents, patrons, and directors—
thought about joining the public school system.

Finally
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the board asked it to ascertain black sentiment concerning
"mixed schools.,,so
The committee discharged its duty thoroughly and
quickly.

Only twelve days later, the president called a

special meeting to hear the committee's report.

Lengthy

and detailed, it contained considerable information on
black schools in the city.

Of prime importance to school

board members, the report disclosed the attitude of the
heads of black schools pertaining to integrated schools.
Most respondents, black and white, thought that separate
schools were best and believed blacks favored them.
Reverend Steptoe, a black teacher in charge of a school
housed at the Fourth Baptist Church, stated "separate
schools were best for the present."

William Finney, the

black principal of Soule' Chapel School, also favored
separate schools and ventured that "mixing the Colored and
White in the same schools will excite prejudices and create
ill-feeling and dissension between the races."

John H.

Collins, the white principal of a school on Gravier Street,
spoke in favor of separate schools and charged that "the
only people clamoring for mixed schools were black
politicians and mulattoes."S1
The contention that audacious black politicians and
frustrated mulattoes were the only segment of the black
population "clamoring" for integrated school deserves
attention.

Admittedly, most respondents favored separate
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schools, but several of them affirmed the principle of
common schools or offered what they thought were adequate
rationales for separation.

For example, P. M. Williams,

the head of the School of Boys and Girls on Gravier Street,
initially stated "that the Colored children have a right to
go to any public school...."

He then tempered that bold

statement with the observation that "under the
circumstances existing in the city at present, it is
advisable and for the best interests of all classes that
separate schools should be established for white and
colored children...."

Other principals used the term,

"best interest," or like Reverend Steptoe, "best for the
present," in explaining their support for separate schools.
Their caution reflected the fact that black New Orleanians
lived in a hostile environment, with many whites
antagonistic towards black education and adamantly opposed
to integrated schools.52
Nonetheless, board interrogators encountered several
other individuals who spoke out forcefully for mixed
schools.

Most notable among them was the irrepressible

Miss Edmonia G. Highgate, a black woman from Syracuse, New
York.

Miss Highgate admitted that "mixing the races now

may create difficulties and injure the cause of education
for the time being."

She expressed confidence, however, in

the eventual success of integration.

She added that, in

her opinion, intelligent black parents viewed integrated
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schools as their right.

Despite her views, she gained the

respect of the committee which thought her "a very
intelligent, and apparently; highly educated lady.’1 E.
Tinchand, a black Creole educated in France and the
principal of a school in the Second District, also
supported integrated schools, as did Bertrand Aggeret, the
white principal of a small school on Ursuline Street.53
Ignoring the views of dissenters and buoyed by the
comments favorable to separate schools, the board busied
itself with establishing black schools.

The school board

Committee contacted and reported on seventeen black
schools.

Each of the city's four districts contained at

least two.54 The first and second districts had six
schools for blacks, the third district had two, and the
fourth district had three.

The size, affiliation, and

sponsor of each school varied.

At least eight of the

schools were somehow affiliated with the Freedmen's Bureau,
seven were private schools associated with an organization
or an individual, and two were church affiliated.

The

financial support of the Freedmen's Bureau had been reduced
substantially.

Eleven of the seventeen schools charged

tuition, ranging from $1.50 to $3.00 a month.

The Bureau

only provided funds for rent and textbooks at cost to the
eight Bureau schools contacted by school officials.

The

importance of education to black families and the black
community was poignantly dramatized by their efforts, from
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meager incomes, to pay the cost of their children's
education.55
The board empowered the Committee on Colored Schools
to assume responsibility for securing teachers and locating
buildings for the black schools.

The board intended to

establish the schools within the structure of its system
but did not commit itself to employ teachers presently in
the black schools they contacted or to use current school
buildings.

Several newspaper announcements calling for

teacher applications and buildings suitable for schools
produced good results.

Between 17 September and 2 October

the board received ninety applications.

Slightly less than

half of the applicants enjoyed board certification and were
eligible for immediate employment.

The remaining forty

seven had to take a competence exam for certification.
Unfortunately, only six of them passed the exam.

Still,

the board had a sufficient pool of applicants, and the high
failure rate did not hinder recruitment.56
The work of school officials and the educational
aspirations of many blacks merged in October 1867 with the
opening of the first public schools for blacks in New
Orleans.

During the same month, school officials

established nine black schools.

The Committee on Colored

Schools also took measures to gain supervision over black
schools still controlled by the Freedmen's Bureau.
Committee members met with Ephraim S. Stoddard, City

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

24
Director of Freedmen's Colored Schools.

At the meeting,

described by one participant as "most pleasant and
cordial," the conferees reached an agreement to transfer
the schools to the Board of School Directors of the City of
New Orleans.57 The transfer, completed on 15 November,
included teachers, buildings, furniture, and equipment.
The Bureau transferred eleven primary schools to the board
which brought the total number of new black public schools
to twenty.

Average daily attendance at the schools stood

at sixteen hundred.

Obviously pleased with the initial

venture into black education, Superintendent William Rogers
pronounced "the results thus far...most satisfactory" and
requested authority to "expand departments as necessary."
Superintendent Rogers, as well as the black community,
expected and anticipated increased black enrollment.

And

concerned black citizens must have been optimistic when a
board member proudly proclaimed "nothing has been omitted
to make them [black schools] as efficient as any of the
schools of corresponding grade in the city."58
By the close of 1867-1868 school year, black
enrollment had reached thirty-five hundred and, with
consolidations and closings, the number of black schools
stood at fifteen.

Black parents thought the figures

encouraging; some school officials, however, held a
different view.

Reporting to the school board in May 1868

Assistant Superintendent Alexander Dimitry cautioned the
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board that it "may have created a situation that will get
out of hand by establishing education for blacks, it fuels
interest and expectation."

Dimitry added that the number

of applications increased daily, which put a strain on
existing classroom space.

In fact, he disclosed, black

students had already been turned away because of
overcrowding.59
Dimitry's statement on overcrowding might explain the
continued effort of blacks to gain entry into white
schools.

Blacks with few or no Negro features continued to

circumvent the system of race segregation.

One school,

Bayou Road, in the downtown section of the city, reported
twenty-nine students suspected of belonging to the "other"
race.

Even with inclusion, the idea of "passing" remained

an option for many blacks.

Their actions, in part,

reflected the substandard condition of black education.
Blacks realized that the white schools received, and would
continue to receive, the largest share of the board's
educational dollars.

For example, the 1868 projected

school budget submitted to the City Council totaled 396,900
dollars.

School officials planned to allocate only 65,000

dollars of that to black schools.60 The continued
inequitable distribution of school funds gave additional
impetus to the push for desegregated schools.
There were no polls conducted in the 1860s and 1870s
to ascertain what the masses of black New Orleanians
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thought about desegregated schools.

The city's black

leadership, however, made its views very clear.

The most

successful black newspaper in the 1860s, the New Orleans
Tribune. which articulated the agenda and ideology of black
leaders, strongly favored integrated schools.
editorial supporting mixed schools declared:
is not equality.

A typical
"Separation

The very assignment of schools to certain

children on the ground of color is a distinct violation of
the first principles of equality."61 Political
developments soon demonstrated that many in the black
community agreed.
The refusal of white leaders between 1862 and 1864 to
extend suffrage and civil equality to wealthy and educated
blacks, who were free before the Civil War, forced free
blacks to form a bond with their less fortunate brethren.
Therefore, in the 1860s white racism helped unite the black
community, and segregation institutionalized it for the
next one hundred years.

New Orleans' free black

population, eighty percent of which was mulattoes, out of
necessity linked its political and civil liberation with
that of the former slaves.

That is not to say, however,

that cleavages did not exist within the black community.
Blacks, both formerly free and newly freed, carried certain
cultural traits into post-Civil War New Orleans, not least
of which was a language difference.
French exclusively or were bilingual.

Many free blacks spoke
Indeed, their first
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newspaper appeared in French, L 1Union. Their relative
wealth also separated free blacks from freedmen.
The free blacks initial attempts to distance
themselves from the former slaves, however, had less to do
with skin color than perceived status based on wealth and
education.

Free blacks had no more inclination to

associate with poor whites than they had to associate with
poor blacks.

In the main, wealth and education determined

leadership in the black community during Reconstruction
(and, of course, in the white community as well). Lightcomplexioned Creoles worked and associated with blackAnglos without dissension related to skin color.
Disagreement over tactics, strategy, and conflict over the
spoils of victory contributed more to black disunity than
color prejudices.
For both the wealthy and the poor, the much awaited,
and long campaigned for, black political participation
arrived in 1868.

Political empowerment enabled black

leaders to alter their strategy.

Instead of petitioning

and supplicating public officials from a position of
weakness, black leaders now had the political power to
demand.

Although black voters did not possess the

numerical strength to dominate city and state politics,
blacks nevertheless became a force and elected officials
had to address their demands.

High on the list stood a

quality, integrated public school system.

Blacks believed
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that continued race segregation in the schools reinforced
the prevailing system of white superiority and black
inferiority.

That belief, coupled with the very tangible

evidence of discrimination in school expenditures, helped
to sustain the desegregation effort.62
During one of Louisiana's many constitutional
conventions, this one in 1867, blacks managed to secure the
inclusion of a measure prohibiting segregated schools.
This convention, convened under congressional oversight,
contained a total of ninety-eight delegates.63 Fifty of
them were black, with twelve of those from New Orleans.64
As a group they possessed talent and diverse backgrounds.
They represented "firm Republican party men who had support
from the party and shared many of the same attributes:
education, shrewd natural ability, military service,
business ownership, and professional careers."65
The convention met in New Orleans on 23 November 1867
and completed its work approximately fifteen weeks later.
The delegates, both black and white, brought certain
ideological and pragmatic objectives to Mechanics Institute
Hall, the convention site, and they hoped to put a definite
imprint on Louisiana's future.

Ninety-six of the delegates

were Republicans, but events during the course of the
convention demonstrated the utter uselessness of party
labels.66 The convention, historian Roger Fischer has
argued, contained three distinct-factions.

Sixteen members
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from the country parishes he considered white Unionists,
and approximately thirty, mostly non-native whites, he
labelled Radicals.

The fifty black delegates formed a

third faction.67 It would be a mistake, however, to
suggest that any of the factions, especially the black
group, was homogeneous.

Generally, though, black delegates

coalesced around two principles: universal suffrage and
elimination of legal distinctions based on race.68 They
hoped to codify in the constitution a new racial era for
Louisiana.

"Many of the convention delegates had little

experience in exercising political power and had worked in
an unfriendly atmosphere," observed a student of the
subject, but "these limitations did not prevent them from
establishing a workable structure of government."69
The black delegates played an important role during
the convention, chairing or sitting on all of the various
committees.

They helped to produce one of the more

enlightened and democratic constitutions in the state's
history.70 In the true spirit of American constitutionmaking, compromise and moderation prevailed.

Although the

provisions granting suffrage co blacks and assuring them
equal treatment alarmed many members of the white
community, given the mood of Congress expressed through the
Reconstruction acts and visible in the form of federal
troops, most whites realized black enfranchisement
represented a fait accompli.

Then, too, some whites had
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heeded the words of the ex-Confederate war hero, General
Pierre G. T. Beauregard who "urged Louisianians to accept
the facts that Blacks would vote and work at influencing
that vote."71 Despite the charges of "Africanizing" the
state, whites resented the increasing political power of
northerners more than the potential voting strength of the
freedmen.72
Blacks were also interested in leadership, or rather
who would lead, but were most concerned with securing
"radical" legislation to promote civil and political
equality.73 Prior to and during the constitutional
convention, the New Orleans Tribune implored the black
community and its leaders to remain focused on the stated
objectives of universal suffrage and equality before the
law.74 Commenting on the potential of the convention as an
means for change, a Tribune editorial stated:
In a community where we have been so long
laboring under a denial of justice, in a
community where customs rather than laws
perpetuate a constant discrimination between
White and Colored children, it is a matter of
necessity to provide in the new Constitution for
the enforcement of impartial treatment to all
men, women and children. This is the peculiar
feature that the Constitution of 1867 will have
to bear, a feature determined by the very spirit
and the perverted customs of the Community for
which that Constitution is to be made.75
Several of the delegates at the convention wasted
little time in attempting to negate, through constitutional
enactments,- "the perverted customs of the community"
regarding separate schools.

James Ingraham from Caddo
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Parish and Dr. George Wickliffe of New Orleans introduced
measures pertaining to public education.

Ingraham wanted

"the establishment of at least one Free Public School in
every parish of the State" and thought black and white
students should "attend school in the same school
houses."76 Wickliffe proposed a more comprehensive plan,
encompassing higher education, funding, and governance.
Wickliffe's "ordinance" contained eleven articles.

Article

one of his proposal embodied the basic principles of civil
equality which blacks hoped to achieve.
The Legislature shall establish free public
schools throughout the State, and shall provide
for their support by taxation or otherwise. All
children of this State between the ages of six
and eighteen, shall be admitted to the public
schools in common, without distinction to race,
color, or previous condition. There shall be no
separate schools established for any race.77
Without recorded debate, the president of the
convention, James G. Taliaferro, referred Ingraham and
Wickliffe's proposals to the Committee on Education.

This

thirteen member committee, chaired by John Lynch, a white
northerner and former major in the Union Army, contained
six black and seven white delegates.78 In addition to
Lynch, one other white member had recently migrated south,
Peter Harper.

Enough disagreement existed among the

members that it proved impossible for them to reach a
consensus.

The most important, but not the only,

hinderance to unity was the issue of whether or not the
state should conduct its public schools "without
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distinction of race, color, or previous condition."

Four

members opposed the idea of desegregated schools and issued
a minority report.

Two of the four were transplanted

northerners, Lynch and Harper, the other two, John Barrett
and G. Snider had lived in the South before the war.

Their

minority report not only revealed their opposition to
desegregation, but also to state control of education.

For

example, they wanted the members of the legislature to have
the power to abolish the office of State Superintendent of
Education by a two-thirds majority "whenever, in their
opinion, said office shall be no longer necessary."79
Seven members, five blacks and two whites, signed the
majority report.

In scope and specificity, the proposal

closely paralleled the measures introduced by Wickliffe.
It, too, forbade segregation in public schools; created,
empowered, and set the salary of a State Superintendent of
Education; and mandated the establishment of a state
university in New Orleans, a normal school for teacher
training, and institutions for persons insane, visually and
•

audio impaired, and mentally

•

•

deficient.

80

The report was

in harmony with the thinking of many black New Orleanians
"that in order to have only one nation and one people, we
must educate all children in the same public schools."81
After receiving the committee's report the entire
convention voted on various articles pertaining to
education.

Most of them aroused little debate or
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opposition and gained quick acceptance by the delegates.
As anticipated, however, the issue of desegregated schools
aroused considerable discussion.

By a vote of sixty-one to

twelve, the delegates adopted article 134 which, except for
two significant changes, mirrored the proposals of
Wickliffe and the committee.

Unlike Wickliffe's proposal,

the bill that passed mandated the opening of "at least one
school in every parish throughout the State," and raised
the school age limit to twenty-one.

82

All of the black

delegates, present and voting, cast their ballots with the
majority.

Six of the fourteen northerners serving as

delegates and the six white southerners voted against
Article 134.83
Several of the dissenters explained their negative
votes.

G. Snider of DeSoto Parish maintained Article 134

"will be the great means of defeating the Constitution on
the day of ratification."

George Dearing refused "to

inauguarate a system of schools in the present immoral
state of society which I am forced to believe will have
such a demoralizing influence."

W. Jasper Blackburn, of

Claiborne Parish, claimed to be "a friend of all men, and
more especially of all children, regardless of race or
color,"

Nonetheless, as a pragmatist he thought mixed

schools would "break up our free public school system, or
at least virtually exclude the Colored children from all
participation therein."

Another dissenter, William
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McMillen, before the Civil War a resident of Ohio, believed
the inclusion of Article 134 would "defeat the organization
of a complete and thorough common school system in the
State.”84
The comments of McMillen, Blackburn, Dearing, and
others contained a few common threads.

They knew that the

sixty-one yes votes to the contrary notwithstanding, most
whites in New Orleans and throughout the state opposed the
idea of mixed schools.

Indeed, as Dearing pointed out,

many whites opposed free public schools of any type.

The

delegates who voted no thought that insistence on mixed
schools would lead to resistance and a general revolt
against public schools.

At the time of the convention,

only New Orleans had more than a rudimentary public school
system.

And its system faced chronic financial

difficulties.

White apathy and hostility against mixed

schools, they reasoned, would doom public education.

To

dissenters the choice was not between mixed schools or
separate schools, but between separate schools or no
schools.

Peter Harper, who had served as a captain in the

33th United States Colored Infantry, summed up that view
when he declared:

"I vote no, being anxious that a system

of schools might be established whereby all the children of
the State may be educated, and being confident that this
article of the Constitution will do much to defeat a
desirable result."85
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Deference to white southern sensibilities, no matter
how pragmatic, and allegiance to the "too soon” theory had
by 1867 become a familiar refrain to the black community.
In one of several perceptive editorials criticizing the
"too soon" advocates, The Tribune raised the rhetorical
question, if not now, when?
come?

"When will the right time

Is it, per chance, after we will have separated for

ten or twenty years, the two races in different schools and
when we shall have realized the separation of this nation
into two peoples?

The difficulty, then, will be greater

than it is today."86 By the summer of 1867, five years had
elapsed since the arrival of federal troops and the
euphoric expectations that the Civil War was more than an
epic conflict to restore the Union and end slavery, but
also a battle to make the principles of democracy and
equality a reality for six million black southerners.

Five

years had passed and many blacks shared the sentiment that
"too soon" was rapidly becoming "too late."

But hope is

the enemy of cynicism, and as the delegates met in
Mechanics Hall during the winter of 1867-1868, hope ruled
the day.

When the delegates finally adopted the

constitution, including an article prohibiting separate
schools, it appeared that maybe "too soon" had given way to
"now."87 In April 1868, Louisiana voters went to the polls
and voted 51,737 to 39,076 in favor of ratifying the
»

•

QQ

constitution.
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The constitution provided Louisiana with a new system
of government; legislators, however, had to transform the
principles embodied in the document into workable laws.
Anticipating the eventual adoption and ratification of the
constitution and the subsequent call for statewide
elections, Republican leaders in early December 1867
expressed a need for a nominating convention to select
•

•

candidates for state office.

89

The Republicans convened m

January 1868 and produced a bi-racial slate of candidates
headed by Henry Clay Warmoth for governor and Oscar J. Dunn
for lieutenant governor.

In selecting Dunn, the party

attempted to placate a group of blacks, headed by Dr. Louis
C. Roudanez, who had insisted on the selection of a black
candidate, Francis E. Dumas, for governor.90
To many white New Orleanians, the new state
constitution and subsequent laws were too enlightened and
democratic, especially the ones pertaining to desegregated
schools.

Attempts to bring about mixed schools produced

massive opposition.

The school board refused to institute

desegregation and continued to assign students to race
specific schools.

In fact, opposition forces managed to

delay the effective start of desegregatgion until January
1871.91
The city's white press vehemently opposed all efforts
that undermined the dominant position of the majority
population.

But nothing enraged the shapers of public
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opinion more than the thought and prospect of integrated
schools.

Even the sharing of political power failed to

elicit the same degree of editorial virulence.

None of the

newspapers exercised restraint or adopted a wait and see
position.

"The schools now established in this city have

been founded by white people for white children," stated
the New Orleans Times.92 A letter to the Times from "Fair
Play" considered it "unjust to us poor people who cannot
afford to send our children to private schools," to face
the choice of mixed schools or no schools.93 By 1867, the
white press, as well as citizens like, "Fair Play," stated
they did not object to the idea of educating blacks, but
they wanted it done in separate schools.
Not just the actions of rabid racists, but the caution
of white Republicans delayed the start of desegregated
schools in New Orleans.

Many persons in favor of a unified

system of public education urged caution in pursuing
desegregated schools.

Thomas W. Conway, State

Superintendent of Education from 1868 to 1872, was one such
individual.

Conway gained his position as part of the

Republican electoral surge of 1868.

A former Chaplain in

the Union Army, the New York native had held various
positions related to freedmen between 1863 and 1868— at one
time serving as Superintendent of the Bureau of Free Labor
and Assistant Commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau in
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Louisiana.94 He had also aided the struggle for black
suffrage.
Conway, along with many others, believed that support
for public education rested on fragile ground and the
entire common school effort could collapse under the weight
of too stringent a demand for mixed schools, especially in
the rural parishes.

In Conway's opinion, "the question of

mixed or separate schools, however important in itself,
must be conceded to be secondary to that for which alone
schools, either mixed or separate, exist.

The end is

greater than the means."95 His views, of course, closely
resembled the statements made at the constitutional
convention by opponents of school desegregation.

Conway

thought the public schools suffered because of "the
indifference, amounting to virtual opposition, which, in
large sections of the state, has obstructed every endeavor
for the establishment of public schools."96 He predicted
that time would lessen the prejudices and passions of men
and separate schools would suffer the fate of slavery.
The seductive allure of time itself as an agent of
positive change did not appeal to New Orleans' black
leaders.

They consistently and repeatedly demanded mixed

schools.

Neither the abolition of slavery nor the

acquisition of the ballot had resulted from a change of
heart among southern whites.

Union guns had secured the

former and Republican ideology the latter.

Armed with the
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vote and buoyed by the presence of federal forces, blacks
saw little reason for gradualism.

Then, too, little

evidence existed in New Orleans to indicate a softening of
white attitudes towards the freedmen.

The haunting spector

of the 30 July massacre at Mechanics Hall, where a white
mob wounded or killed hundreds of blacks, persisted years
after the event.97 Democrats, pledged to the status quo,
controlled city politics, and the white press remained
hostile.

After fighting for six years to gain the vote and

an opportunity for a public education, blacks doubted
"time" would favor their cause.
The refusal of the board to institute desegregation
eventually made Conway discard his cautious stance on mixed
schools.

He wrested control of the schools from the board

by allocating state education funds to ward boards.

The

incumbent board unsuccessfully appealed Conway's decision
to the Eighth District Court of Judge Henry C. Dibble, "a
Northern-born Radical."

In March 1871, at the urging of

Conway, the state legislature passed a bill that
restructured the school board.

The new bill created a

thirteen member board with one representative from each of
the city's thirteen wards and the city's treasurer served
as an ex-officio member.

The State Board of Education

appointed the members and selected Judge Dibble to
represent the Second Ward.

The new board also contained

three blacks— P. B. S. Pinchback, John R. Clay, and Blanc

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

40
F. Joubert.

With this reorganization and "friends" of

black education in power, the administrative impediment to
desegregation disappeared.98
In January 1871 the experiment in desegregated
education began.

Just how many schools actually had

students of both races is impossible to determine.

During

this period, school officials reported enrollemnt figures
without regard to race.

Moreover, there are no extant

minutes of the school board for the period July 1869 to
January 1875.

Comments by contemporaries, however,

indicate that at least one-third of the public schools
experienced some desegregation between 1869 and 1877."
"Some of the schools of the city are almost wholly white,
others are partially mixed, while some of the best grammar
schools are about half and half," reported a Methodist
journal, "Colored scholars are in our high schools, and
•

also m

our State Normal School."

100

Several months later

the Weekly Louisianian stated that one-third of the schools
were mixed.101 Interest by blacks in desegregated schools
remained high throughout the period.
The number of blacks attending desegregated schools
would have been higher if school officials had elected to
assign students to specific schools.

Instead, school

officials instituted an open admission plan.102 Not
realizing the depth of desegregationist sentiment within
the black community, school officials hoped their freedom
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of choice policy would keep desegregation to a minimum.
The open admission policy, however,
desegregation.

failed to thwart

A knowledgeable student on the subject

placed the number of black students who attended
desegregated schools at 500 to 1,000.103
In a study on New Orleans school desegregation during
Reconstruction, Louis Harlan identified twenty-one to
twenty-five schools attended by both races.104 Districts
two through seven contained eighteen of the desegregated
schools in 1872.105 The concentration of desegregated
schools in slightly less than half of the city's thirteen
representative districts reflected the residential pattern
of the black community.

Except for the three high schools

opened to students from throughout the city, blacks
attended desegregated schools located in their
neighborhoods.

The cost of transportation, if available at

all, caused most students, black and white, to attend
schools close to home.
Black leaders championed desegregated schools because
they wanted racial distinctions eliminated from post-civil
War society.

Enfranchisement gave them an opportunity to

transform their ideals into reality; New Orleans maintained
desegregated schools from 1871 t

>

1877.

Blacks knew, and

later events demonstrated, that desegregated schools and
the other vestiges of civil equality depended on the
retention of suffrage.

Blacks also knew that most whites
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wanted them removed from the political arena.

As a result

blacks welcomed any sign that indicated a softening of
white opinion on matters of suffrage and civil equality.
During this period blacks did find some whites who
expressed a willingness to endorse black suffrage and civil
equality.
By 1873 desegregated schools had not led to better
race relations, rather a temporary and slight improvement
in race relations helped sustain the mixed school idea.106
The improvement grew out of the convergence of politics and
education.

Political expediency, not a change in attitude,

forced some white leaders to reduce their attacks on
desegregated education.

White New Orleanians and the

city's white press "actually sought to win the Negro's vote
on a basis of recognizing his civil rights," explained one
historian.107 Their acquiescence in an issue blacks viewed
as a litmus test of the sincerity of whites' intention to
treat blacks as equals made an attempted black-white
political coalition possible in the 1870s.
The effort at compromise and conciliation culminated
in the Unification Movement of 1873.

Influential white

business leaders believed that continued racial
polarization reflected in disputed elections and sporadic
violence would lead to the state's ruin.

Indeed, many

thought the state under Republican party rule had long
»

since entered a state of decay.

108

Moreover, most whites
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blamed northern opportunists for what they considered
rampant political corruption and mismanagement.

Business

leaders, acting on the assumption that "the great port
metropolis needed political stability to achieve economic
prosperity" attempted, albeit briefly, to charter a new
course m

•

New Orleans' race relations.

109

Isaac N. Marks, a

wealthy New Orleanian with diverse business intersts,
emerged as one of the leaders of the movement.

Other white

leaders included General P. G. T. Beauregard, James I. Day,
and Judge William M. Randolph.110
Attempts at "unification," of course, had to include
the participation of blacks.

Concerned about the level of

violence and racial animosity, many black leaders endorsed
and supported the Unification Movement.

Louis C. Roudanez,

a black physician and recognized leader in the black
community, pledged his support.111 In addition to Roudanez,
other black participants included Aristide Mary, Lieutenant
Governor Caesar C. Antoine, and George Y. Kelso, a state
senator.112 Not all Republicans were enthusiastic about the
movement's potential, though.

The New Orleans Republican,

for example, questioned the wisdom of joining any political
•

movement other than the Republican Party.

113

•

With all of

its alleged faults and political vices, the Repulican
Party, in the opinion of many blacks, represented the party
of liberation and black enfranchisement.

They remained

reluctant to venture into unchartered waters.

The
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architects and supporters of the unification plan thought
they had developed the perfect means to achieve political
peace and economic prosperity in post-civil War Louisiana.
And perhaps they had.

After several months of discussion

and planning, a citizen's committee comprised of fifty
black and fifty white leaders— a racial composition
strikingly similar to that of the 1867-1868 Constitutional
Convention— presented its list of recommendations to the
public.114 As a citizen committee devoid of legal
legitimacy, the Committee of One Hundred sought widespread
public support and presented its views as "An Appeal for
the Unification of the People of Louisiana.1,115 Commenting
on the proposals contained in the "appeal," one scholar
noted, "no group of Southerners in the Reconstruction era
was willing to go farther in harmonizing race relations
than the authors of this document....1,116 The unifers hoped
to secure black support for a political alliance dedicated
to honest government, free from out of state influence.

In

return, blacks would be guaranteed political and civil
•

equality.

tl7

The Unification Movement, centered in the city and led
primarily by New Orleanians, received little support
•

outside the area.

118

Except for a well attended mass

meeting on 15 July 1873, the Movement failed to produce a
viable black-white political coalition.

Ushered in during

the promise of spring, the Movement losts its momentum
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after the July meeting.

Why did the Movement fail?

Blacks

doubted the ability of white leaders to make good on their
promises.

The shouts of one white participant at the

meeting questioning whether Marks would send his children
to mixed schools did not allay their fears.

The shouting

spectator, more than Marks, reflected the sentiments of
white New Orleans.

The primary cause of the Movements'

failure, however, rested with the refusal of whites to
accept racial equality.119 The rejection of the principles
of equality also affected black education.
The same fear of, or better aversion to, racial
equality also undergirded white opposition to desegregated
schools.

The conservative disavowal of violence and other

extra-legal means of popular protest eventually waned in
the face of the seemingly intransigent radical Republican
governments.

Failure to reach a qtick settlement during

the disputed state elections in 1872 resulted in the
establishment of rival governments, both claiming
legitimacy.120 Para-military gatherings became an accepted
form of political expression.

The White League grew in

strength and boldness, and the level of violence increased
during the spring and summer of 1874.121 The term massacre
became a familiar one to the black community.

In September

1874, at the "Battle of Canal Street," the tide turned
perceptively and permanently in the direction of the White
League and the Democrats. 122

•

•

Within that milieu of violence
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and distrust the public schools existed, some still
desegregated.123
To many black New Orleanians, desegregated schools
represented the promise of black enfranchisement and civil
equality.

To whites they illustrated its perils.

On 14

December 1874 some whites turned to mob violence to
accomplish what they could not as yet do legally—
resegregate the schools.

Initial signs of unrest occurred

at the Girls Upper High School located in the uptown
section (above Canal Street) of the city.

Several black

students and their teachers from Coliseum School came to
the school to take their high school entrance exams.

The

principal refused to allow them to do so, stating it
violated a directive she had received from Superintendent
Charles Boothby.

The students, all white, demonstrated

their agreement with the principal by threatening to
boycott the school until they received assurances that
school officials would not admit blacks.

The graduating

seniors went even further and signed a petititon vowing not
to accept their diplomas until school officials settled the
matter.124
The disturbance at Girls' Upper High School quickly
spread, fueled by the white press.

On 15 December, a group

of men physically attacked Superintendent Boothby for
alledgely insulting several students from Girls' Upper
High.

Boothby denied the accusation, and the principal,
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teachers, and students at Girls' Upper High corroborated
his statement.

As Superintendent of the Schools, Boothby

had become a prime target for whites who were dissatisfied
with desegregated schools.

The attack resulted from

frustration, and the alledged insult to female students,
was merely an excuse.125
Blacks at several other schools also experienced
violent manifestations of white discontent.

When black

students attempted to apply at Boys' High School, a group
of whites prevented it.

By this time the whites, most of

them students, had gained approving names like "youthful
regulators" and "young board of directors," from the white
press.

Spurred on by their new notoriety, the group

visited the Girls' Lower High School, located below Canal
Street, and attempted to expel the black students in
attendance (in a community where many blacks were
indistinguishable from whites, the young toughs had a
»

12/5

difficult task determining racial identity).

They

succeeded in disrupting the attempts of blacks to enter or
remain in the high schools.

Their success then led to

similar disturbances at several primary and grammar
schools, and continued white harassment led eventually to
•

•

fights between blacks and whites.

127

During the several days of unrest, the police could
not restore order; faced with the prospect of escalating
violence, the school board closed the schools.

They
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reopened on 11 January 1875 amid relative calm.

The board

thought it wise to give Superintendent Boothby authority to
close any school threatened with disturbances.128 Minor and
sporadic clashes continued throughout the remainder of the
school year, but there is no evidence that Boothby closed
any of the schools.129 He did contend, however, that "the
violent attacks upon many of our schools in December,"
contributed to a higher than normal rate of absenteeism in
January and February.130 New Orleans' experiment in
desegregated schools, unique to the South, continued
despite the upsurge in violence in December 1874.

Some

schools remained desegregated until the administration of
Governor Francis T. Nicholls.
Did the reality of the desegregated system equal the
expectations blacks had for the system?

Did black students

in fact receive a "better" education in mixed schools?

The

available evidence supports a qualified yes to these
questions.

During the period of desegregation, blacks

attended all of the city's high schools.

After the

absorption of the Freedmen's Bureau schools, and before
effective desegregation, the city only provided blacks with
schools through the grammar level.

Moreover, "nearly all

the mixed schools were classified as Grammar A Schools,
which had more teachers and a higher salary scale, and sent
more graduates to the high schools than the Grammar B
•

Schools and Primary schools."

131

•

•

Desegregation, at least in
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theory and to a degree in practice, expanded over three
fold the number of schools available to blacks.
Inclusion into the public school system did not, of
course, eliminate the myriad of problems related to black
education.

Many black students, like their white

counterparts, attended substandard, overcrowded, illequipped schools, often receiving instruction from
unqualified teachers.

During Reconstruction, the entire

system of education in Louisiana was in an experimental
stage, made moredifficult
aftermath. Asrecently

by the exigiences of warand its
as1862, New Orleans possessed four

distinct school systems, representing the city's four
municipal districts.

Only the Second Municipal district

had attempted to provide adequate funds for its schools.
During Reconstruction, opposition to taxes for
education increased as charges of political corruption
•

•

,

became more frequent and vitriolic.

132

••

Historian Horace

Mann Bond's contention that, "in Louisiana, the scarcity of
funds for operating the schools resulted in an almost
complete absence of public funds outside of the large
t

cities," gave too much credit to New Orleans.

133

In truth,

the situation in New Orleans was only slightly better than
in the rural parishes.

Each of the three superintendents

often commented on the lack of school revenues.

"For many

years the appropriations for public education in this
city— always inadequate— have remained about the same, in
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disregard of the increase of population," lamented one of
them, John B. Carter.134
During the period of school desegregation, school
officials focused on the many problems associated with
administering a growing school system chronically short of
revenues.

Black leaders and parents also concerned

themselves with the larger issue of how to provide the city
with good public schools.135 Enough opposition to the mixed
school idea remained, necessitating constant vigilance and
defense of the experiment in desegregated education.
The organization of the New Orleans Schools remained
the same throughout the 1860s and 1870s, consisting of
primary, grammar, and high schools.

The overwhelming

majority of students attended primary or grammar schools.
To meet the demand for them, the city's thirteen districts
contained at least two, or often, more schools.

For

example, in 1872, nine of the thirteen districts had four
or more grammar or primary schools.

The Twelfth District

possessed the most schools, twelve, and had the third
largest school age population.136 Only three schools
offered instruction beyond the grammar grade level.
Enrollment throughout the period decreased at the higher
grade levels.

During the 1872-1873 school year, for

example, 16,259 of the 19,747 primary and grammar students
were between the ages of six and twelve.

1*V7
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Table 2
Total Enrollment in the New Orleans Public Schools, 1867187513*

Year

Black

White

1867

4,378

17,190

21,568

1868

3,626

18,379

22,005

1869

5,225

18,059

23,284

Total

1870

17,142

1871

19,091

1872

19,819

1873

20,263

1874

25,215

1875

26,251
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Many students entered school house doors for the first
time because of the educational initiatives of the 1860s
and 1870s.

State Superintendent of Education, William G.

Brown expressed the new emphasis on universal education,
"There is no force as powerful to lift mankind from a
position of dependence and narrow, circumscribed life as
education.

It is the laborers' faithful friend and

counselor, standing sentinel to guard his liberties, to
render a helping hand in the hour of perplexity and doubt,
the good genius that enables him to overcome the
difficulties and embarrasments of the hour, and achieve
success."

139

Brown's comments represented an appreciation

of the role education could play in the development of the
black community.

When Brown left office in 1877 blacks had

taken the first steps toward community development and
educational attainment.

It was already apparent, however,

that each succeeding step would be met with resistance.
The first stage of educational attainment had involved a
struggle for inclusion and desegregation; the next stage
involved the contest to decide blacks' "proper place."
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Chapter Two
Education and the Struggle for Blacks'
Proper Place, 1877-1900

Recent scholarship has provided a corrective to the
belief that the Hayes-Tilden election of 1877 represented a
sharp and abrupt change in the decade-old program of
Congressional Reconstruction.

Hayes' decision to withdraw

the last of the federal troops from the South was only one
of many significant events that helped return the South to
"home-rule."

Before 1877 even the staunchest

interventionist realized, given the level of white
hostility and violence, it would take a major commitment by
the federal government to sustain effective black political
participation.

The nation's leaders, however, thought it

best to return the "Negro Question" to the region where the
problem resided— the South.

Northerners, as well as

southerners, turned their attention to what they considered
a more important agenda, the building of an industrialized
North and a New South with an industrial emphasis.

The

importance of protecting the civil rights of blacks paled
in importance by comparison.1
In the mid-1870s public interest in education
declined as city leaders— both black and white—
concentrated on the raging battle for political control of
the city.

The competing groups camouflaged themselves with

53
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party labels, but they fought over whether newly
enfranchised blacks would continue meaningful political
participation.

The black community, led by such political

stalwarts as P.B.S. Pinchback and C. C. Antoine, eventually
lost the battle for political participation and with it
some of the educational momentum generated between 1868 and
1877.2
Blacks in general, and those in New Orleans in
particular, did not passively acquiesce in the decision to
reduce them to an inferior status in society.

Throughout

the last two decades of the nineteenth century, they
continued their attempts to vote and to influence political
decisions.

Nevertheless, the status of blacks deteriorated

in small increments, not in one climactic fall.

More than

the decline in political participation, however, adversely
affected black education.

The amount of money spent on

black schools depended on the health of the city's economy,
the attitude of white political leaders, and the level of
protest by black leaders and parents.3 Black education, in
other words, remained hostage to white political supremacy,
inadequate revenues for the entire system, and racist
thought concerning the proper level of education for
blacks.
The resolution of Louisiana's second disputed election
of the decade brought, along with ''home rule," Robert M.
Lusher back into office as State Superintendent of
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Education, replacing William G. Brown.

During the period

of the Republican ascendancy, Lusher had served as
Louisiana's agent for the Peabody Fund and administered the
fund to finance a private school system for whites.4 He
returned to public office in 1877 determined to amend "the
anomalous provisions of Articles 135 and 136 of the State
Constitution."

With the Democrats in power Lusher

expressed confidence that the new legislature would not
"delay in replacing these articles by more acceptable
provisions for the mental instruction and moral training of
the two races, in separate schools, with equal facilities
and advantages for both."5
Lusher, described by one scholar as a "dogmatic white
supremacist," had no intention of providing blacks with
equal school facilities.6 In his estimation blacks should
receive, at most, a primary school education in preparation
for employment as unskilled workers.

He was less

interested in providing equal education than he was in
implementing resegregation.

Lusher believed "that nine-

tenths of our colored fellow citizens prefer separate
schools for the education of their children, and that the
desire to enter white schools, in contravention of the
natural law, is peculiar to children of mixed white and
colored blood, whose parents have always been free."7 To
satisfy the black Creoles, who he thought did not want to
associate with dark-skinned blacks, Lusher proposed the
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establishment of a three tiered school system with separate
schools for whites, black creoles, and blacks.8 Operating
a dual system would prove costly enough and the three
tiered system never took hold.
Lusher directed his attention to New Orleans, where
desegregation still existed.

Before Lusher could implement

his plan of school segregation he had to remove the
incumbent school board whose members had blocked "the
sunlight of peace and reconciliation," by allowing mixed
schools.9 Using the appointive power contained in a new
school act of March 1877 and following recommendations made
by the state legislature, Lusher appointed eight members to
the new twenty member school board.

The other twelve

members were named by the Board of Administrators
(Commission Council). The school superintendent and the
city treasurer served as ex-officio members.

Four of the

new members were black— George H. Fayerweather, Louis A.
Martinet, Joseph A. Craig, and Pascal M. Tourne.

All of

them except Craig had received state appointments.10
During their bid for control of state government, the
Democratic "Redeemers" had promised to assure continued
black participation in politics.

They made it clear,

however, that black participation would be minor.11 The
four black appointees represented an attempt by the
Democrats to keep their promise, at least for a time.
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The new board organized on 4 April 1877 and elected
Thomas J. Semmes president.

It named William 0. Rogers

Superintendent, a post he had held in the 1860s.

Rogers,

like Semmes, and most of the board members, wanted the
schools resegregated as soon as possible.

But certain

problems, primarily a lack of revenues, forced them to
retain mixed schools until the end of the school year.
They spent the next two months trying to operate the school
system on a 25,000 dollar a month budget.12
On 6 June board member Archibald Mitchell moved "that
a committee of three be appointed, who in

conjunction with

the superintendent shall report at their earliest
convenience what changes may be necessary to effect a more
thorough discipline in the Public Schools...."13
Mitchell's motion may have been vague, but his colleagues
understood its intent.

The appeal for a "more thorough

discipline" was actually a call to resegregate the schools.
President Semmes appointed Mitchell, Joseph Collins, and
Robert Bartley to the committee.

Less than three weeks

later the committee had completed its report.
At a special meeting on 22 June the board sought to
codify white sentiment for a racially segregated school
system.

Mitchell outlined the rationale for it in his

committee's report to the board.

"Personal observation and

universal testimony," he stated, "concur to establish the
fact that public education has greatly deteriorated since
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colored and white children were admitted indiscriminately
into the same schools."

Detrimental effects of

desegregated schools, the committee members contended,
included a decline in white enrollment since white parents
refused to send their children to desegregated schools.
Blacks also suffered because of the "turbulent spirit" of
whites, manifested most demonstratively in the school
disturbances of December 1874.

Mitchell was "not reluctant

to recommend separation because [he] believe[d]...both
races favor[ed] separate schools."

To give added weight to

their proposal the committee members pointed out that they
believed northern cities such as New York, Philadelphia,
and Cincinnati also had separate schools.14
Desegregated schools were not the only practice under
attack at the special meeting.

To their horror, supporters

of public education learned that the same three member
committee recommended the discontinuation of all high
schools.

The committee offered the familiar reason for

such a drastic step— a lack of funds.

But Mitchell went on

to explain that "whilst recommending the measure as a
financial necessity alone we do not deem it improper to
state that we do not regard our High Schools as
indispensable requisite to an efficient system of public
education, and are inclined to believe that teaching
advanced studies at the public expense is an abuse of our
educational system."15 The committee's report and
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Mitchell's statement in support of closing the high schools
indicated the lack of broad based support for public
education in the city of New Orleans.

The lack of

financial support by the community hampered the entire
educational system, especially the educational
opportunities for blacks.

The board, however, decided to

defer action on the two proposals until the next meeting.16
Black leaders responded to the proposal to resegregate
the schools by appealing to Governor Nicholls to intervene
before the board voted.

Aristide Mary, a black landowner

who had been active in the struggle for suffrage and civil
rights, led a delegation of blacks who met with the
governor.

The group denounced the board's plan, but

Nicholls simply replied that his pledge to promote black
equality did not include support for desegregation.
Frustrated in their attempt to gain the support of
Nicholls, black leaders tried a more direct approach.18
When the board met on 3 July 1877, a large delegation
of blacks attended and presented a lengthy petition
protesting separate schools.

Again, Mary provided

leadership and counsel to the black protestors.

The board

received the petition, took no action on it, and proceeded
with its agenda.

Without rancor or rhetoric, the spokesman

for the segregationist forces, Archibald Mitchell, offered
a motion to resegregate the races:
Whereas: This board, in the performance of its
paramount duty; which is to give the best
education possible with the means at its disposal
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to the whole population, without regard to race,
color or previous condition, is assured that this
end can be best attained by educatina the
different races in separate schools.
The proposal to resegregate the schools passed by a
vote of fifteen to three.

Three of the black members cast

the only dissenting votes— Martinet, Fayerweather, and
Toume.

The other black member, Joseph Craig, voted with

the majority.20 Why did Craig vote to end the experiment
with mixed schools?

Neither Craig, nor any other member,

gave a reason for his vote so a definitive answer remains
elusive, but available evidence suggests one or two
plausible reasons.

Craig supported the Democratic Party

and according to one source was the founder of a "colored
conservative club."21 The term "conservative" in Craig's
case probably meant an acceptance of the "Redeemers" pledge
of peace between the races based on a policy of "separate
but equal."

Craig's vote could have reflected the belief

that separate schools would lead to improved race
relations.

On the other hand, his vote may have been

merely a gesture to the politicians that placed him on the
board.22
Craig's vote, of course, had no influence on the final
decisions to resegregate the schools.

Even if blacks had

voted as a "block" they were, as Governor Nicholls aptly
phrased it, "sandwiched in" without control.

The

significance of Craig's vote lies outside the school board
and its decision to resegregate the schools, but within the
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development of the black community.

For over a decade

black leaders had waged a battle for suffrage, civil
equality, and acceptance into the larger society.

Some of

their deeds during Reconstruction were petty and venal, but
the articulated ideology that made it possible for them to
serve had its tap-roots deep into basic American values—
democracy, equal opportunity, and equality before the law.
The withdrawal of federal troops, its impact powerfully
more symbolic than real, and the inauguration of the
Nicholls administration presented the black community with
its first ideological crisis.

At what point should

principles give way to pragmatism?

Craig's vote signaled

the beginning of that ideological struggle.

He had

apparently chosen not to fight on principle but to seek a
practical accord with white supremacists.

But the men of

principle had not yet surrendered the field.
The board acted on its segregation motion during the
summer recess, therefore, concerned black leaders had time
to formulate a response.

It is difficult to assess how

many blacks favored desegregated schools or accepted the
pragmatism implicit in Craig's vote.
existed within the community.

At least two views

Many blacks had never

enjoyed the benefits associated with desegregated schools.
At most only twenty to twenty-five percent of black
students attended mixed schools.

Yet all had suffered

verbal abuse, mob intimidation, and physical violence in
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the cause of desegregation.

Those who had gained little if

anything from integration, but still suffered as much from
white violence, considered segregation as a possible
prerequisite to ending race-related violence.

Therefore,

some blacks welcomed the return to segregated schools,
though were neither as vocal nor as organized as those who
remained committed to the battle for an integrated
society.23
Blacks held several meetings throughout the city in
response to what they considered a crisis.

According to

the Weekly Louisianian, a local black newspaper, attendance
at the meetings was "large and enthusiastic."

The

participants adopted resolutions condemning the board for
violating the 1868 State Constitution that had prohibited
the establishment of separate schools.

Black leaders

thought they had legitimate grounds for legal action and
decided to contest the board's decision in court.
Attorneys filed a suit in the Sixth District Court on
behalf of Paul Trevigne, a black teacher, former editor of
L'Union, and former school board member.24

The presiding

judge, N. H. Rightor, issued a temporary restraining order
forbidding the school board from proceeding with the
resegregation plan.25
On 23 October 1877, however, Judge Rightor lifted the
restraining order and dismissed Trevigne's suit.

He ruled

that Trevigne had failed to show personal injury and had
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filed the suit after the board had resegregated the
schools.

By using these grounds to dismiss the suit, Judge

Rightor skirted the central issue in the case— the
constitutionality of the board's plan.

Article 135 of the

1868 Constitution forbade separate schools, yet the school
board had adopted and instituted measures to accomplish
what the constitution would not allow.

Rightor chose not

to attempt the difficult task of reconciling law with
(’'immunity sentiment.

The next judge to hear a similar case

from the black community displayed no such misgiving.26
Arnold Bertonneau, a black merchant, Civil War
veteran, and delegate to the 1867-1868 Constitutional
Convention, also filed a suit opposing resegregation.27
Bertonneau attempted to avoid the legal fate of Trevigne by
demonstrating specific injury from the school board's
policy.

He attempted to register his children in the

Fillmore School without success and in his suit charged the
school board and its agents with violating his civil
rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, and Article 135 of the
State Constitution. 28
Judge W. B. Woods did not reach a decision until
fifteen months later; in the meantime the black and white
communities argued the merits of the case in the press.
The New Orleans Times. anti-black but without the virulence
of the New Orleans Daily States, came out forcefully in
favor of separate schools.

29

The Times' editors thought
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Pinchback had orchestrated the continued struggle for mixed
schools and speculated that he was "too shrewwd a man to
cherish such an absurd and impractical scheme, too adroit
and frugal a politician to waste time in pursuit of a
chimera."

The combative and equally committed Pinchback,

through his newspaper, the Louisianian, replied that, "As
citizens and taxpayers entitled to the protection of the
courts, we are therein to prevent the perpetuation of a
great wrong upon us. . . .11 Articulating the hopes of many
blacks, Pinchback optimistically stated, "we do not despair
of ultimate success.1,31
In February 1879 Judge Woods reached his decision in
favor of the school board.

The establishment of separate

schools based on race was not a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, according to Judge Woods.

He compared racial

separation in schools to sex separation, a widely
practice.

accepted

Under the desegregation policy adopted by the

board, "both races are treated precisely alike.

White

children and colored children are compelled to attend
different schools.

That is all.

The State, while

conceding equal privileges and advantages to both races,
has the right to manage its schools in the manner which in
its judgement will best promote the interest of all."32
Judge Wood cited an Ohio law, upheld by the Ohio Supereme
Court, that required separate schools.

The Daily Picayune

agreed and provided an extension to the judge's remarks:
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" . . . the constitution of the United States does not
create schools or confer on any body any right in any
school in any state.

Hence, the constitution of the United

States cannot be invoked to set aside or modify any
regulations on the subject of education that the State may
choose to make.1,33 The courts eventually extended that
belief to cover all areas of race relations in the South.
The struggle for desegregated schools revealed some
interesting truths about race relations, politics, and the
role of education in post-Reconstruction New Orleans.

The

argument that separate schools repesented inferior schools
would have to await the bitter lesson of experience.

Black

efforts at desegregation at this time centered on the
proposition that the schools should serve as an example of
racial harmony to the larger community.

"Every

discrimination which is maintained against us is a blow
upon us," the editor of the Tribune had argued, "and will
have an influence to postpone the realization of equality
before the law and impartial protection to our people."35
Separate schools represented the antithesis of a nation of
"one people," the Reconstruction goal of the black
community.
Whites also interpreted desegregated schools as a
harbinger of a nation of "one people," and that is why they
fought to eliminate them.

Any type of interaction between

the races that failed to demonstrate or buttress white

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

66
supremacy, whites viewed as an attempt by blacks to gain
social equality.

Less than one generation removed from the

institution of slavery, whites had little tolerance for the
twin evils of mixed schools and social equality.

The state

elections in 1876 failed to answer all of the political and
social questions of the day, but did lead to a white
consensus on the separation of the races.

Although

Archibald Mitchell, other school officials, and city
leaders expressed a willingness to provide blacks with
educational opportunities, they emphatically rejected
desegregated schools.
Race relations, politics, and education remained
intertwined during this period, with improved black
education inextricably dependent on the retention of
effective black suffrage and a degree of racial harmony
within the community.

Race relations, but more important,

the education blacks received, declined over time: 1877
marked a great departure but not a sudden end.

Before the

complete ascendancy of the "radical racists" in the 1890s,
blacks continued to vote, though not always freely.

36

Blacks continued to hold elective and appointive offices
until the turn of the century.

The numbers decreased

significantly, however, in the 1880s and 1890s.

37

Nonetheless, their presence and the black vote helped to
forstall the harsher manifestations of white supremacy that
surfaced in the 1890s and reigned until the 1940s.38
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The State Constitution of 1879, enacted after the
Redeemers' gained power, did not place any specific
disabilities on black suffrage and the delegates passed a
resolution "assuring the Negro that his newly acquired
rights would not be jeopardized or imparied.I|39 Nearly two
decades would pass before Louisiana voters gained another
opportunity to express their views on the subject.

Several

provisions in the 1879 Constitution affected the black
community, two of them related to education.

The

constitution addressed the issue of desegregated elementary
and secondary schools by making no reference to them at
all.40 On the other hand, the constitution contained a
race-specific article (231) regarding higher education.
Rather than use a constitutional measure to exclude blacks
from the existing universities attended by whites, it
stipulated that, "The General Assembly shall also establish
in the city of New Orleans a university for the education
of persons of color; provide for its proper government, and
shall make an annual appropriation of not less than five
thousand dollars nor more than ten thousand dollars for its
maintenance and support.1'41
In 1880 lawmakers passed the necessary enabling
legislation and Southern University, nurtured into
existence by black politicians P.B.S. Pinchback and T. T.
Allain, opened in 1881 as a state university for blacks.
It opened at a time when many blacks had abandoned the
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belief that a racially integrated society could exist in
the South.

Southern University represented an attempt by

some blacks to live and adjust in the post-Reconstruction
South.

For nearly four decades Southern would provide

black New Orleanians with their only source of public
secondary education.
however,

Integrationist sentiment lingered,

and some prominent blacks assailed Pinchback for

his support of Southern.42 Pinchback faced the issue
squarely and admitted that establishment and attendance at
Southern "will deprive us of a great part of our civil
rights."

Nonetheless, in words strikingly similar to those

of W.E.B. DuBois over a half century later, Pinchback
attempted to justify his position.

"However true this may

be," he asserted, "it is but sentimental when we recognize
the fact, that there is not in this state, nay, I venture
to say in the whole South a single institution of learning
where the colored and white children are educated
together....What we want is education, whether it be
acquired in a mixed or colored school it must be had....I|43
Pinchback's pragmatic pronouncements failed to
convince his critics.

Some opponents believed that the

acquiescence of black delegates at the Convention gave "the
appearance of consenting to their own debasement."

Support

for Southern, they charged, "helped to create a system they
knew would deprive the black children of the advantage of
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education available to other children in the state."

Much

of the criticism against Pinchback and other black
supporters of Article 231 came from the black Creole
community.

Aristide Mary referred to the Article as the

"Black League in the Constitution."44 Mary and other
critics argued "that this line of demarcation, once
established, chiefly by their consent, would serve as the
basis and the pretext for other measures contrary to the
interests and rights of our citizens."45 Both groups had
seen the future; the quarrel between them centered on how
best to respond.
The immediate effect of "home rule" on black education
was a return to segregated schools admist pronouncements of
equal facilities.

School officials provided secondary

education to blacks by conducting a high shool in a rented
building.

Although separated, black students in the high

school classes had "skillful and experienced teachers, and
the school appear[ed] to be steadily increasing in favor
among the class which it is designed to benefit,"
Superintendent Rogers stated.

Sixteen blacks enrolled in

the secondary school that first year and twenty-five the
next.

Attendance at the school declined during the 1879-

1880 school year, and the board discontinued secondary
education for blacks.47
The decision to abolish the black high school could be
excused as wise and prudent because of the reduction of
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students.

Indeed, school board members often defended

their actions by pointing out that few blacks had taken
advantage of high school facilities when they were
available.

But the board's refusal in subsequent years to

reestablish the school when demand increased demonstrated
its failure to recognize the changing educational needs of
the black community.

Nevertheless, even after the public

high school closed, blacks did have access to a high school
education.

Unlike their counterparts in many other areas,

black New Orleanians benefited from the establishment of
several colleges founded to educate the freedmen.

Of the

four black colleges established in the two decades after
the Civil War— New Orleans, Leland, Southern, and Straight
Universities— Southern was the only public college.
Throughout their early existence the colleges attempted to
address centuries of black educational neglect and provided
instruction beginning at the primary school level.49
Such alternatives to public education relieved some of
the pressure on school officials
opportunities for blacks.

to enhance educational

Several years after

discontinuing the black high school, school officials
cooperated with Southern University to have eligible public
school children transferred to Southern for secondary work.
The agreement developed from a series of meetings between
members of the Southern Board of Trustees and school board
members.

Southern officials agreed to admit students who
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had completed the sixth or seventh grade and to stop
admitting students below that level.

The agreement worked

to the advantage of the board, since it eliminated the need
for the board to offer secondary education to blacks.

The

board maintained some control over admission to Southern by
requiring Southern officials to give entrance examinations
only to students recommended by the superintendent.

The

board also exercised influence by apparently subsidizing
the tuition of students who entered Southern after
completing grammar school.

The first group of students

admitted to Southern under the new arrangement started
school in January 1885.50
Perhaps the black community believed that the
secondary facilities provided by several colleges
adequately met its needs.

Before the turn of the century

the school board received few petitions or communications
from black citizens complaining about inadequate high
school facilities.

In the early twentieth century the

upsurge in petitions requesting a black high school
represented the black community's response to the declining
availability of private secondary education.51 The decline
occurred, in part, because of the desire of the area black
colleges to become colleges in fact as well as in name.

As

the colleges grew they started to offer and emphasize a
college level course of study.

They no longer wanted to

provide extensive work at the high school level.

Their
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reorientation also reflected the moderate, but nonetheless
discernible, growth in black educational advancement.

A

final factor in the changed focus of the black colleges was
the growing belief that the black community needed a
trained professional class of teachers, ministers,
physicians, and lawyers.52
The average black, however, entertained no such lofty
professional goals.

Obtaining a grammar school education

constituted a formidable enough quest.

Between 1877 and

1900 much of the collective energy of the black community
centered on public education at the primary and grammar
grades.

The larger community shared the same concern.

Therefore, education and public school policy were main
points of interest in the city.

Black leaders knew that if

white education suffered black education would fare much
worse.

They watched and sympathized with white community

leaders as they attempted to administer a school system
chronically short of money.

Revenues for the schools came

from state and city appropriations, and the poll tax.53
The board rarely received the amount requested in its
budget to the city council.

The poll tax, the only tax

specifically dedicated to education, accounted for a small
percentage of the annual budget.

For example, in 1878 the

poll tax collected only totaled $746.25.

New Orleanians

paid the poll tax reluctantly, when they paid it at all.
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The superintendents who held office during this period
spoke often of the need for additional school revenues.
"Our schools cannot be conducted successfully,"
Superintendent Rogers disclosed, "as now organized, upon
uncertain revenues."55 In the Democrats' zeal to undo the
work of the Republicans, monies appropriated to education
plummeted.56 The school budget for a typical year during
Reconstruction, 1 July 1874 to 30 June 1875, was $480,496.
In December 1877, Rogers submitted the first budget under
the Democrats to the commission council requesting
$303,678.

Were the Democrats more efficient?

No, the

saving came from a 40 percent reduction in teachers'
salaries.57 An inadequately financed educational system
victimized not just blacks but the entire community; blacks
suffered disproportionately, but they did not suffer alone.
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Table 3
Estimated or Actual Expenditures for Selected Years

Year

Expenditure

1874

479,554

1877

303,687

1882

279,316

1886

305,536

58

Annual Budget, 188259

Teachers Salaries

$229,006.45

Superintendent's Office

4,200.00

Officers of the Bd., Secy.

3,000.00

Custodians

13,213.00

Fuel

1,510.75

Rent

7,945.85

Repairs

9,992.45

Supplies and Current Expenses

6,541.20

Sites and Buildings

2,500.00

Furniture

Total

1,406.45

279,316.15
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With little financial support from either the city or
the state, the school system passed through one financial
crisis after another.

Insufficient school revenues worked

a tremendous hardship on the teachers.

They labored for

small salaries that sometimes fluctuated annually and they
often went months without any compensation.

For example,

New Orleans teachers received no pay between September and
December 1878.

The next year brought little relief as they

went from October 1879 to March 1880 without pay.

The

board attempted to borrow fifty thousand dollars to meet
the January and February payrolls for 1880 but was unable
to.

The sad litany of unmet payrolls continued throughout

the 1880s.60
Financial problems affected more than the salaries of
school teachers.

The lack of revenues often forced school

officials to postpone needed repairs to deteriorating
buildings.

Although the city owned the schoool buildings,

the mayor and council members contended that the school
board was responsible for their maintenance and repairs.
School officials, on the other hand, believed the
responsibility rested with the city and constantly asked
council members for money to make repairs.

Their requests

usually fell on unreceptive ears because the city also had
pressing budget problems.

61

An occasional infusion of cash

and a upsurge in civic pride sometimes led to a favorable
response, though.

School board members employed a more
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direct but just as ineffective approach in August 1877.

In

a letter to the mayor and Commisssion Council, they
outlined the urgent maintenance needs of many of the
schools and threatened not to use the buildings unless the
city funded repairs.

When the council still refused to

provide the money, board members, conscious of the need "to
protect life and limb" of the students, voted to make
emergency repairs not to exceed a cost of two thousand
dollars.

The maintenance and repair of school buildings

remained a problem for the board.62
Segregated within a system that experienced constant
revenue shortages, could not always pay its teachers, and
failed to make timely repairs on its buildings, how did
black education fare?

Did the state of black education in

New Orelans during the post-Reconstruction period justify
Pinchback's pragmatism regarding segregation?
events prove Aristide Mary correct?

Or, did

The highly visible

black campaign for suffrage, civil equality, and
desegregated schools, had existed alongside problems
related to employment, housing, and adjustment to
freedom.

63

Black leaders and parents expressed and

demonstrated a commitment to education throughout the 1880s
and 1890s, but could not always translate the commitment
into practice.

Black public education in the years

immediately following the black compromise of 1879
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appreared to justify Pinchback's position.

But Mary had

cast his glance farther into the future, and realized that
a principle once conceded was difficult to recover.

The

educational needs of the black community expanded, the
narrow view of whites on the same subject did not.

But

that took two decades to develop; in the interim blacks had
to slowly build and maintain an educational tradition.

It

started at the primary and grammar school levels.
The attitude of school officials at the beginning of
the period reflected the paternalistic ideology of the
Redeemers and continued to exist for several years after
the Redeemers had suffered the political fate of their
Republican predecessors.

"Whether in improved methods of

instruction, modes of discipline, school accomodations or
provision for the convenience and comfort of teacher and
scholar, "Superintendent Rogers maintained in 1878, "there
has been no distinction to the prejudice of any class.65
Several years later Rogers expressed similar views.

"They

share impartially in all educational means at the disposal
of the board," he stated.

Roger's successor in office,

Ulric Bettison, echoed Rogers'sentiments and both wanted to
see an increase in black enrollment. 67
As several scholars, most notably C. Vann Woodward,
have contended, race relations in the years following
Reconstruction remained in a state of flux that affected
black education.68 When school officials spoke on the
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subject of black education they usually assured the black
community of continued support.

Whites had not yet seized

on the idea of using education, or more accurately the
denial of education, as a means of oppression or black
degradation.69 Rather than promoting oppression,
degradation, or schooling them for slavery, many whites
shared Superintendent Rogers' view that schools would
assist blacks in "acquiring habits of industry:

learning,

directly or indirectly, those lessons of virtue and
intelligence, which are designed to make them better, more
useful, as individuals, and as members of society"70
School officials translated their statements into
policy by attempting to provide blacks with adequate school
facilities.

During the first year under the resegregated

system blacks had the use of twenty-three primary and
grammar schools.

Two of the schools, McDonogh Nos. 5 and

6, were "fine large, brick buildings, ornaments to the
city."71 When school superintendents made recommendations
for new buildings and maintenance they usually included
black schools.

As a result, the conditions of black
■w

schools were comparable to white schools/21 This would
later change but did indicate that at one point "forgotten
alternatives" existed.
Black public school enrollment remained static and in
some years declined.

School officials used several

reporting categories to monitor student attendance— number
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of students registered, number enrolled, average of daily
roll, and average daily attendance.

Absolute comparisons

are virtually impossible because school officials did not
use the same reporting categories each year.

Additionally,

at times they reported figures by calendar year and at
other times by school year.

Available statistics, however,

provide a good indication of changes in school attendance.
In 1877 the number of blacks enrolled in school stood at
4,338 and a year later had risen to 6,856, an increase of
2,518.
in 1878.

The average attendance was 3,025 in 1877 and 5,625
By the 1887 school year enrollment and attendance

had experienced a sharp decrease.

Only 6,029 enrolled in

school and the average attendance for the year was 3,042.
Enrollment had increased to 6,013 during the 1898-1899
school year with an average attendance of 3,746.73 An
upsurge in black enrollment did not occur until the
twentieth century.
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Table 4
New Orleans Public School Enrollment74

Year

Black

White

1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900

4,338
6,856
6.654
5.595
5,473
5,540
4,511
4,955
4,752
5,306
6.029
6,042
4,858
5,426
5,592
5,436
4,929
5,441
6,126
5,855
6,117
6,013
6.221
6,662

15,169
17,294
17,670
15,316
18,928
19,427
17,130
18,227
19,579
19,555
19,620
20,930
16,278
17,974
17,617
18,454
18,559
19,829
21,274
22,673
23,597
23,509
24,549
24,859

Total
19,507
24,150
24,324
20,911
24,401
24,976
21,641
23,182
24,331
24,861
17,954
26,972
21,136
23,400
23,209
23,840
23,488
25,270
27,400
28,528
29,713
29,522
30,770
31,521
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The black students who atteneded school received until
the 1890s a "range of studies...common to all the
schools."75 The emphasis remained on English, math,
writing, history, geography, and penmanship.

The level of

difficulty and specific topics covered varied at each grade
level.

All schools, including those for blacks, used the

same books.

Unfortunately, during this period parents

often had to purchase the necessary books for their
children, so many students attended school without books or
other school supplies.

Black students who enrolled in

school and attended regularly progressed at the same rate
as white students.

Age-grade averages for 1887 revealed no

consistent statistical differences— blacks had lower
figures for some grades and higher for others.

Teachers,

with limited oversight from the principals, determined
student promotion.

Attendance, class performance, and

exams served as the standard criteria for promotion.
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Table 5
Age-Grade Averages, 187778

Year

Black
Male

First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh

8.6
10.2
10.6
11.1
11.8
12.5
13.9

Female
8.6
10.1
11.1
11.4
12.8
13.5
13.9

White
Male
8.0
9.8
10.7
11.8
12.8
13.1
13.6

Female
7.6
9.4
10.4
11.4
12.2
13.2
13.7

High School Entrance Examination Questions77
History, Geography and Civil Government
1.
For what do we remember John Cabot? John Smith?
Thomas Jefferson? Henry Clay? Abraham Lincoln?
2. Name the states bordering the Mississippi River.
3. What war was waged during Polk's administration?
Name the two generals who most distinguished themselves in
the war.
4. What three departments of government were established
by the Constitution? What is the duty of each?
Grammar
1.
In what three ways may a dependent clause be used?
Give an example of each.
2.
Write a single declarative sentence; a simple
interrogative sentence; a simple imperative sentence; a
simple exclamatory sentence.
3.
Correct the following: "Lets you and I go in" "I do
not know who to blame." "Indeed herewith I send you a
dollar." "He spoke of you failing to come." "He consulted
Webster and Walker's dictionary."
4.
Analyze by diagram or otherwise: "He gave me an apple
this morning.
Etymology, Penmanship and Composition
1. What is a prefix? A root? A suffix?
2. Write a composition of not less than one hundred words
on one of the following subjects: Mardi Gras,
Public Schools, Iron; or, you may write a letter.
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Arithmetic
1.
Define greatest common divisor. Define least common
multiple. Find the greatest common divisor of 374, 714,
and 1,020. Find the least common multiple of 15, 30, and
60.
2.
(a) Find the value of 231.04 + 2.64/.024-2.64 x .024.
(b) Find the cube root of 2.3 to 3rd decimal place.
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The public school curriculum continued to emphasize
academic subjects with a few business related courses
offered in the high schools.

Black instruction followed

the same trend, but without the business courses.

Neither

blacks nor whites received manual or industrial training in
the public schools.

School officials first gave serious

consideration to manual training in 1896 because of
interest generated by the Mechanics' Dealers' and
Lumbermen's Exchange.
The group forwarded to the board a copy of a
resolution that described the benefits of manual training
in glowing terms.

They wanted the establishment of a

minimum of two manual training schools.

The board

responded by naming a special committee to gather
information concerning manual education and the feasibility
of such a course of study in New Orleans.

The special

committee wasted little time and issued its report at the
next meeting.78
The board members learned that national interest in
manual training had increased because of the Centennial
Exposition held in Philadelphia in 1876.

There spectators

and educators had marveled at the sophistication and skill
of the work done by Russian and Swedish children.

New York

led the way and started offering manual training at five
public schools in 1888.

After its inception in New York,

the manual training idea quickly gained favor throughout
the country.

The committee members thought it was time for
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New Orleans to join other leading cities and recommended
that the board secure permission from the State Board of
Education to begin offering manual classes.

Although

enthusiastic, the committee members suggested a cautious
start.

For secondary students they recommended providing

instruction in wood working and the proper use of tools.
Participating students would receive two hours of
instruction twice a week.

After agreeing to make changes

if necessary, the full board adopted the report.

Budget

limitations, however, prevented the board from implementing
the recommendtion. Even if it had gone into operation, the
proposal did not include blacks.79
School board members failed to consider manual
training for blacks because by 1896 the educational
aspirations of the black

community and the board's

commitment to black education had diverged.

The 1890s and

the following decade were the "crucial" period for blacks.
The genteel paternalism that had existed at the start of
the 1880s had all but disappeared by 1890.

on

The white

South had closed ranks on the "Negro Question" as
effectively as it had done on the "Slavery Question" forty
years earlier.

Moreover, during the process, northerners

were conspicious by their silence, at least as voices of
dissent.81
Louisiana joined the rush to Jim Crowism in 1890 with
the passage of a railroad car bill mandating separate but
equal seating for blacks and whites.

Other segregation
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laws followed, separating or excluding blacks from street
cars, railroad terminals, restaurants, hotels, and places
of entertainment.82 The laws had little to do with
altering existing behavior.

They represented the

ideological statement of a dominant group.

Many blacks

would later leave the South as some had already done, most
noticeably in the 1870s.

Most stayed, however, and some

resisted.
"It was in 1890 that the Citizens' Committee was
formed, when a return to exaggerated fanaticsim about caste
or segregation once again alarmed the black people....

We

were face to face with a government determined to develop
and establish a system by which a portion of the people
M

would have to submit to the rest."

So began an account

by one of the participants who tried to prevent the
complete legal subjugation of black New Orleanians.

The

black response to the railroad segregation law encompassed
all the elements of legal protest in America.

Various

elements of the community's black leadership participated
in the protest, but the black Creoles were the driving
force throughout the period of litigation.84
Louis A. Martinet emerged as the leader of the protest
against the railroad car bill.

Martinet, a former state

representative, school board member, and attorney, had
recently started publishing the Crusader, a black
newspaper.

In his editorials, Martinet attempted to

recapture the militancy of the New Orleans Tribune which
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had ceased publication in 1870.

As the "men of Tribune"

had done before him, Martinet promised to fight without
compromise.

AS

Martinet and other black leaders tried to

defeat the bill before it became law.

They first formed

the American Citizens' Equal Rights Association, drew up a
protest petition and presented it to the legislature.
Intimately aware of the support throughout the South
for segregation laws, they "protest[ed] against the passage
of any class legislation now pending before the General
Assembly, or which may hereafter come before the honorable
body...."

They appealed to the legislators to remain true

to their professed values of justice and equality, and
found it "difficult to conceive how any caste legislation
can maintain the sacredness of these truly American
principles

"

They also offered a Biblical argument:

"men should not do unto others what they do not wish should
be done unto them."

Blacks knew the proposed laws "would

be a free license to the evilly-disposed that they might
with impunity insult, humiliate and otherwise maltreat
oe

inoffensive persons...."

For all those reasons and more

they appealed," in the name of God and the constitution...
that the chalice of political bitterness may be snatched
from the grasp of intolerant persons and made to melt into
the sacred fires of patriotic mercy."87
Political expediency rather than adherence to the
siren call of justice and morality temporarily halted the
march of Jim Crowism.

The legislature still contained a
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few black members, and they opposed the railroad bill.
After the bill fell three votes short of passage in the
Senate, the New Orleans Times Democrat chided the Senate
"because it placed Louisiana in opposition to the other
Southern States, and ...the failure will be misunderstood
by the Negroes and produce unpleasant results."88 A bill
once defeated could, of course, rise again. This one did.
On 10 July 1890 Act 111, "to promote the comfort of
passengers on railway trains; requiring all railway
companies carrying passengers on their trains, in the
state, to provide equal but separate accomodations for the
white and colored races...," became law.89
Martinet castigated the black "political men" for
their naivety at best or, at worst, their crass dishonesty.
"They worked," according to Martinet, "with might and main
against the bill, no doubt, but after it was too late."90
Many of the black legislators aligned themselves with the
state's infamous lottery interest and voted for the
lottery's extension, ostensibly in exchange for white
support to defeat the separate railroad car bill.

After

the lottery bill passed, Act 111 gained approval three days
later.

91

Protest and the legislative process having

failed, blacks turned to the guardians of equality under
the law— the courts.
An appeal to blacks within the city and throughout the
country enabled the Citizens Committeee to raise enough
money to test the constitutionality of Act 111.

go

Between
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1892 and 1896 the case moved slowly through the judicial
system before the United States Supreme Court rendered its
decision on 18 May 1896.

In Plessv v. Ferguson the Supreme

Court gave legal sanction to "separate but equal," which
was, even then, no longer a "thin disguise."

Judge John M.

Harlan's lengthy dissent notwithstanding, race relations in
America for the next half century would be governed by the
idea that, "Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial
distinctions based upon physical differences, and the
attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the
difficulties of the present situation.

If the civil and

political rights of both races be equal one cannot be
inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the
United States cannot put them upon the same plane.1,93 But
there was more.
In 1896 and 1898 white Democrats found the definitive
answer to the "Negro Question."

Confronted with a brief,

but potentially worrisome, alliance between dissatisfied
blacks and whites under the Populist banner, Democrats took
measures to reduce the effectiveness of poor white voters
and eliminate black voters.94 After a harrowing, though
successful, reelection campaign in 1896, Governor Murphy J.
Foster supported a more restrictive suffrage bill.

Act 89

went into effect on 1 January 1897.95 By 1898 the number
of

black voters in the city had dropped from 14,177 to

3,089.96
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The Democrats followed the registration law with a
call for another constitutional convention to permanently
disfranchise blacks and poor whites.
convened in February 1898.

The convention

"We are all aware that this

convention has been called by the people of the State of
Louisiana principally to deal with one question," the
president of the convention reminded the delegates, "and we
know that but for the existence of that one Question this
assemblage would not be sitting here today."
delegates, let us not be misunderstood!

"My fellow-

let us say to the

large class of people of Louisiana who will be
disfranchised under any of the proposed limitations of the
suffrage, that what we seek to do is undertaken in a
spirit, not of hostility to any particular men or set of
men...."

Ernest B. Kruttschnitt, went on to add "that the

Question which we are trying to solve here is one which
imperils the integrity of the future government of the
State of Louisiana.1,97 Several weeks later Kruttschnitt
presided over another "assemblage," and in his capacity as
president, called the school board meeting to order.98
Racism and discrimination was more than the emotive,
ritualistic, and sadistic random killing of blacks.99 It
was organized, purposeful, and directed towards maintaining
the dominance of whites over blacks.

School board members

pursued a policy of limited education for blacks.

School

officials no longer expressed concern about low black
enrollment or made references to maintaining equal
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facilities for blacks.

The new policy damaged black

educational advancement in two ways.

First, it came at a

time when school officials begem to expand educational
opportunity for whites, which widened the gap between white
and black education.

Second, the limited educational

policy of instruction at the primary grade level was
diametrically opposed to the black community's desire to
use improved education as an aid in community development.
In 1900 blacks reached their educational nadir within
the public school system.

Ironically, a request to extend

kindergarten classes to some black schools providced the
occassion for whites to eliminate even more services for
blacks.

100

Instead of granting or refusing the request,

several board members thought it offered "a favorable
moment at which to call attention of the board to the work
of our colored schools and suggest a change in the
curriculum and character of work to be done in these
schools.”101 These members suggested that the board
discontinue grades six, seven, and eight in the black
schools.

In the remaining grades— one through five— they

wanted "to make that education useful, thorough and
practical as far as it goes, and to fit him and her for
that sphere of labor and social position and occupation
which they are best suited and seem ordained by the proper
fitness of things."102 The board adopted the new policy and
instructed the Superintendent to put it into effect for the
next school year.
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By 1900 the idea that blacks only needed a primary
school education with limited manual training had become
the dominant philosophy throughout the South.

Education

for blacks would not entail training for occupations which
placed them in competition with white workers.

When whites

thought of the ideal type of black education they thought
of Hampton Institute located in Virginia and Tuskegee in
Alabama.

103

School board members wanted New Orleans to join

the rest of the South by offering blacks the "proper" kind
of education.

Education for black advancement had been

replaced by education for black oppression.

Through

custom, law, and school board policy white New Orleanians
had defined what they considered blacks' proper place.
Blacks rejected the policy of limited education, however,
and through their leaders organized to secure improved
educational opportunities.

Less optimistic about achieving

a nation of "one people," than they had been, but
nonetheless determined to fashion an educational agenda to
fit their needs, blacks started the quest for parity within
the framework of "separate but equal."
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Chapter Three
Education and the Haking of a Protest Tradition, 1900-1945

At the dawn of the twentieth century the prospects for
improved education appeared gloomy for black New
Orleanians. From the mid-1870s, their at first gradual and
then accelerated loss of political power was followed by
similar losses in education.

The four black colleges

located in New Orleans still offered academic training at
the grammar and high school level.

They all charged

tuition, even though minimal, it prevented many blacks from
attending them.1 The public school system was the only
source of education for most blacks.

Black community

leaders refused to accept the mandate of white leaders to
use education as a means of oppression.

They had their own

idea of their proper place in New Orleans society, and that
their place was not the bottom.
In 1900, 77,714 blacks lived in New Orleans out of a
total population of 287,104.

Only 5,509 blacks, though,

attended the city's public schools.

Decisions by school

officials, therefore, directly affected only a small
percentage of the black community.

But the issue always

involved more than the educational interest of the black
students actually enrolled.

Educational access and

opportunity were community goals with larger significance.

93
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Barred from politics through legal and extra-legal means,
segregated in or denied acess to public accommodations, and
employed in mostly menial jobs, education became a way out
of the quagmire.

The quest for improvements in education

became the only sustained form of protest and agitation
directed against the citadel of white political power and
supremacy.

Between 1900 and 1945 the tactics and

strategies changed, but the goals and focus remained the
same— improved schooling consistent with the principles of
full citizenship and equality.
Black education existed within the larger framework of
race relations in the city.

Therefore, improvement in

black education, especially gaining additional facilities,
sometimes involved more than the presence or absence of
sufficient revenues.

Early in the twentieth century whites

in New Orleans attempted to increase the spatial separation
of the races; as a result, they developed a heightened
sensitivity to black schools in areas with a large white
population.

Residential patterns over a century in the

making came under scrutiny.

Not only did whites want to

prevent black encroachment, in some cases they attempted to
remove blacks from schools and institutions they had
occupied for several decades.

One of the more contentious

examples involved attempts by school officials to build a
replacement for the Bayou Road School.

The Bayou Road

incident provides a typical example of the difficulties
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blacks encountered in their fight for improved schools.
Blacks living in the Sixth Ward, a working class
neighborhood below Canal Street, had attended the Bayou
Road School since the 1880s.

The Sixth and Seventh Wards

contained most of the city's black Creoles.

By 1910 Bayou

Road, located at the intersection of Bayou Road and
Derbigny Street, was one of the few schools still conducted
in a rented building.2 It was also overcrowded and in a
state of physical deterioration.

The Bayou Road Parents'

Club informed the board of the problems and requested
immediate improvements and additions to accommodate the
pupils.

The board refused to commit itself to constructing

a new building but promised to rent another building for
use as an annex and to make some repairs on the present
structure.

When whites in the neighborhood learned of the

proposed annex, they protested.

After referring the

protest to the Committee on Teachers and Instructions, the
board decided not to alter its plans.

The board members

refused the request because the lease for the building had
been signed and "Bayou Road Colored School has been
established there for a number of years."3
The addition of the annex alleviated the problem of
overcrowding but left the board with another rented
building in need of substantial repairs.
school

Conditions at the

worsened and evoked a strong letter of condemnation

from the city's Board of Health.

In response, John
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Wegmann, the chairman of the Committee of Buildings and
Grounds, inspected the school.

Wegmann acknowledged the

bad conditions but thought the Board of Health official had
exaggerated and possibly over-dramatized the conditions.
Nonetheless, Wegmann considered the buildings unsuitable
for school purposes.

"It is the best we have, however, and

I can conceive of nothing that can remedy the situation,
unless it be the building of a new school somewhere in the
neighborhood."

Wegmann examined and quickly dismissed the

possibility of using the McOonogh No. 18 School, an
abandoned white school located about a mile and a half from
Bayou Road, as a replacement.

He considered it to be in

worse condition than Bayou Road.4
In February 1914 the board finally initiated plans to
build a new school to replace the two rented buildings.
School officials examined seventeen possible sites before
deciding to purchase a large tract of land encompassing the
old school.

Several factors influenced the board's

decision, but one of the more prominent considerations was
its belief that using part of the old site would prevent "a
protest from neighboring property owners."5 That proved
more hopeful than prophetic; a sustained and angry protest
would eventually develop.
Almost a decade passed before school officials
actually built the new school.
to the delay.

Several factors contributed

When school officials first made the
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decision to replace Bayou Road, the city had responsibility
for building schools and acquiring sites.

But in 1914,

despite a "strong plea" from the board because of
conditions at Bayou Road, members of the Commission Council
stated that the city could not afford to purchase the site
for the new school.

Consequently, board members voted to

lend the city enough money to make the purchase as well as
to build another black school.

Using funds from the board,

the city purchased both tracts in the summer of 1914.
After acquiring the land, however, the city still did not
build the school because of a lack of funds.6 Meanwhile,
the situation at the Bayou Road School had grown
progressively worse.

Officials from the Board of Health

closed the school in September 1914 and refused to reopen
it until the board made needed repairs.

A year later, on

29 September, a storm tore into the city and damaged most
of the schools, including the annex to Eayou Road.7 Work
crews under the supervision of board and city officials
eventually managed to repair most of the damaged schools,
but several, including the Bayou Road Annex, had to be
demolished.8
The affects of World War I came to the city, receded,
and the Bayou Road School remained as overcrowded and
dilapidated as ever.

Finally, in 1922, construction

started on the long overdue replacement for Bayou Road.
Almost immediately intense opposition developed and exposed
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the state of race relations in New Orleans.

Numerous

whites appeared before the school board and left little
doubt that whites expected and demanded the bulk of the
community's resources.

Any concessions made to blacks had

to occur after city leaders satisfied the needs of the
majority population.

White opposititon to the building of

Bayou Road, therefore, centered not only on its location
but on the scale of the project.

School officials planned

to build a school comparable in quality to schools built
for white students.
The first protest came in July 1922 when a group of
whites from the neighborhood around Bayou Road attended a
meeting of the school board.

One protestor complained that

the location was not in a black area.

Another stated that

property values "would depreciate with the erection of a
large modem school, that negroes would move into the
neighborhood, and that such a condition would prove
obnoxious to the residents of that section."

A third

suggested that the board either build another school in a
neighborhood with a large black population or convert an
older white school into a school for blacks and give the
new school to whites.

School board President, Daniel

Murphy, reminded the protestors that the school had
occupied its present site for approximately fifty years.
The previous board had considered similar objections,
Murphy added, and despite the sentiments of the group,
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blacks in that area needed school facilities.

With

surprising candor Murphy charged "that no matter where the
board decided to locate a colored school protest would
arise."

Percy Moise, elected to the board in 1920,

informed the delegation that he would entertain
alternatives that satisfied the group, but at the same time
provided for the educational needs of students in the Bayou
Road area.

The meeting ended with the understanding the
A

board would delay making a final decision.
At a January 1923 board meeting white citizens again
voiced their opposition to the school.

"To put from eight

hundred to a thousand negroes in that section almost
entirely inhabited by white people," according to one
spokesman, "would be a very serious disadvantage to both
races."

Disavowing any hostility to the education of

blacks, the speaker argued that "a more suitable location
could be found for the negro school that would be less
obnoxious to white residents of that section."

Another

member of the delegation used a different approach when he
stated the location of the school "was just as unjust for
the negroes as it was for the whites to establish a negro
school in that vicinity; that there were vested rights
involved and that it was an injustice to the negroes to
force them to come a great distance to the school located
in a white section."

When questioned by board member Fred

Zengel, the speaker admitted that he did not represent the
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black community.10
Percy Hoise and Zengel asked protestors for
suggestions of what to do with students in the Bayou Road
area if the board denied blacks access to the school.

A

female protestor suggested converting McDonogh No. 9

to

black use, notwithstanding her own acknowledgement of the
hazardous condition of the building.

She thought it absurd

for white students to attend McDonogh No 9 "while the
Negroes would be given a school that was really a
monument. "11
None of the speakers convinced the majority of the
board to deny blacks the new school.

The "constructive"

plan that Moise hoped to find had not been presented.
Board president James Fortier, who had not entered into the
discussion, relinquished the chair so that he could speak.
Fortier used his opening remarks to dramatize his deep
conviction on the subject.

He lived, he began, in the

Sixth Ward only "about twenty-four squares from the
proposed school, but [that] if he lived seventy-five
squares he would be as vitally interested as though he were
a resident directly across the street."

According to

Fortier the issue "concerned the development and the growth
12
of the entire city." Fortier did not want to see black
homes or schools in predominantly white areas and lamented
the Supreme Court decision in Buchanan v. Warlev. which had
declared residential segregation laws unconstitutional. 13
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In the absence of legal authority, it became important for
agencies like the school board to prevent blacks from
living in white areas.
Fortier recommended three possible uses for the
school;

none of them involved blacks.

He wanted it used

as a junior high school, an annex to Esplanade High School,
or an industrial training school.

Moise asked Fortier what

he planned to do about the eight hundred black students
scheduled to attend the school.

Fortier thought school

administrators could devise a plan to house the black
students in other locations.

Moise again voiced his

support for the protestors but wanted a concrete plan to
provide for the students.

Moise reminded the protestors

that the board had adhered to the established practice of
building replacements for black schools on or near the
original site-many of them he claimed had purchased their
homes "with the knowledge that the Negro school existed in
their midst."

Nonetheless, Moise was willing to concede to

white sensibilities by borrowing money to build another
school for blacks in a different area.

In the interim,

however, he wanted to proceed with the scheduled opening of
the school as a school for blacks.14
Fortier disagreed with Moise's position and wanted an
unequivocal declaration from the board that blacks would
not enter the school.

Fortier viewed potential black

enrollment as a threat to segregation and white supremacy.
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But for once the familiar call to arms associated with the
phrase "threat to white supremacy " failed to elicit the
usual response.

Moise made a motion that passed four to

one to continue the plan for opening the school for blacks
with the understanding that if the board received a
workable plan to house the students, school officials would
transfer the students immediately.

Fortier cast the lone

dissenting vote and remained determined to keep blacks out
of the school.15
Fortier, expecting persistence more than justice and
morality to triumph, called a special meeting less than a
week after the board voted against his plan.

Fortier

unveiled the idea of "placing these pupils on part-time for
the next five months, while a comprehensive policy was
being devised to cover the entire field of negro
education."

Moise stated his objections in strong terms,

and the meeting ended without a vote.16 Undeterred and
correctly sensing that a viable plan would break the
opposition, Fortier came to the next meeting better
prepared.

At it, he recommended placing the students in

several schools in the area.

Fellow member Daniel Murphy

declared his faith in Fortier's sincerity, "but felt that
since this was the first move on the part of the board to
give the negroes a real substantial building, he deemed it
unwise to defer the opening of the school as a colored
institution."

When Superintendent Gwinn stated that the
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area schools could accommodate the students by placing them
on part-time status, board members Mrs. Arthur Baumgartner
and Fred Zengel reversed themselves and supported Fortier.
Baumgartner made a motion to defer the opening of the new
school until Fortier had an opportunity to present his
plan.

The motion passed by a three to two vote.

Moise and

Murphy cast the dissenting votes.17
A bevy of activity ensued before the next meeting of
the board.

Emile La Branche, a black businessman, the

black Republican politician Walter L. Cohen, and other
black leaders called a mass meeting to protest the board's
decision and to formulate a response.

Members from the

Colored Educational Alliance, New Orleans NAACP, the
National Progressive Association for Negroes, and many
interested black citizens attended the meeting.

Their lack

of suffrage left the blacks attending the meeting with few
options.

They could not threaten the board members with

political reprisals.

The group denounced the board's

position and drew up a petition of protest.

They chose

LaBranche to serve as their chairman and spokesman and
decided to present their petition at the next board
meeting.18
Blacks received unexpected support from the New
Orleans Times Picayune, one of the city's leading white
newspapers:
Time and reflection have only served to confirm
this newspaper's belief that the closure of the
school and consequent denial for an indefinite
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period of elementary education to Negro children
whose fathers and grandfathers learned their
letters in the place now closed to them amounts
to a grave injustice....Let us close the incident
in the right and wise way by adopting the course
counselled by every consideration of justice and
equity.19
Some of the board members were also busy several days
before the next meeting.

Mrs. Baumgartner and Fred Zengel

decided to personally inspect conditions at three of the
schools scheduled to receive the influx of new students
from Bayou Road.

Both of them emerged from the inspection

obviously concerned by what they had observed and would
later share their findings with the other members.20
On 9 February a large crowd of blacks and whites
assembled for the regular scheduled meeting at the
Carondelet Street school board Office.

Emile LaBranche

presented the petition from the black community.

He called

attention to the fact that blacks in that area had needed a
new school for decades and had made countless appeals to
school officials.

Over the years the "Parents Club had

waited and the children had suffered," LaBranche stated.
"We now come to you," he closed, "and ask that you open to
the colored children this school which has been built for
them.

There is no territory in the city of New Orleans

where there is a greater need for educational facilities
for school children than in the territory of the Bayou
Road.... The redistricting does not make the schools any
larger, nor nearer our homes."21
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LaBranche confined his arguments to the educational
needs of blacks.

The next two speakers, both white,

labored under no such constraints.

They believed that the

use of the new school by blacks threatened segregation and
white supremacy.

Their views expressed mainstream southern

thought regarding blacks.22 Elucidating what he considered
the racial sentiments of the white community, one of the
speakers maintained that "all of us of the Southland who
are of the white race cure firm in one belief— and that is
the supremacy of the white race and the segregation of
these races in all things political and social."

The other

speaker argued placing blacks at the school would lead to
fights and other disturbances between black and white
children in the area.

23

Then Fortier rose to speed?. He criticized the
newspaper articles supporting the board's original plan and
declared the time had come to reassess black education.
Fortier wanted the board to develop a comprehensive plan to
provide blacks with vocational and manual training.
Fortier also angerily criticized the blacks who had the
audacity to appear before the board and question its
decisions.

And he admonished his fellow members for

establishing a dangerous precedent by reacting to the
protests of blacks.

Fortier's position was clear; he

wanted the school used for whites.

Fortier could not

comprehend the board's attempt to provide a modern school
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for blacks, when, for example, "Our white boys of the
Warren Easton High School are crowded and put into che
basements."24 Despite his advocacy of a policy contrary to
the educational needs of the black community, Fortier
observed that his proposal would foster friendlier
relations between blacks and whites.

In his view the needs

and aspirations of the black community did not enter into
the prescription for improved race relations.25
Apparently neither Fortier nor the various groups
realized Baumgartner and Zengel had changed their opinion.
Baumgartner asked Fortier if he had visited any of the
schools.

He said no.

Baumgartner then stated that she and

Fred Zengel had visited the schools within the last week.
She considered the conditions at the schools deplorable.
"We found the Valena C. Jones crowded to a great extent.
We found them in dark rooms in cottages rented by the board
some time ago.
desk.

We found the children three and four in one

I saw a condition in the Valena C. Jones [school]

that I never knew existed in a school room before. "
Despite the horrible conditions at Jones, Baumgartner
reported they were better than the conditions at Bienville.
Zengel supported Baumgartner's bleak assessment and thought
Fortier's plan to add more students to those schools
impractical.

After subsequent discussion failed to produce

any new points, the board adopted a motion by Zengel to
open the school for blacks within a week. Only Fortier
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voted against the proposal.26
What seemed a favorable vote for the black community
was actually only a compromise.

The members also declared

their intent to build a replacement for the school and
locate it in a predominately black neighborhood.27 In an
irony probably lost on most contemporaries, the school
board named the New Bayou Road school after Joseph A.
Craig, the black Reconstruction school board member who in
1877 had voted with the white majority to resegregate the
public schools.

In 1927 when school officials finally

transferred the black students to a new' school they
transferred the name of the school with them.28
The Craig School controversy vividly illustrated the
general dynamics of race relations and black education in
New Orleans.

The condition of black education reflected to

a large degree the racial ideology of the dominant
population.

Whites in the South had definite views

concerning the kind of education blacks should receive.
Overcrowded schools, unsanitary buildings, rented annexes,
and a general disregard for the educational needs of the
black community stemmed from their desire to keep blacks in
an inferior position in the social order.29 Moreover, as
James D. Anderson pointed out, other ideological currents
influenced black education.

Anderson maintained that the

debate "was not in any significant sense a conflict between
exteme racists and moderate racists.

There were racists,
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extreme and moderate, who both supported and opposed the
idea of universal public schooling for blacks and whites.
There were also extreme and moderate white supremacists who
favored a racially restrictive form of universal
30
education.
What, if not race, determined black
educational policy in the South?

According to Anderson

"conflicting conceptions of the relationship between
political economy and universal education," were decisive.
A combination of northern philanthropists and southern
reformers vied with the South's agricultural interests for
control of the South's educational destiny.31 The two
sides had different ideas on how to maintain a docile and
stable work force.

Southern reformers and their northern

allies placed their faith in the socially redeeming powers
of education.

By contrast, the agriculturalists had no

reason to abandon their traditional and effective methods
of coercion and force.32 New Orleans urban environment,
however, did not possess an agriculturalist-reformist
dichotomy. The debate in New Orleans centered.on whether
black education would serve as a means to improve the
socio-economic position of blacks or as a brief way station
to inculcate social deference and rudimentary skills in
reading, writing, and arithmetic for a lifetime of menial
labor.

Racism was the key variable that united most whites

in New Orleans in favor of limited education for blacks.
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The racist ideology, though triumphant, existed in the
midst of alternate views on black education.

The Bayou

Road School controversy revealed the presence of three
views regarding black education.

Black leaders, of course,

thought blacks should receive an education comparable to
whites.

They articulated their opposition to limited black

education clearly and often.

There were also some school

officials, however, who advocated and supported improved
black education, although their support stopped short of a
belief in equal facilities and curriculum for blacks and
whites.

Another group, as characterized by James Fortier

and most members of the white community, wanted a
continuation of the policy of limited education for blacks-education at the elementary level with some manual
training.

Nonetheless, black education progressed

throughout the Jim Crow Era despite a vocal ideology of
limited education for blacks.
The refusal of the school board to allocate sufficient
revenues to black New Orleanians accounted for the poor
condition of black schools.

What philosophy or policy

guided school board members when making budgetary
decisions?

How many members had clearly defined ideas on

the desired purpose and scope of black education?

Several

members and school officials used the school board meetings
as a forum in which to articulate their views on black
education and race relations.

At the beginning of the
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period several board members maintained that New Orleans
should duplicate the policy of other southern states and
limit black education to the primary grades, emphasizing
manual and domestic training.

Advocates of the

primary/manual training school philosophy attempted to
fashion a program for the present as well as the future.33
When Sol Wexler resigned his position as President of
the board in 1916, the belief that the educational needs of
blacks differed from those of whites still prevailed.
Wexler admonished his soon to be former colleagues:
Do not neglect the negro in providing educational
facilities. The welfare of the South can be
greatly increased by better educational and
uplift work among our negro population. Give
them the rudiments of a good education up to the
eighth grade, with specially selected subjects,
and particularly teach them the domestic
sciences, manual training and the vocations which
will enable them to become more useful citizens
and taxpayers.34
Several years later James Fortier echoed the
sentiments of his predecessors.

Fortier, an ardent white

supremacist, thought "it absurd to follow any plan for the
education of the negro which involved anything beyond
reading and writing and the teaching of the trade; that the
negro's place in life was to do the heavier manual work...;
that it was absurd to attempt to teach negroes the beauties
of Roman and Greek history...."35 Fortier wanted school
officials to build schools that featured only manual
training.

Years after the death of Booker T. Washington,

his legacy of promoting industrial education for blacks
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continued to influence the educational policy of most
whites.
Of the men who served as superintendent during this
period, the one who said the least about black education
probably revealed the most.

Warren Easton, who had the

longest tenure of the superintendents, failed to mention
the needs of black students in his annual reports from 1900
to 1910.

His omission indicated the low or non-existent

priority given to black education.

During Easton's years

in office black education reached its lowest point.

His

actions alone did not contribute to that condition, but his
policy of active neglect did little to arrest the trend.36
After the death of Easton in October 1910, Joseph
Gwinn became superintendent.

Almost immediately he found

himself in the midst of a small tempest regarding the
South's racial norms.

After assuming office, Gwinn called

a meeting of all the teachers, both black and white.
Unlike previous meetings, however, some blacks and whites
sat in the same section, which drew condemnation from the
school board.

Effectively chastened, Gwinn declared:

"In

the future all meetings of teachers called by the
Superintendent shall be for white teachers alone or for
colored teachers alone.

I shall also discontinue the

practice of holding joint meetings of white and colored
principals.... In this connection I wish to state I am now
and have always been opposed to any action which tends
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towards or seems to tend toward the breaking down of the
color line.... ',37
Despite Gwinn's declaratory allegiance to segregation,
he demonstrated an increased awareness of the need for
improved black education.

His opinion on black education

did not mirror that of the black community, but it marked a
new departure from the twenty-two years of active neglect
under Easton. Gwinn maintained that manual and industrial
training represented the ideal type of education for the
minority population.

Nonetheless, he conceded that

"provisions should be made for the smaller class who are
going to enter the teaching or other professions.n38 Black
education not only suffered because of the narrow
instructional limits whites attempted to impose, whites
refused to adequately fund the programs they had outlined.
Gwinn at least sought more funding and included black
schools in his annual reports.

Although such statements as

"there is pressing demand for an evening school for colored
youth," merely reiterated the many petitions and statements
of the black community, blacks benefited from having
someone in office not totally hostile to their educational
interests.

39

Nicholas Bauer became superintendent in 1923,
succeeding Gwinn.

Bauer, a native and lifetime resident of

New Orleans, continued the course chartered by Gwinn.

He

occasionally met with black parents and leaders.40 Bauer
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once vowed "that he would never be satisfied until every
child in New Orleans, both white and colored...[received]
full and adequate educational facilities."41
The policy of educational neglect and limitations
pursued by Fortier and board members affected the quality
and quantity of black school facilities.

The white

response to the Bayou Road School was not an isolated
phenomenon.

Protestors frustrated many attempts by school

officials to supply blacks with additional school
facilities.

The Bayou Road incident was atypical only

because it involved a school of considerable expense.
White protest usually centered on plans to convert existing
white schools to black use.

The historical residential

patterns in New Orleans caused a dilemma for
segregationists and school officials.

In-migration and

intra-city relocation kept the racial composition in some
neighborhoods in a state of constant flux.

The sword cut

both ways— whites moved into black areas and blacks moved
into white areas.

School officials had the unenviable task

of operating a dual educational system with limited
resources amid black demands and white protests.42
Using money from the John McDonogh Fund, the city
officials had built a school for blacks living in the
westbank community of Algiers.43 In 1904, due to an
"increasing number of white children in the vicinity of
McDonogh No. 5," school officials proposed building another
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school and transferring the black students.

On 14 April

1905 the board adopted a resolution to convert the school
and build one for blacks in another section of the city.44
This represented a form of indirect urban planning along
racial lines because adequate school facilities attracted
additional residents.45 Blacks protested the change
because school officials planned to build a school of
lesser quality and wanted to transfer the black students to
a rented church until the completion of the new school.
Board members heard their protest, but decided to follow
the original plan.
Blacks usually found themselves on the other side of
the argument, favoring conversion.

Between 1900 and 1945

blacks attended several schools that formerly housed white
students.

For example, the board converted Zacharie,

McDonogh Nos. 13, 17, 20, and Benjamin schools to black
use.47 To prevent the conversions whites used several
arguments in addition to the appeal to white supremacy.
Julia Volz, chairwoman of the Fourth Ward Civic League,
spoke out against the conversion of McDonogh No. 17 because
"when Bienville founded the city of New Orleans he
jIQ

certainly did not found it for the colored people."

Few

opponents of conversion used such a historical approach.
Typical statements included the belief that property values
would decline or that area businesses would suffer.
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Black leaders did more than react to the educational
limitations whites attempted to impose.
their own needs.

They identified

At various times the educational needs of

the black community included additional schools to relieve
overcrowding, improvement in the physical condition of
existing schools, high schools, instruction in industrial
and commercial training, and a better curriculum.

The

educational advances of the black community occurred as a
result of the efforts of black leaders and parents.
Between 1900 and 1945 blacks formed a plethora of
organizations dedicated to improved education.

Many of

them were small and focused on the needs of a particular
school or neighborhood.

All of the schools had "Mothers'

Clubs" or "Patrons' Clubs."

Judging from communication

received by school officials, the school-centered
organizations were active and to a degree effective.
Several ward based organizations such as the Third Ward
Educational Association and the Seventh Ward Educational
League attempted to address the needs of an entire ward.
In addition, city-wide groups like the Colored Educational
Alliance, the Federation of Civic Leagues, and the
Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance fought, as they
had done in the Bayou Road incident, for educational parity
and improvement.49
The organizations, through their leaders, attempted to
gamer a larger share of the city's educational resources
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through communications and petitions to school officials.
The tactic of drawing up lengthy petitions which detailed
the ills and inadequacies of black schools remained a
favored tactic throughout the first half of the century.
Black leaders gathered statistics, conducted visits to
individual schools, and then presented incontrovertible
evidence of the actual condition of black schools to white
officials.

During most of this period the Colored

Educational Alliance, founded in 1913, led the fight for
better schools along with other key organizations.30
Seeking to stem the tidal-wave of repressive actions
against blacks, a group of leaders organized a local
chapter of the NAACP.

The branch received its charter on

15 July 1915 and counted among its active members Reverend
Henderson Dunn, Walter Cohen, Thomas Bailey, Dr. Rivers
Frederick, Constant C. Dejoie, Paul Landix, Dr. George
Lucas, and Mrs. Ida Johnson.

No other organization in New

Orleans would work as long or as diligently for black
equality.

Most black leaders joined the branch, and

leadership within the black community was virtually
synonymous with leadership in the branch.

Eventually, most

issues involving education and race relations came through
the branch office.51 The NAACP often served as an umbrella
organization for the city's various black civic, social,
religious, and fraternal groups.

This was especially

important for a black community with religious and color
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diversity.

Since limited education affected the entire

community, it was not difficult to forge alliances.
The various organizations provided a communication
network for black leaders but not the entire community.

On

19 September 1925, the New Orleans Herald, which soon after
became the Louisiana Weekly, began publication under the
leadership of Constant C. Dejoie.

Prior to its inception,

blacks, either out of a financial inability or
unwillingness, had not supported a race-specific newspaper.
After the demise of the Louisianian in 1882, no other black
newspaper, except for a promising but short run of the
Crusader, edited by Louis A. Martinet, attained the
subscribers and revenues to survive.

The religious,

regionally-oriented but New Orleans based Southwestern
Christian Advocate provided some coverage of the black
community, but its anti-Catholic, pro-Methodist stand, and
its lack of clear editorial focus prevented it from
becoming a paper for the whole black community.52
The Louisiana Weekly avoided a similar identity crisis
and from the beginning espoused a clear mission. "We
believe," the paper declared in its debut edition, that
in matters pertaining to race, a newspaper should
not straddle. There is only one course for a
newspaper to take in matters pertaining to Negro
life and that is the right side. Any attempt to
side step and to "pussyfoot" is more harmful to
the race than anything else. Negro newspapers
are not the property of the individuals who have
them in charge, but the property of the Negro
public whose interests they should serve.
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Thereafter the Weekly remained steadfast and true to
its stated alms.

The paper not only echoed the sentiments

of the black community, it helped to define vital issues.
More than an organ of information and race chauvenism, it
printed articles and editorials that challenged the
prevailing social order.

Inadequate educational

opportunities made education one of the Weekly's major
points of focus.

"At the beginning of this next year,"

stated an editorial in December 1926, "we shall turn our
attention to our schools, both public and private.

We

shall attempt to turn the spotlight upon the various
institutions of learning which are training our
young.—

1,54 The Weekly turned the spotlight on often and

remained in the forefrunt for improved schools.
The paper contained more than "doom and gloom"
articles. It frequently chided blacks for not doing enough
to remedy the situation.

When school officials instituted

programs or allocated funds to enhance black education, the
editors offered expressions of thanks.

"The relieving of

the exceedingly overcrowded condition in our public schools
by the erection of modem buildings is a great step towards
racial understanding and good will...."55 On occasions
individual school board members received favorable
comments.

Mrs. Arthur Baumgartner, who had voted to allow

blacks the use of Bayou Road School and the first female to
win election to a school board seat, obtained an
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unsolicited endorsement because "she has made it her duty
to visit all the Negro schools in the system and to see the
equipment and meet the teachers and principals.

She has

been kind enough to visit their various affairs... her
direct contact with the various schools has made her big
heart feel our needs."56 Hoping that other members
possessed if not big hearts then at least some, the Weekly
expressed "faith in the good intentions of the board.1,57
When black leaders and the black community in general
acted in bad faith or simply refused to act, the Weekly
answered editorially.

A lack of response to a school

related problem led the Weekly to question the dedication
of the Colored Educational Alliance.

"Now is the time for

some one to cause this League to awaken from its
lethargetic indifference and function as it should, or
cease to masquerade and keep some one that is sincere from
working in the interest of the group."58 Good leaders
often needed better followers and to that end the Weekly
remained adamant.

Consistent with the persistence of the

self-help tradition, the paper implored blacks to do more
to help themselves in throwing off the odious yoke of
oppression and discrimination.

"Too long have we as a

group sat supinely by and with weeping and wailing bemoaned
our lot... And now must we remember that only when we act,
act as men, act as thinking men, act, act, act, will we
find ourselves the recipients of these things that are our
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just and legal right."59
"It may be, since law makers and educators neglect
us," an exasperated Louisiana Weekly editor stated,
"lacking militant members in the higher professional groups
to fight for us, we may look hereafter to the laboring men
to protect our interests and make the way for us."60
Leadership within the black community, however, came
largely from the professional class of physicians,
dentists, clergy, lawyers, entrepreneurs, and teachers.
They fought for improved schools and attempted to impart an
educational ethos to the black community.

Throughout the

twentieth century the number of black professionals
increased.

The early twentienth century emphasis on black

self-help produced economic activity and entrepreneurs
relatively free from white control.

The absence of direct

ties to the white community enabled some leaders to pursue
a black educational agenda without the fear of economic
retaliation from whites.
In a study on black professionals and the community,
the black historian Carter G. Woodson documented and
analyzed the level of community involvement of black
professionals.

Woodson criticized black physicians, but

still concluded that "In spite of all the shortcomings of
physicians...this professional class has done something for
the uplift of the masses."61 That assessment also applied
to other professional groups.

Physicians and their
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professional counterparts, through monetary contributions,
supported the various institutions within the New Orleans
black community.

Organizations such as the Urban League,

N.A.A.C.P., Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. could not have existed
without support from the professional classes.62
Woodson's macro-analysis of the relationship between
black professionals and the community demonstrated that,
"The Negro physician in another way has manifested interest
in the community.

To secure drainage and proper

sanitation, additional school facilities and adequate
compensation for Negro teachers and the like, the Negro
professional man because of his outstanding position in the
community has been forced to the front in making the appeal
for those things which his people deserve."63 Leadership
within New Orleans' black community mirrored Woodson's
assessment and the physicians led the way.

Many physicians

worked for race advancement but several garnered
exceptional accolades from the community— Drs. George
Lucas, Joseph Hardin, Rivers Frederick, A. W. Brazier,
Lloyd B. Landry, and Leoneadas T. Burbridge.
A native of Scooba, Mississippi, Joseph Hardin
migrated to New Orleans in 1890.
black physicians in the city,

Like many of the early

Hardin attended Flint

Medical College where he received his medical degree in
1904 and decided to remain in New Orleans to start a
private practice.

In the mid-1890s Hardin developed an
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interest in politics and remained an active Republican
throughout his life.

His foray into politics soon led to

involvement in other civic activities.

In 1912 he helped

organize the Fourth Ward Poll Tax Association as part of an
effort to increase the number of black voters.

Concern

with his Seventh Ward neighborhood convinced Hardin to
assist Alex Mollay in the formation of the Seventh Ward
Civic League.

Soon, similar organizations addressed the

needs of particular wards and Hardin became instrumental in
creating the New Orleans Federation of Civic Leagues.

The

Federation of Civic Leagues, as well as the ward-based
civic leagues, attempted to solve community

problems,

especially those related to education and race relations.64
A contemporary of Dr. Hardin, George W. Lucas also
devoted his time and talent to matters involving black
advancement.

A transplanted Texan who graduated from Flint

Medical College in New Orleans, Lucas built a prosperous
medical practice.

His work as a physician, however, did

not prevent him from becoming an active member in several
organizations, among them, the New Orleans N.A.A.C.P.,
Dryades Street YMCA, the Knights of Pythians, and the Elks.
He was more than a joiner, he was also a leader.

For

several years he served on the NAACP's national board.

Dr.

Lucas served as President in the 1920s during the Branch's
successful challenge of New Orleans segregation
ordinances.65 Lucas' career as physician-activist could
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have served as a model for Woodson's observation that,
"Unless the Negro can exercise the same rights of citizens
in voting and holding office, he cannot transfer the will
of the race to the government.

In organizing the people

toward this end and in stiumalting their effort to battle
for their rights, the Negro physician has contributed more
than any other class, with the possible exception of the
Negro lawyer."66
Rivers Frederick, another black physician, projected a
less public profile than Hardin or Lucas and in the opinion
of a biographer "allowed himself to be viewed only in noncontroversial roles by the white community of New Orleans.
He was seen as a humanitarian, a competent professional,
and a champion of better medical care for blacks in
Louisiana.

With this special image, he was able to secure

favors for many blacks from the white power structure."67
Dr. Frederick played an instrumental role in the formation
of the local NAACP Branch and remained a life member.

He

was also active in the Urban League and devoted time and
gave money to solve problems within the black community.

CO

Although Frederick did not match the visible community
activism of Lucas and Hardin, he surpassed them in the
practice of medicine.

A native of Point Coupee Parish,

Frederick came to New Orleans to attend Straight University
and later Flint Medical College of New Orleans University.
He decided to seek his last year of medical school training
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in the state of Illinois.

He received his degree in 1897

and after stops in his home parish and several years
residency in Central America, Frederick returned to New
Orleans in 1908.

Frederick returned to Louisiana because

of his "growing desire to return to the place of my birth
in order to help train young Negroes for adequate service
in the growing field of medical practice, badly needed
among our people."69 Unfortunately, shortly after his
arrival in the city, Flint Medical College closed its doors
for the last time.

Blacks desiring medical training had to

travel to Nashville, Tennessee to attend Meharry Medical
College, or to the nation's capital to attend Howard
University.

The opening of Flint-Goodridge Hospital,

however, in 1916 gave Frederick an opportunity to train
young black doctors in his capacity as staff physician and
Chief of Surgery.70 Dr. Frederick, and other physicians
who labored under less than ideal conditions, provided
blacks with medical care not readily available anywhere
else.
Black physicians did not work alone in the fight for
better education.

Percy P. Creuzot, a dentist, gained the

respect of the community because of his tireless efforts
for improved schools.

For several years, he served as

president and chief spokesman of the Colored Educational
Alliance.

James Gayle, a Seventeenth Ward businessman,

served at various times on the Republican State Central
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Committee, led voter registration drives, and served as
President of the local NAACP Branch.

Arnold Moss, a

successful businessman and member of a host of
organizations, provided leadership in the city's Tenth
Ward.

Women were also active.

Mrs. Deborah Guidry, a

devoted teacher and social worker, contributed to the
success of the NAACP sponsored suit against residential
segregation.

Miss Fannie C. Williams, a native of Biloxi,

Mississippi, became one of the most respected educators in
the city.

She served as principal of Valena C. Jones

Elementary School for thirty-three years and started
several educational and social programs without monetary
assistance from school officials.

As head of the Valena C.

Jones Normal School, Miss Williams had a direct influence
on many black teachers in the school system.71
No study of early twentieth century black leadership
in New Orleans would be complete without mentioning Walter
L. Cohen.

A native New Orleanian of free parentage, Cohen

grew up amid the high expectations of Congressional
Reconstruction.

He later became a protege of Henry Demas,

a black legislator from St. John Parish, who managed to
retain his senate seat long after the assault on black
political participation in the 1870s.

In the 1890s Cohen

became prominent in Republican politics at the local and
state levels which enabled him to gain recognition from the
national leadership of the Grand Old Party.

After the
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election of William McKinley as president in 1896, Cohen
received the position of Registrar of Lands.

72

Cohen and

other black Republicans repeatedly foiled attempts by
whites to purge them from the Party.73 Cohen once
complained that "If the success of the Republican party in
this state meant the elevation in any respect of the Negro
they [white Republicans] would rather see the Republican
party defeated."74 In addition to his involvement in
Republican Party politics, Cohen remained committed to the
struggle for improved black education.

Until his death in

December 1930, Cohen worked closely with Dr. Hardin as a
member of the Seventh Ward Civic League.75
Several ministers provided leadership to the
educational movement and countless others used their Sunday
sermons and neighborhood influence to preach the gospel of
education.

Reverend Henderson Dunn and Bishop Elijah Jones

were among the educational leaders in the city.

Reverend

Dunn migrated to New Orleans from the Thibodaux area and
attended Straight University.

After graduating in 1903, he

taught school for several years and in 1908 assumed the
pastorate of Central Congressional Church.

Included in his

congregation were many of the black professionals of the
city.

Many of them were graduates of Straight College

which received support from the Congregational Church.
Bishop Jones presided over the Eighth Episcopal District of
the African Methodist Episcopal Church.

Bishop Jones also

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

127

edited the Southwestern Christian Advocate and used its
pages to promote education.76
The black perception of the purpose of education, as
well as the kind of education blacks needed, differed
markedly from those responsible for public education.
Black leaders refused to accept the limitations imposed by
the white community.

The New Orleans black community

agreed with a Mississippian who thought, "no subject opens
a broader field for discussion among our people, no subject
needs to be talked more, and no subject should be given
more thought by them than the subject of education."77
Blacks in New Orleans went beyond discussing and thinking;
they acted.

In 1900 more black children remained outside

the school doors than inside.

A steady increase in

enrollment, however, reflected confidence that "An
education for your child is better than forty acres and a
mule.

The mule may die, the title of the land may be
7fl

defective, but an education abideth eternally."

Leaders

like Reverend Dunn and Reverend Elijah Jones used terms
such as "immediate" and "imperative" when assessing and
advocating black education.

They also stressed the role of

the parent. 79
Through public meetings, communications to school
officials, and the local press blacks expressed their
educational objectives.

They expressed them through the

various neighborhood and community organizations as well as
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through recognized and respected community leaders.

Racism

and discrimination directed at the entire black community
helped to blur class and color distinctions among blacks
and facilitated black unity.

Limited educational

opportunities provided a focus for their collective efforts
and the beginning of a sustained protest tradition.
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Chapter Four
Education During the Jim Crow Era, 1900-1945

Through the various organizations they formed to
improve education for the black community, black leaders
fought for specific objectives.

Using protest, petitions,

and constant pressure on school officials, they won some
victories.

Their protest strategy centered on three areas.

First, black leaders sought to expand black educational
opportunity by forcing school officials to provide black
students with high, vocational, and evening schools.
Second, they fought for improved conditions within the
schools —

improved curriculum, better buildings, and a

reduction in overcrowding.

Third, they attempted to gain

an all black teaching corps and salary equalization for
black teachers.

Although blacks had made gains in all

three areas by the end of the period, educational
opportunities for blacks remained unequal to those
available to whites.
One of the more glaring examples of the school board's
policy of limitation was the lack of high school facilities
for blacks.

School officials at least acknowledged a need

for vocational training and admitted the public school
should provide it.
provide it.

Of course, they did very little to

But school officials did not even admit a need

129
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for a black high school, and black leaders usually had more
success winning monetary concessions than in changing the
board's opinion of the proper education for blacks.

The

school board's decision in 1900 to reduce black education
to the fifth grade forced blacks to temporarily abandon
their efforts to secure secondary schools for blacks.

It

made little sense to launch an aggressive push for a high
school when public education ceased after the fifth grade.
Then, too, Southern University located in New Orleans still
offered high school courses.

Between 1900 and 1910 blacks

worked to regain grades six through eight.1
The closing of Southern University in 1913, and its
removal to Baton Rouge in 1914, however, led to a change of
strategy.

Many whites and blacks thought Southern's

location in an urban environment prevented it from becoming
a vocational and agricultural training school for blacks
from throughout the state.

Black leaders in the rest of

the state argued that New Orleans had three other black
universities and that alone justified the removal of
Southern.

State officials including Governor Luther E.

Hall, his predecessor Jared Sanders, and State
Superintendent Thomas H. Harris supported the move.

Joseph

S. Clark, a black educator who would later become president
of Southern, actively worked for Southern's relocation.
Most blacks in the city opposed the move, but support for
the change did emerge from individuals affiliated with
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Straight University.

According to one account, Straight

acted because of self interest— the elimination of a rival
free university.2
New Orleans school officials, also acting from self
interest, passed several resolutions opposing the removal
of Southern because it would create an educational void
that blacks would put pressure on them to fill.

Indeed, in

July 1913, as soon as it appeared doubtful that Southern
would remain in New Orleans, blacks did ask school officals
to "make arrangements for a colored high school, as the
pupils formerly attending Southern University are now
deprived of the State High School...."

A month later a

group of parents from McDonogh No. 6 asked that at least
the seventh grade be added when school opened in the fall.
The board agreed to add the seventh grade in 1913 and the
eighth in the following year, but still refused to open a
high school.3 Between 1914 and 1917 blacks repeatedly
petitioned the school board for a black high school.

Each

time board members denied the request.
Blacks did not abandon their attempts to sway the
board, however.

Education could not aid black community

development without public secondary schools.

By 1900 high

schools, once only for the elite, were becoming a source of
social mobility for the sons and daughters of the white
working class.4 The whole idea of social mobility for
blacks, however, contradicted whites' belief in the
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inherent inferiority of blacks.

Segregation forced New

Orleans' white leaders to concede the need for a small
number of blacks to receive academic high school training.
They recognized that a separate black community needed
physicians, teachers, lawyers, and clergymen, but they
nevertheless refused to allocate public funds to assist in
the training of a professional class.
In January 1917, 823 New Orleans children completed
the eight year elementary school course of study in the
public schools.

Most of them looked forward to attending

one of the four public high schools— Warren Easton, Sophie
Wright, Esplanade High, or Francis Nicholls.

School

officials had built the schools within the last six years
and they represented a capital outlay of nearly two million
dollars.

The city's architect, E. A. Christy, and

Superintendent Gwinn had visited several midwestem cities
to learn of the latest in school design and equipment.5
They wanted to ensure that New Orleans would have high
school facilites unsurpassed in the South.
into formulating the curriculum.

Care also went

Warren Easton offered

college preparatory courses as well as commerical classes
in bookkeeping, banking, and typing.

Wright and Esplanade

High were college preparatory schools for girls. Nicholls
£
offered vocational training for females.
Seventy-one of
the 823 students, however, could not attend the four public
high schools— they were black.
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But in 1917 that changed.

Years of agitation, along

with an increasing number of black grammar school
graduates, finally convinced the school board to open a
high school for blacks that fall.

For this venture, school

officials did not plan any fact gathering trips or
appropriate a large capital outlay.

They simply

transferred white students from McDonogh No. 13 and
converted it to black use.

Blacks would have preferred a

modern high school in a less commercial part of the city.
They accepted the building because they were realists and
black grammar school graduates needed a high school
education.

The school opened in 1917 as McDonogh No. 35,

and would eventually win acclaim for academic excellence.7
John Hoffman, a Tougaloo, Mississippi graduate of
Wilberforce University and Michigan Agricultural College,
served as its first principal.8
The curriculum at McDonogh No. 35 featured the
traditional college preparatory courses.

To graduate

students had to complete a mix of required and elected
subjects in English, Latin, history, science, music,
mathematics, and physical education.

"Credit for these

subjects," according to a resolution adopted in September
1917, was "to be given on same basis as in the white high
schools."9 Except for the general science textbook, blacks
used the same books as whites.

Eighty-two children

enrolled for the fall semester and an additional sixty-one
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in the spring.

Only one spring graduate from the

elementary school failed to enroll at McDonogh No. 35 in
the first year.

A need had existed for a black high

school, and blacks took advantage of the new opportunity.
Like the leader of any pioneering effort, McDonogh
35's principal wanted the school to show immediate signs of
success.

Assessing the first year of operation Hoffman

noted, "From the beginning, both pupils and teachers have
joined in their efforts to set a high standard of
efficiency and promote a spirit of good will in the
school."10 The staff and students also experienced some
success in eliminating opposition from whites in the area.
"This wonderful spirit seems to have had its effect on the
residents in the immediate vicinity," Hoffman reported,
"and whatever opposition or uncertainty they may have
expressed in the beginning has evidently been swept
away."11 Hoffman realized that the growth and success of
the city's first black public high school depended on
fostering good relations with neighboring whites.
Meeting the educational needs of blacks, not improving
race relations, was the school's mission, however.
well did it succeed?

How

From the start the school faced a

dilemma, or rather a crisis of identity.

Although McDonogh

35 was established as a college preparatory school, Hoffman
wanted it to "meet the larger needs of the community." As
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the only black public high school in the city, Hoffman
believed the school should offer a diverse curriculum.

He

therefore sought to expand the curriculum to include
vocational education and thought "that courses in Wood
Working and Domestic Science will be extremely desirable
for our pupils."12 In later years he advocated
introducting courses in plumbing, printing, and automobile
mechanics. Citing the opportunities available for
employment in those fields, he believed, "the majority of
the boys will greatly benefit by such a chance to fit
themselves for practical service."13 By 1927 vocational
classes had become a part of the curriculum, and a
contemporary observed, "For a number of years the manual
training department of the Negro high school made all the
work desks for the whole system, [and] the cooking
department takes care of the daily lunches...."14
Emphasis on vocational training failed to hinder the
school's academic development.

Hoffman stressed academic

attainment with the same zeal with which he advocated
vocational expansion.

At the conclusion of the first year

he mentioned the "excellent showing made in the Department
of Science."

He credited its success to the teachers and

students who "worked enthusiastically during the entire
year to build up a first-class department."

The

mathematics department drew praise for helping students
develop "clear and concise reasoning" skills.

The history
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classes "awaken in the pupils a higher sense of duty and
patriotism through a knowledge of the development of
civilization and nations."

Hoffman expressed less

satisfaction with the English teacher and wanted "a teacher
of marked ability and special training in English

" To

enhance the academic environment the students formed a
debating society and attended lectures presented by guest
speakers.

With the school's growth the board hired

additional teachers.15
McDonogh No. 35 continued to provide quality education
by overcoming obstacles.

For example, shortly before

school opened in 1923, the school board inexplicably voted
to suspend the teaching of Spanish, chemistry, and physics.
That action jeopardized 35's standing as a college
preparatory school and caused concern within the black
community.

The board reacted slowly in reversing its

position and waited until the following year to restore the
subjects.16 The popularity and success of the school soon
produced overcrowding and a continued commitment by blacks
to secure additional high school facilities.17
In addition to a need for secondary schools, blacks
also needed educational facilities for students unable to
attend school during traditional school hours.

Black

children failed to attend school for the same reason many
whites did— they simply lacked interest.

On the other

hand, large numbers of black and white youths worked and
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Table 6
Trends in Black High School Enrollment, 1918-194018

Year Ending
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

Total
143
255
372
565
613
766
509
454
694
869
902
1226
1372
2182
2425
2578
2811
3286
3682
4006
4111
4274
4568

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

could not attend regular day school.

In 1910, of the

city's population of persons 7 to 20 years old 45.7 percent
of blacks in the age group attended school compared to 54.2
percent for the entire city.

In 1920 approximatley 58

percent of blacks between 7 and 20 years old attended
school.

Figures for the entire city were slightly better
19
at nearly 60 percent.
Several educational trends at the
beginning of the century involved attempts to expand
educational access.

The start of evening schools

significantly expanded educational opportunities for white
youths in the city.
evening school
school year.
students.

School board members voted to start an

at the Boys High School for the 1903-1904

The school opened on 2 November with 142

Enrollment reached 180 before the end of the

session five months later.

In addition to classes in

English, reading, math, geography, and history, students
received instruction in typing, bookkeeping, and
stenography.

Increased enrollment led Superintendent

Easton to request additional evening schools.

When the

1911-1912 school year started, nine evening schools
operated throughout the city.20 None of them admitted
blacks.
The evening school curriculum offered a vivid look
at the relationship between educational access and enhanced
employment opportunities.

The curriculum expanded from the

initial three commercial courses to include classes in
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manual and industrial training, domestic science, and
additional commercial classes.

When necessary, school

officials fashioned a curriculum to meet a specific need or
objective.

During the winter of 1907-1908 white New

Orleanians became upset by what many regarded as an
inordinate number of blacks in the federal civil service.
Some whites charged that the area black colleges provided
their students with special instruction to prepare them for
the federal exam.

Superintendent Warren Easton immediately

organized a class at one of the evening schools to prepare
whites for the test.21 He soon reported "excellent results
by pupils of the Civil Service Class of Evening School No.
1"

Seven out of the eight evening school students who took

the test passed; one of them earned the highest grade on
the letter carrier exam.22 Neither the educational
inequalities nor the tangible benefits of educational
opportunity escaped the attention of the black community.
Blacks wanted school officials to provide evening
schools for them as they did for white youths who worked.
Between 1900 and 1918 evening schools remained a high
priority.23 Expressing the frustration many blacks felt
over the board's refusal to provide evening schools, an
editorial in a religious newspaper "Question[ed] the right
of a people to rule who are so nearsighted and thoroughly
selfish as to refuse the petition of an element of the
citizenship that is loyal, though poor and helpless."24
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Although blacks did not benefit initially from the
expanded educational opportunities associated with evening
schools, they welcomed the new program. They knew, as one
scholar observed, that "the southern educational revival
widened the gap between the schooling of whites and blacks
at the same time that it extended opportunity for both
groups."

ae

Once a new program for whites became

operational, black leaders and parents increased their
requests and demands for the same programs.

Constant

denials by the board failed to lessen their resolve and
persistence often produced favorable results.

For example,

after countless appeals and petitions the school board
established an evening school for blacks in November 1918.
Despite its restrictive admission requirements— males had
to be employed six hours a day and instruction could not
extend beyond the fourth grade level— the evening school
experienced immediate success.

Enrollment reached 398

during the first year of operation.26
The DuBoi sian-Washingtonian debate over manual
versus academic training for blacks had little relevance to
blacks in New Orleans because school officials refused to
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Table 7
Trends in Black Evening School Enrollment, 1919-194027

Year Ending
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

398
922
2321
2824
2277
2021
2527
2023
3890
4203
4402
4754
4710
4702
4754
3581
4780
4808
3282
2413
2764
2166
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adequately fund vocational training for blacks.28 Despite
the opening of McDonogh 35 and the start of evening
schools, exclusion or limited educational opportunities
served as the operational philosophy of school officials.
James Fortier and other school board members consistently
expressed the belief that blacks should receive, almost
exclusively, manual, industrial, or domestic training, but
budgetary problems prevented them from putting the idea
into practice.

It was cheaper to teach blacks Greek and

Latin than sewing and carpentry.

Indeed, even in white

schools, vocational training developed slowly because of a
chronic shortage of revenues.

At the beginning of the

century no students received industrial training.29
Community groups wanted industrial training in the
white schools and frequently pressured school officials to
furnish it.

When the Mew Orleans Educational Association

requested the introduction of manual training in 1900,
board members promised to act when funds became available.
Dr. James H. Dillard, representing the Public School
Alliance, pledged the support of his organization for any
plan to start industrial training.

Some individuals and

groups went beyond speeches and petitions.

Joseph Kohn, a

businessman and president of the Chamber of Commerce,
offered to donate one thousand dollars toward the purchase
of industrial training equipment.

Kohn later extended the

same offer for equipment for a black school. 30

The board
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accepted both offers.
Community efforts to secure industrial education
received the enthusiastic support of the various
superintendents.

Warren Easton actively sought to start an

industrial program in 1901. With plans still dormant
several years later, he informed the board members that
industrial education was not a "fad."31 He suggested they
establish a program in the high schools or in a separate
vocational training school.

The board began seriously to

study Easton's recommendation in the spring of 1905 and
referred the matter to the Committee on Elementary and
Secondary Schools.32 Unable to reach a decision on whether
to start the program in the high or elementary schools, the
board waited five years before taking action.

In 1910,

school officials decided to start industrial training in
several white elementary schools. 33
Most whites agreed that blacks needed manual
training, and of course, some insisted they needed no
other.

Black leaders and parents also embraced manual

training but thought blacks needed other training as well.
Blacks knew that even in a race-neutral society, varied
intellectual abilities and vocational interests
necessitated a diverse school curriculum.

The idea that

schools should prepare students for work was a cardinal
principle; few dissented from it.

The struggle for

vocational training remained an integral part of the
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development of the black community.

The occupational

status of black New Orleans necessitated and justified such
an approach.
The majority of black males employed in the city
worked as unskilled laborers.

For example, in 1920 blacks

constituted 27 percent of the population, but nearly 45
percent of the persons engaged in domestic and personal
service.

Looked at another way, foreign-born white males

had more professional jobs than black males (619 to 462).
Four-times as many blacks, however, lived in the city,
100,930 to 25,992.35 In 1950, black laborers outnumbered
the white laborers almost two to one.

Earning capacity, of

course, depended on occupational status.

As a consequence,

in 1944 black median income was fifty percent less than
that of whites.

36

Black leaders and black parents

attempted to enhance and expand the occupational options of
black youths through vocational training.
Kohn raised his initial offer from one thousand
dollars to twelve hundred dollars for industrial equipment
in a black school.

Citing a lack of funds, school

officials still failed to take advantage of the offer,
notwithstanding the requests from blacks and the
recommendations of the superintendent.

"Facilities for

trade and industrial education are needed for the colored
youth in the upper grammar grades,"
stressed in 1912.

Superintendent Gwinn

On another occasion he admitted that
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"nothing has been done to supply facilities for industrial
education for the negroes.

All recognize the great need

for this training for the youth of that race."37 At one
point the board considered building an extension to the
Thorny Lafon School to house several industrial classes.
Board members abandoned that plan, citing the expense of
what was actually a relatively modest construction cost of
$2,250.

At the same time they had appropriated $100,000

for the vocational training of six thousand white
students.38
Finally, in 1918, school officials authorized the
construction of a three room annex for manual training at
Lafon.

Several years after making his pledge Kohn sent the

board a twelve hundred dollar check.39 Eighteen years into
the twentieth century, blacks and their supposedly "proper"
education met.

By

1927 many other black schools,

including McDonogh 35, offered manual or domestic training.
Female students received instruction in sewing and cooking,
and males learned printing, carpentry, and bricklaying.40
Vocational instruction in various elementary schools
and at McDonogh 35 provided only a partial solution to the
problem of inadequate black vocational training.

Blacks

and school officals acknowledged the need for a trade
school for elementary school graduates.

Whenever the

subject came before the board, however, a claimed
insufficiency of funds prevented the board from acting.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

146
Into the financial void, and to the relief of the black
community, stepped representatives of the Julius Rosenwald
Fund.

School officials had attempted to get money from the

Rosenwald Fund since 1923.41 Interest by the Fund
coincided with the school board's issuance of three million
dollars in bonds for school construction.

The board voted

in February 1930 to use $275,000 from the bond money to
construct a black trade school.

At the time the figure

represented the largest amount of money allocated for a
black school by the board.42 Rosenwald Fund officials then
pledged $125,000 to the proposed $400,000 project.
Some members of the black community did not support
the plan to build a trade school.

John Guillaume,

president of a proprietary business college, argued that
blacks needed academic high schools more than a trade
school.

"A trade school building is not our greatest need

in the line of school facilities," Guillaume stated in a
letter to Superintendent Bauer.43 In an editorial titled
"We Need It," the Louisiana Weekly disagreed with
Guillaume:

"The trade school idea is a good one; if not,

the white children would not have two in our city while we
are getting one.

If the idea is good for the opposite

group, where they have one hundred chances to our
children's one for positions by which they are to earn
their daily bread, then why condemn something that will
have a tendency to put our children on an equality with
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those of other groups."44
Blacks welcomed financial support from the Rosenwald
Fund and noted with some satisfaction statements made by
Dr. Franklin Keller, an executive of the Fund.

Dr. Keller

met with leaders of the black community in February 1931 to
discuss the trade school project.

He assured the

delegation that "in New Orleans there will be as fine a
trade school for Negro children as there is now for either
whites or Negroes anywhere in the United States."

Keller

attempted to allay the concerns of blacks regarding the
type of courses to be offered.

He maintained the trade

"school will continue to introduce new courses of study
along with the development of new trades during the
constant revolution of industry."4S He cited the city's
need for bricklayers and automobile mechanics and argued
that the trade school should train blacks to meet those and
other labor needs of the community.
Viewing vocational education in a broader context,
blacks wanted vocational courses to go beyond the narrow
dictates of the New Orleans labor market.

The recent war

and the northern migration of blacks convinced many black
leaders of the need for training local blacks for a
national labor market.

The South's hold on the black

population grew less tenacious as the years passed.

"If

the school disregards equipping the Negro for the needs of
the forty-eight states," charged the Weekly "and holds to
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the theory that brick-laying and plastering is sufficient
thereof, we are compelled to ask 'to what aught is this
waste'?1,46 The black community did not feel constrained by
the policies or actions of the majority population.

They

knew the proper education of black children involved a
struggle of seemingly endless duration.
Many whites, on the other hand, wanted a very limited
vocational curriculum for blacks.

Racism and

discrimination involved more than a cerebral or emotive
ideology; it enabled white workers to maintain a favorable
position in the labor market.

Since race antipathy

prevented the inclusion of blacks in most local skilled
unions, white workers had a vested interest in suppressing
the development of black skilled workers.

Attempts at

black-white worker solidarity had already succumbed to the
"color-line. "47
Board members like Isaac Heller, who displayed some
sympathy for black education and led the campaign within
the school board for a black trade school, had to contend
with the feelings of the white community.

A month after

school officials annonced their intention to build a trade
school, Heller tried to mollify white fears with the
assurance that the school would not increase occupational
competititon between blacks and whites.

Heller maintained

the trade school curriculum would reflect traditional black
employment patterns.

Although he spoke in general terms,
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his statements prevented the formation of organized and
sustained white opposition.48
Conflict and concern over the proposed curriculum
became moot when school officials allowed the project to
die a slow death.

With the assistance of the Rosenwald

Fund and the money from the bond issue, school officials
had sufficient revenues to erect the trade school.

To the

chagrin of the black community, the school board purchased
a former hospital building on Carondelet Street to serve as
its central office.

Part of the money for the acquisition

came from the funds set aside for the trade school.49 Why
did the board suddenly change policy?
Support for the project among the members was tepid
at best and rested to a considerable degree on the efforts
of Heller and Superintendent Bauer.

A $400,000 school for

blacks, even if it promised to train them for the "right"
jobs, was too large an expenditure for black education.
Additionally, the lingering fear of potential job
competititon between the races convinced the school board
to abandon the project.

The effects of the depression all

but eliminated reconsideration of the project for several
years.
In the meantime the board, with bitter irony, or
disdain, decided to build an inexpensive elementary school
on the site previously purchased for the trade school.

The

new school, constructed in less than two months, alleviated
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overcrowding at three schools in the area.

Ordinarily

black leaders and parents expressed joy at the addition of
new schools.

This time they knew that they had lost more

than they had gained.
wondered:

With justifiable indignation blacks

"Did they decide to give a 25,000 dollar

temporary building on a site selected for a trade school in
order to avoid erecting the needed trade school?"50
Black leaders, however, continued the effort to
secure a trade school.

Throughout the 1903s the Colored

Educational Alliance, the New Orleans NAACP, and the
Federation of Civic Leagues kept the issue before the
school board.51 Funding through the Works Progress
Administration eventually made the trade school a reality.
In 1940 construction started near the previous site which
had been purchased amidst much fanfare and hope.

In honor

of the man who a half-century earlier had placed his
approval and life's energies in industrial education, the
co

board named the school after Booker T. Washington.

Victories in the struggles to get black high schools,
evening schools, and a trade school greatly increased
educational opportunities for blacks.

Black leaders though

wanted limitless educational opportunities; as soon as they
claimed victory in one battle they moved on to eliminate
other educational deficiencies.

What type of instruction

the students received also mattered to parents and
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community leaders.

Although the city operated a dual

educational system, in many subjects a common curriculum
existed for blacks and whites.

In other words, a black

first grader taking arithmetic had the same curriculum as a
white first grader.53 Disparities in the content of black
and white education occurred because whites received
instruction in many more subjects than blacks and had
programs not available to blacks.
From the first year of school, discrimination
affected the content and scope of black education.

For

example, school officials provided kindergarten classes for
whites but failed to give blacks the same opportunity until
the 1940s.

In a response to a request for kindergarten

classes for black students in 1900, the Committee on
Teachers established the tone for several decades when it
informed blacks "it is the sense of this committee that
under the existing conditions it is not feasible to
inaugurate said system at present."54
School officials continued the division of the grades
started in the nineteenth century, elementary (primary and
grammar), high, and normal.

The primary grades remained

one through four, and grammar grades consisted of five
through eight.

High school students had a three year

curriculum, except for the 1900-1901 school year when
officials increased it to four years.

Some dissatisfaction

with the three year plan lingered, and occasionally,
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someone proposed changing to a four year curriculum.
Opposition from educational pressure groups effectively
overcame such sentiments.55 But in the end the decision by
some colleges not to accept students without four years of
high school forced a change.

Even then the ever

resourceful school board transferred the eighth grade from
the elementary division to the high school division.56 The
curriculum at the normal school for prospective teachers
remained at two years.

With the advent of evening schools

and increased interest in vocational training, the
organizational divisions changed to meet those needs.57
The elementary schools provided instruction in
language arts, reading, spelling, mathematics, science,
history, civics, art, and physical training.

In each

subject teachers expected a specific mastery of certain
skills.

In language arts students acquired "freedom and

facility in expression," and the ability to "differentiate
between thought, exprssion, and the mechanical side of
language work."

Memorization remained in vogue; teachers

had a list of stories and poems for each grade they
taught.00 First grade teachers exposed their students to
works such as Longfellow's Hiawatha. Jacob's Fables of
Aesop, and Holbrook's Book of Nature myths.

"To secure

mastery of the printed page, and easy effective expresssion
of thought; to develop appreciation of literature, love of
books, power to select and use them wisely...,"

grammar

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

153

school students read Rip Van Winkle. The Legend of Sleepy
Hollow. The Shell and the Brook, and The First Snowfall.59

As the number of supervisors and administrators
increased, the school board devoted more time to curriculum
development.

Teachers received bock-length guides that

provided detailed outlines and suggestions for teaching as
CQ
well as for tests and measurements.
Students spent about
fifty percent of the school day on their English-related
subjects.

Time devoted to mathematics and science was

eighteen and ten percent respectively.

61

Students usually

spent the remainder of the school day studying history,
geography, and drawing.
Attempts to improve the curriculum or to up-grade
facilities were frequently undermined by lack of funds.
Resistancce to taxes for education, a fixture in nineteenth
century New Orleans, continued into the twentieth.

New

Orleans consistently spent less on education than cities of
comparable size. The state's contribution to local schools
62
remained small.
Inadequate funding retarded the entire
system, but blacks suffered to a much greater extent since
they received a much smaller share of the public school
budget.63
An indiction of the inequities of school board policy
can be gleaned from examining the number, condition, and
value of various schoools.

In the 1901-1902 session blacks
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had twelve schools and whites sixty.

In 1910 New Orleans

had sixteen black schools and sixty-eight for whites.
Moreover, school officials generally spent more to maintain
white schools than to maintain black ones.

Whites also

benefited disproportionately from new construction.
Between 1900 and 1910, school officials erected twenty-one
schools.

Even though

more than black, only
black population.

white schools already numbered far
three of the new schools served the

The estimated site and building value of

the new black schools averaged $25,000.

By contrast, the

value of the new white schools averaged $42,500.
black schools were frame structures:

The three

twelve of the

eighteen white schools

were brick.

Whites not only

received more schools,

they received better schools.

Ten years later, the Superintendent's report for the
1920-1921 school year revealed similar statistics.

Out of

the eighty-six public schools in the city, fewer than
twenty served the needs of blacks students.
leaders had erected new schools.
1910 and 1920.

Again, city

Fourteen went up between

Only one, however, served black students.65

Black and white leaders knew that often the number of
available schools affected total black enrollment; limited
facilities equaled lower enrollment.

"It is evident,"

Superintendent Warren Easton reported in 1903, "that the
full seating capacity has been reached and a further
%

increase in the enrollment cannot be expected until the
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school accommodations are enlarged."66 After 1920 black
enrollment outpaced available facilities, which placed
additional pressure on school officials and provided them
with tangible evidence of black educational interest.
Increased enrollment and interest also placed pressure on
black leaders to fight for better schools.

To meet the

educational needs of the black community, black leaders had
to become more aggressive in their attack on the status
quo.
The need for additional black schools persisted
throughout the period.

Leaders of the black community

continually kept the issue before school officials.

In the

main, the school board was a reactive body, seldom making
decisions until some type of community interest or pressure
developed.

In matters related to black education, this

tendency was even more pronounced.
therefore,

Black activism,

became an even more crucial element in the

campaign for improved schools.

Blacks residing in the less

developed sections of the city fared worse in the quest for
schools.

Residents in the Milneburg area, an outlying

district near Lake Ponchartrain, on several occasions
petitioned school officials, without success, for a school.
Others living in the more populous areas also kept their
needs before the board.

A 1913 petition from the Colored

Educational Alliance requested the erection of several
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Table 8
Average Cost of Operations Per Pupil, 1922-1940s7

ar Ending
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

Black
36.77
32.50
39.41
34.82
43.35
42.72
41.38
41 .47
40.82
37.78
37.82
29.03
27.33
27.67
27.88
37.73
41 .86
42.18
44.32

White

Differer

74.26
70.05
69.20
63.09
73.77
77.65
79.31
78.08
77.59
74.52
75.99
56.15
52.10
56.21
69.49
79.34
85.19
8.615
86.15

$37.49
37.55
29.79
28.27
30.42
34.93
37.73
36.61
36.77
36.74
38.17
27.12
24.77
28.54
27.81
31 .76
37.48
43.01
41 .83
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annexes to relieve overcrowding as well as new schools.68
The petitioners pointed out that money spent on black
education would benefit the entire community.

In a city

that often displayed hostility to any form of black
education beyond the primary level, it made sense to link
the educational aspirations of blacks to the development of
the larger community.

Black New Orleanians did not invent

this strategy; blacks in other cities employed similar
CQ
tactics with a degree of success. Black leaders and
parents emphasized that they wanted a fair share of the
community's educational revenues.

Fair and equitable meant

the resources spent on black education should approximate
the black percentage of the population.
Adherence to the latter part of the separate but
equal doctrine had long ago succumbed to racism and
budgetary constraints.

Black leaders like Reverend Dunn

and Dr. Hardin hoped that investigation and exposure of the
conditions in the schools would lead to improvements.

They

also used the many investigations as a means to keep the
black community involved in educational issues.

Blacks

gained few absolute educational victories, but parental and
community interest increased because of the emphasis placed
on education by black leaders.
Unsanitary and unsafe conditions existed at most of
the black schools and received the attention of black
leaders.

Beginning in 1925 the black owned newspaper, the
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Louisiana Weekly, made improved education a top priority.
When blacks petitioned for improved school buildings they
sought not an upgrading of buildings from adequate to good
or good to better; rather they had to fight to improve
schools from deplorable to adequate.70 In 1913 blacks and
school officials considered several of the schools
unsanitary— Oleander, Fisk, Fisk Branch, Bayou Road, and
Miro.

After city health authorities condemned the Oleander

School, school officials rented a building to accommodate
the students.71
Renting building served only as a temporary measure,
modern brick structures represented the real answser to the
problem.

School officials, however, rarely allocated

enough money for such permanent solutions.

When officials

finally transferred students from "the broken down church
building which formerly housed Fisk Branch School,"
conditions improved marginally.

A school hygienist

considered the building unfit for a school.
one report:

According to

"All of the rooms are filled with desks.

The

windows have not been changed, but are the same windows
usuallly found in residences.

No desk space for the

teacher is possible, as the rooms are too small for both
teacher's and pupils desks."72
As late as 1927 blacks had only one modern school
building, Joseph Craig located in Faubourg Treme, the
city's oldest black residential area.

Most of the other
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schools were wooden structures in poor condition.73 A
large delegation of blacks, including Dr. Hardin and
members of the Seventh Ward Civic League, appeared before
school officials in 1928 to discuss conditions at Jones.
Dr. Hardin presented pictures of the school that supported
his statements, and Superintendent Nicholas Bauer informed
the board that conditions were as bad as Dr. Hardin
indicated.

Bauer recommended immediate relief and

suggested the construction of a modern school for that
section of the city.74 The board members assured the group
that relief would follow, and this time they kept their
promise.
Several months later school officials accepted bids
for the construction of the new school at Annette and Miro
Streets.75 In October 1929, over two thousand individuals
attended dedication ceremonies for the new Valena C. Jones,
"considered one of the best equipped school buildings in
this section of the country."

The lengthy program included

speeches by Superintendent Bauer, board member Isaac
Heller, community leader Hardin, and Jones' principal
Fannie C. Williams.

Heller gave the keynote address and

used the theme "The New Negro" as his topic.

Miss Williams

encouraged the crowd to tour the school and "note the
modem equipment, which includes a radio in the school
auditorium, an electric refrigerator and gas stoves and
ovens in the domestic science room, a fire-chute, and a
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well equipped infirmary."76 Doubtlessly, many parents in
attendance shared Miss Williams' joy, heightened by the
realization that the school began in the early twentieth
century in a "lowly tenement house."77
The number of blacks enrolled in school increased
dramatically between 1900 and 1945.

Except for a

significant and, to a degree, unexplained fluctuation in
enrollment from 1901 to 1906, black enrollment demonstrated
sustained growth.

In 1900, blacks accounted for 17.5

percent of total enrollment, by 1920 the percentage had
increased to 21.3 percent.

The increase occurred despite

the fact that increased enrollment invariably contributed
to overcrowding which forced many students to attend school
on a part-time basis.

Moreover, increased enrollment often

exasperated an already critical teacher-to-pupil ratio.

In

a superintendent's report that acknowledged some of the
needs of black schools, Joseph Gwinn stated, "practically
all of the schools for Negroes are overcrowded."

As a

remedy he suggested that "additions are needed at McDonogh
32, Bienville, McDonogh 6, and Thorny Lafon."

Throughout

the period blacks complained of the endemic overcrowded
conditions in their schools.
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Table 9
New Orleans Public School Enrollment, 1900-194079

Year Ending
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

Black

5,509
5,072
4,856
4,949
4,558
4,847
5,659
6,295
6,717
6,616
7,674
8,105
8,367
8,706
8,736
9,656
9,404
9,685
9,362
10,984
12,996
15,256
16,103
16,128
17,052
16,500
19,625
21,025
21,911
23,018
22,572
24,987
25,130
26,640
29,256
29,062
27,537
28,322
27,787

White
26,038
26,133
26,228
26,751
27,331
27,125
28,605
31,710
33,687
36,117
38,151
38,499
40,080
39,161
40,244
39,161
40,244
41,836
40,182
40,611
49,923
44,662
47,325
47,087
47,401
47,952
48,732
50,165
52,927
52,891
56,834
55,948
57,364
58,968
59,587
57,496
54,797
54,140
53,657

Total
31,547
31,205
31,144
31,700
31,889
31,972
34,265
38,005
40,404
42,733
45,825
46,604
48,447
47,867
48,980
47,868
48,990
41,647
49.544
51,595
53,920
59,918
63,428
63,215
64,453
64,452
68,356
71,189
74,839
75,909
79,406
80,935
82,494
85,608
88,843
88,558
82,334
82,402
81,444
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Schools recently built often became overcrowded.

The

new Thorny Lafon School, erected In 1906, was overcrowded a
year later, which necessitated an annex.

McDonogh No. 32,

built in 1907, had to conduct some of its classes in a
rented church building that constantly needed repairs.60
School officials responded to overcrowding by renting or
building annexes.

Renting church buildings, though popular

with school officials, worked a hardship on teachers and
students.

Unlike residences, school officials could not

build partitions or even place desks in the rented
churches.

Although vacant during the week, the buildings

had to be in condition for use by their congregations on
Sundays.

Nevertheless, the practice of renting churches

continued.61
When the board could not find suitable buildings to
rent or did not have the funds to construct annexes, it had
blacks attend school only part of the day.

The idea of

part-time classes developed slowly but became widespread in
the 1920s.

Students at McDonogh No. 6, however, had their

school day shortened as early as 1915.

In the beginning of

the 1922-1923 school year, 5,396 black students attended
school part-time.

Only 192 white students, however, had

less than a full day of school.62 School officials
attempted to limit part-time classes to the primary grades,
but that often proved impossible as the number of blacks in
grammar and secondary schools increased.

Students forced
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to attend part-time averaged 2 1/2 to 4 hours of school.
No official policy or regulation existed regarding the
length of the school day for students attending classes
part-time.
arose.

School officials reacted to conditions as they

They made no effort to defend the practice as a

remedy for overcrowding, citing as a reason the familiar
refrain— insufficient revenues.

83

In 1927, a survey of black schools conducted by
reporters for the Louisiana Weekly, disclosed overcrowded
conditions in most of the schools.

Craig School, one of

the better facilities, had part-time classes, and

the

paper's reporter lamented that "It is to be pitied that an
almost perfect school should be marred by this evil."84
Craig served a large district; some of its students
traveled over twenty-five blocks to attend.

Thorny Lafon,

in uptown New Orleans, hailed derisively as the "largest
elementary school in the world," resorted to part-time
classes as the only way to accommodate the large number of
DC

students.

A writer asked, "When, oh when, shall we come

across a school where enough room is provided for giving
all the children full time in the classroom?"86

The decision to resegregate the schools in 1877 did
not result in the elimination of white teachers from black
schools.

In a community that claimed to want to enforce

the color line in all aspects of human interaction, the
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presence of white teachers in black schools appeared
contradictory.

Nonetheless, despite a board resolution

passed in 1890 calling for the removal of white teachers,
the practice continued into the twentieth century.87 Both
black and white groups opposed the practice and frequently
petitioned the board to have it stopped.

In the face of

such widespread dissatisfaction, why did it persist?

At

various times one or more factors influenced the board's
decision.

First, native white teachers steeped in the

tradition of the region's racial mores could be counted on
to reinforce the dominant position of the majority
population.

Second, the use of white teachers in black

schools increased employment opportunities for white
females, a significant consideration because of the absence
of professional jobs for women.

Third, the number of

qualified black applicants lagged behind demand until the
1900s.88
The number of black schools staffed by whites
fluctuated; on at least two occasions board members
considered expanding the practice rather than phasing it
out.

In 1906 two board members, Knickerbocker and Brennan,

tried to win board support for replacing the entire corps
of black teachers with whites.

Neither Brennan nor

Knickerbocker offered a reason for their proposal and their
motives remained unclear.

Whatever their rationale, the
OQ
board voted against the measure.
School officials built
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an annex to the always overcrowded Lafon in 1910 and
proposed staffing the annex with white teachers.

They

justified their decision by claiming that the annex
represented a new school.

When blacks learned of the plan

they quickly registered a protest.

They contended that the

new building was am annex to Lafon and so should have black
teachers.

The board subsequently voted to place black

teachers at the new annex.90
Attempts by blacks to remove all the white teachers
proved just as elusive as Brennan and Knickerbocker's
effort to remove all black teachers.

Blacks residing in

Algiers persistently, but unsuccessfully, tried to get only
black teachers at McDonogh No. 32.

Yet their brethren in

the Second and Fourth Districts did achieve that goal at
Bayou Road and First Street Schools.91 As late as the
1912-1913 school year, four black schools still had white
teachers— Lawton, McCarthy, McDonogh No. 6, and McDonogh
No. 32.

The same sentiment that made whites support

residential segregation contributed to a more concerted
effort to remove white teachers from black schools.

The

board voted to make the change at McDonogh No. 6 and
McDonogh No. 32 in August 1913.

Two years later Lawton

became an all black teacher school and in 1916 McCarthy did
too.92
One researcher believed "the establishment of a
completely colored division of the New Orleans Public
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School was and still is an educational triumph for the
Negro race."93 Blacks believed that the racial views of
the white community made it virtually impossible for white
teachers to provide quality instruction to black students.
The number of qualified black teachers increased durinq the
early twentieth century.

Fannie C. Williams, O.C.W.

Taylor, Lucian Alexis, and John Hoffman were only a few of
the young teachers who joined the public schools.

The use

of more black teachers also increased the number of
professional positions available to blacks.

The dearth of

professional positions for blacks actually helped the
development of black education.

College bound students had

few options in choosing a professional career, so the
majority studied to become teachers.94
Despite the willingness of blacks to pursue teaching
as a career, several obstacles existed.

The absence of a

free teacher training school posed the biggest problem.
The school board sponsored a normal school for whites but
not, until 1923, for blacks.

Additionally, the board, in

cooperation with Tulane University, conducted a normal
school in the summer for white teachers which afforded them
an opportunity to improve their teaching skills.

Black

teachers recognized the importance of the summer normal
programs and looked for ways to obtain those advantages for
themselves.

In 1915 Reverend Dunn and Reverend Jones, led

a successful effort to establish a summer normal program
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for blacks.

The school board contributed 250 dollars to

help defray expenses, and Straight University donated the
use of its facilities.

Superintendent Gwinn selected

Alfred Lawless as the first director and named an advisory
committee composed of Sylvania Williams, Hattie Feger, and
Thomas Sherrard.

Lawless, along with the advisory

committeee, recommended the faculty with approval of the
superintendent.

Lawless conducted a successful program and

the next year Gwinn recommended its renewal.

Registration

for the 1919 session reached 230 and the board's
contribution rose to 500 dollars.95
The separate and unequal doctrine extended to teacher
salaries as well as school facilities.

In the midst of the

1900 campaign to reduce black education to the primary
grades, the Committee on Elementary Schools considered a
proposal to equalize the salaries of black and white
teachers.

The plan never reached fruition; the practice of

paying black teachers less than whites became entrenched,
despite the protest of black teachers and their
supporters.96 Black teachers usually received
approximately twelve percent less than white teachers.

For

example, in 1920 a first year white elementary school
teacher earned eighty dollars a month; a black teacherwith
the same qualifications received seventy dollars.

The

differential remained throughout the years of service.

A

white teacher with six years of experience received 120
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dollars a month and a black teacher 110 dollars.97 Given
the low and often late salaries paid to black and white
teachers, both groups had a right to complain— and they
did.
Black teachers throughout the South also suffered
because of discriminatory salary scales.

go

The salary

"differentials amounted to a loss of approximately 10
million dollars to Negro teachers."99 Through individual
effort and eventually through the coordinated assistance of
the NAACP, black teachers used the court system to
challenge

salary discrimination.

The campaign started in

Maryland in 1936 and resulted in the 1939 consent decree to
equalize teacher salaries in that state.100 The stirring of
change in the distant state of Maryland had no effect on
the local school board.

The salary schedule for the 1937-

1938 school year continued past inequities.

An editorial

in the Weekly placed the issue in a broader context and
argued that more was at stake than additional money for
black teachers:

"...if the Negro teachers employed by the

Orleans Parish school board accept without protest this
most recent discrimination, we fear for children who enter
their classrooms, so humble and lacking in dependence will
they doubtless be due to the attitude of their
instructors.1,101
With assistance from several organizations— the league
for Equal Rights and Justice, the Colored Educational
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Alliance, and the New Orleans NAACP— black teachers through
the New Orleans League of Classroom Teachers and later the
New Orleans Citizens' Committee for Equalizing Educational
Opportunities, attacked salary discrimination.102 Following
what by then had become a traditional approach, in
petitions to the board the teachers first outlined their
grievances and requested changes.

They sent one such

petition in January 1938 and another that July.

Using

statistical information published by the board, they
pointed out that a first year white teacher with a B.A.
degree received an annual salary of $1,000.

On the other

hand, a black teacher with a B.A. degree had a starting
salary of $909 a year.
level of experience.

The disparity increased with the
Thus by the eleventh year in the

system, the white teacher received $2,200 dollars annually,
$760 dollars more than a black teacher of the same rank.
"The added strain of financial worries," the teachers
argued, "takes from us energy which we strongly desire to
use in rendering the highest degree of efficient service to
our children.1,103 They expressed confidence in the board's
willingness and ability to eliminate the inequities.
But this time, the teachers decided to do more than
simply submit a petition and hope.

Between the mailing of

the first and second petitions they hired a lawyer to
pursue a court challenge.

Unfortunately their enthusiasm

exceeded their judgement in the selection of an attorney.
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They secured the services of a white attorney who "informed
the teachers that they needed a plaintiff; and besides he
had not had much experience in that type of law."104
Dismayed but not discouraged, the teachers next sought the
aid of Thurgood Marshall, the attorney responsible for the
salary equalization victories in

Maryland.

Marshall, a

graduate of Howard University Law School, had joined the
NAACP as a staff attorney in 1936.105 Marshall, who had
visited New Orleans several times in the past, arrived in
March 1939 to assist in the pay equalization fight.

A

meticulous organizer and strategist, Marshall informed the
group "that certain steps should be taken before filing
suit.

The teachers should organize a special committee,

raise money, and find suitable plaintiffs."

Before

returning to New York Marshall selected the local black
attorney Alexander Tureaud to help him in the case and he
assured the group that Tureaud would receive his constant
assistance.106
The New Orleans Citizens' Committee for Equalizing
Educational Opportunities, chaired by Donald Jones, a
community activist, provided funds to fight the case.
Forming an organization proved easy but finding a plaintiff
took more care, given the threat of reprisals by school
officials.

Officials in some southern communities

dismissed black teachers who took similar action.107 Unlike
most black professionals and businessmen in New Orleans,
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teachers worked at the pleasure and discretion of whites.
Despite the possible loss of his position, Joseph McKelpin,
a non-tenured teacher at Ricard School, agreed to act as
the plaintiff.108
Two years elapsed between Marshall's visit and
definitive action by black teachers.

The most plausible

explanation for the delay was that the teachers thought
school officials, cognizant of successful challenges in
other areas, would abolish salary discrimination without a
court fight.

They failed to realize that what may have

started out as just another form of petty discrimination
had become in New Orleans a means of holding down the cost
of black education and therefore of subsidizing white
education.

109

Once on the back of the tiger it was

difficult for school officials to dismount without a push.
The push came on 9 May 1941 in the form of a four point
petition presented by Attorney Tureaud on the behalf of
Joseph McKelpin.

It requested:

1. That the board abolish the present discrimination
schedule of teachers' salaries.
2. That petitioners and all other Negroes employed by
the board as public school teachers and principals
be paid compensation equal to that paid white
teachers with the same qualifications and experience
and performing the same services.
3. That a salary schedule free of all racial
discrimination or differential be established by the
board and made applicable to the compensation of all
teachers and principals in public schools in said
city.
4. That because this matter has previously been before
this board prompt action is respectfully requested
in order that the petitioner's legal rights in the
premises may not be jeopardized by delay.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The five member school board, led by President Henry C.
Schaumburg, assured Tureaud that the board would consider
the petition.

Tureaud seized the intitiative, however, and

filed suit in June, 1941.

Schaumburg then called a special

meeting to consider what actions the board should take.
One board member, George Treadwell, believed that Tureaud
filed the suit prematurely because the board had not
refused to grant the requests raised in the petition.
Neither Treadwell nor the other members, however, proposed
to eliminate or narrow the differential between the
salaries of black and white teachers.

Instead they

referred the suit to the City Attorney, Howard Lenfant, and
instructed him to litigate.111 On 7 July Lenfant filed a
"Motion for Extension of Time to Plead" and the court
granted his request.

Faced with precedents recently

established in other states, Lenfant had concluded that a
strategy of delay and dismissal represented his only
option.

After receiving a delay, he next filed a motion of

dismissal in September.
In addition to doing the routine legal work on the case
in New Orleans, Tureaud remained in constant communication
with Marshall in New York.

Tureaud wrote asking Marshall

to "indicate the time at which you would like to argue the
motion to dismiss."

119

This was Tureaud's first important

civil rights case, and he feared the motion to dismiss
might have legal merit.

Marshall, on the other hand, a
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veteran in the legal crusade for black civil rights,
considered the dismissal motion "completely without
113
foundation."
Marshall assured Tureaud that any points
Lenfant could raise had been attempted and lost in the
other cases.

Meanwhile, the case, assigned to Judge Wayne

Borah, remained dormant for several months.

Tureaud called

the judge's clerk several times hoping to hear encouraging
news only to be told that Borah had not reached a
decision.114
Dismayed over what he considered Judge Borah's
inordinate delay in reaching a decision, Marshall proposed
that he and Tureaud meet with the Judge in hopes of
expediting the matter.

Before the meeting took place,

Borah threw out the motion to dismiss and later scheduled a
trial for August 1942.

The prospect of a trial and almost

certain defeat led school board officials to attempt a
settlement.

August J. Tete, who became Superintendent in

January 1942 after Nicholas Bauer resigned, presented
Tureaud with a proposal.

Tete offered what he considered a

"better proposition" because his plan would eliminate not
only the differential between white and black teachers but
between degree and non-degree teachers as well.115
According to Tureaud's figures, about thirty percent of the
black teachers did not possess at least a B.A. degree, and
under Tete's plan they would also receive a salary
increase.

Tete requested five years to implement the plan;
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black teachers would receive twenty percent of the
differentiation in salaries each year until they equalled
those of whites.116 Tureaud lacked the authority to accept
or reject the offer and forwarded Tete's plan to Marshall.
The man with the authority minced few words:

"I think the

plan submitted by the school board stinks," he declared and
outlined his reasons.
too long.

"In the first place five years is

In the second place, there are too many catches.

And in the third place, I am sure that our teachers are
opposed to it."117
Rebuffed, Tete changed his approach and asked Marshall
and Tureaud to suggest "terms" they could accept.

Neither

Tete nor the school board envisioned equalizing the
salaries in one step.

Tureaud also endorsed the concept of

gradual equalization.

"I still believe," Tureaud wrote,

"that we could with some propriety fix at least a maximum
time we would grant them, and leave the details of the plan
to be worked out after they have indicated their acceptance
11ft
of any suggested plan."
Why did Tureaud give tacit
support to a compromise that clearly favored the school
board?

Unsubstantiated charges would later surface that

Tureaud received a bribe from school officials for his
endorsement of a compromise.

Tureaud was a man of

impeccable integrity and labored without compensation in
the black struggle for civil rights for over fifty years.
A bribe was definitely not the reason.

He supported a
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compromise for the same reason the black teachers
eventually accepted one— litigation was costly, sometimes
was lengthy, and its outcome was uncertain.

Although

Marshall refused to propose terms to school officials
because "the pressure at the present time is on the school
board, and not on us," he, too, would later support a
compromise.119
"Unless they propose a plan that is satisfactory to us,
they will have to go to trial in August; and this they do
not want to do," Marshall wrote in July 1942.120 Marshall's
instincts proved correct; in August school officials came
forward with an offer satisfactory to the black teachers
and to Judge Borah.

The opposing sides agreed to a two

year equalization plan.

The board promised to reduce the

differential by fifty percent in September 1942 and the
remainder in September, 1943.

Black teachers were

understandably happy, but Judge Borah's ruling contained a
broader implication for the entire black community.

Borah

had partially resurrected the principles of the Fourteenth
Amendment, principles that had at one time held such
promsie and hope.

Borah stated that the differentials in

white and black salaries were "in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States...."121 Not unmindful of
the implicaation of this statement, the Lousianan Weekly
placed the issue in the larger context of the development
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of the black community.

"The teachers won equal pay.

Why

should not equal facilities for Negro children be the next
step?"122
It was the "next step," and a study conducted by Alonzo
Grace provided additional support for black claims of
educational inequality.

Beginning in the mid-1930s various

white individuals and groups started to question the
efficiency of the city's public schools.

Out of their

concern emerged the Citizens' Planning Committee.

The

school board agreed to hire an educational expert to study
the entire school system and selected Dr. Alonzo Grace, the
Commissioner of Education for Connecticut, to head the
effort.

His investigative team started work in April,

1938, and published its final report in December, 1939.
Some blacks feared that Grace and his staff would either
ignore black education or minimize its deficiencies.

Their

fears proved groundless, however, and the Weekly considered
the completed study "open, fair, and extensive.1,123
Published as Tomorrow's Citizens:

A Study and Program

for the Improvement of the New Orleans Public Schools, the
report contained seven monographs covering a wide range of
subjects:

school facilities, administration, finance,

teacher training, curriculum development, and
recommendations for the improvements of the school.

It

painted an unflattering portrait of public education in New
Orleans.

Many of the problems cited by Grace resulted from
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a history of inadequate financial support for the schools.
An assessment of school buildings, for example, stated:
"New Orleans has serious problems in trying to provide
safe, sanitary and adequate buildings for its school
children... ."124
More than a lack of money, the report added,
contributed to the building problem.

Inadequate planning

caused "a great overlapping of circled areas [attendance
districts], many children living within a half-mile of
1£C
three or four schools."
A utilization survey disclosed
that the white schools had enough unoccupied classroooms to
accomodate 2,310 students.

The researchers thought "a

judicious shifting of district lines would make it possible
to fill some of those rooms, and buildings thus vacated
could be discontinued or converted to other uses."126
Only four of the twenty-five black schools received a
"fairly good" rating.

The remaining schools were in such

poor condition that Grace recommended complete replacement.
In many ways the Grace report merely reiterated the
deplorable conditions blacks had complained of for over
half a century.

The four "fairly good" schools— Craig,

Lockett, Jones, and Landry— possessed serious shortcomings
of their own.

The classrooms at Craig showed signs of

extensive water damage caused by leaks in the roof or
walls.

The desks, chairs, blackboards, and toilets were in

poor condition.

Overcrowding rather than under-utilization
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plagued the black schools.

"The rooms were very badly

crowded, and many classrooms did not have seats and desks
enough for the children present.

In one classroom, there

were fifty-four children present and only forty-seven
seats.

This condition is not peculiar to the Craig

School," the researchers concluded, "but may be found in
any number of colored schools."127
More important than overcrowded and inadequate school
buildings was the educational performance of black
students.

Like their white counterparts, black students

performed below the national norm in most categories.
Approximately sixty-five percent of the black students were
"overage" for their grade.

A typical student entered the

first grade at the age of six, and with normal promotion,
progressed one grade a year.

Thus, for example, at the age

of nine the student should have been in the fourth grade
and in the eighth at the age of thirteen.

Out of a total

of 2,377 blacks in the fourth grade, 1,727 were "over age"
for their grade. 128

The imbalance in the age-grade

distribution became more pronounced as the student
attempted to advance through the system.
An analysis of the promotion rates of 3,674 black
elementary school students revealed that 73 per cent of
them had failed at least one semester, 53 percent at least
two semesters, and a discouraging 10 percent had failed
five to fifteen semesters.

Black high school students
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fared little better.

Approximately 75 percent of the

students who entered eighth grade in 1934 left school
•

without graduating.

129

Like many New Orleanians, the report

viewed the problems of withdrawaal and non-promotion of
black and white students as an indication that the school
system failed to adapt to the needs of the students.
Grace study put it bluntly:

The

"This training-to-be-a failure

..., raises a grave question concerning its justice, its
common sense, and its cost in terms of heartache and
disappointment to pupils and parents."130 The research team
recommended, among other items, a thorough revision of the
curriculum and promotional practices to include vocational
training.
The Grace study generated a considerable amount of
discussion, but unfortunately little action.131 Budgetary
constraints precluded the immediate implementation of the
building replacement program recommended in the study.

The

current curriculum remained as it was except for minor
changes that did little to reverse the high non-promotion
and withdrawal rates.

More might have been done had the

report not come amid America's growing concern with the war
that raged in Europe.

After the United States joined the

war, neither blacks nor whites were as vocal in their
criticisms of school policies.

Blacks embraced the war

effort with the ever present pangs of "twoness."132 On the
eve of America's entry into the war many blacks attempted
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to reconcile their plight with the promise of democracy.
The black American said the Louisiana Weekly;

"Is faced

with the challenge to take up the task of the outraged
democracies..on the other hand he stands face to face with
a danger just as real...as any outside."133
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Chapter Five
Education and the Pursuit o£ the Golden Fleece, 1945-1960

After the end of World War II black New Orleanians
became more aggressive in their attempts to gain a better
education.

Their determined approach resembled that in

other areas of the country; they first sought to force
school officials to equalize black education within the
framework of separate but equal.

A quiet, cautious, and

legal attempt to equalize educational facilities, of
course, predated the war.

Since its inception in 1909 the

NAACP had followed a strategy of using the courts to extend
full citizenship to blacks.

In the early 1930s, through

the efforts of lawyers such as Charles Houston, Thurgood
Marshall and Robert Carter, the NAACP embarked on a legal
campaign to undermine the separate but equal doctrine by
forcing southern states to provide blacks with educational
facilities equal to those of whites.
The idea took concrete form in a report prepared by
Nathan Margold, later modified by Houston, that called on
the NAACP to focus on an "area where the whites were most
vulnerable and least likely to respond with anger"—
graduate and professional training.

"If graduate schools

were peaceably desegregated," one historian of the strategy
has explained, "then the NAACP could turn to undergraduate

181
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colleges.

And then secondary schools.

And grade schools.

Each new gain would help the advance to the next stage.
That the South would know this, too, and therefore fight
accordingly in the courts,

Houston had no doubt.1,1 The

South did fight, but blacks fought also on the national and
local levels.

Black New Orleanians joined the struggle and

grafted the new initiative onto their long-sustained guest
for improved education.
Faced with law suits filed by the NAACP and with court
mandated remediation, school officials throughout the South
attempted to narrow the gap between black and white
educational facilities.

"Southern states spent money,

almost desperately, on Negro schools," explained historian
John Hope Franklin, "Within a few years some of the most
modern schools to be found anywhere in the United States
had been constructed for Negro children in Southern
communities.

Southern leaders pledged themselves to

equalize white and black schools as rapidly as possible."2
New Orleans school officials proved no exception, but did
not start until blacks provided a certain amount of
prodding.
After World War II, black leaders continued to attend
school board meetings in cn effort to obtain better
schools.

In January 1945, Mrs. Charles Young, representing

the New Orleans Parent Teacher Council, complained about
the busing of students to McDonogh No. 24 School.

Some
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students lived as much as six or seven miles from the
school, she told school board members, and often had to
wait for buses in the cold and rain.

Mrs. Young asked

school officials to provide an elementary school for
children living in the area instead of busing them to
McDonogh

No. 24.

At the same meeting another black,

Reverend Morris Burrell, requested a new school for the
same area.

School board member Robert Haas told the

petitioners that the war had forced the school system to
place its building program on hold.3
Such pronouncements failed to dampen the resolve of
black leaders.

In March 1945, the Colored Educational

Alliance presented one of its many petitions to school
officials.

Anticipating the approaching end of World War

II, the Alliance suggested the school board make provision
in its postwar construction budget for gymnasiums for
Booker T. Washington, McDonogh 35, and L.B. Landry, a high
school to replace Albert Wicker, and a downtown high
school.

School board members received the request but

failed to commit themselves to financing the improvements.
After the war ended, returning veterans put increased
demands on the education system.

Dr. Cruezot and other

black leaders urged school officals to furnish a training
center for the ex- soldiers.

Their request was partially

heeded; school officials funded a twelve month veteran
training center at Booker T. Washington.4
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A petition submitted to schools officials in May 1946
indicated a new departure by local black leaders.

This

petition charged that deficiencies in black schools existed
because of racial discrimination.

The lengthy petition

listed eleven areas in which school officials discriminated
against blacks— the number of kindergarten, special
education, and vocational classes, the number of visiting
teachers, the number of gymnasiums, the use of city parks,
teaching loads, the high school academic curiculum, the
quality of school buildings, expenditures, and business
education.

Each section of the petition started with the

phrase "discrimination in" and summarized the particular
deficiency.

More important, blacks contended that failure

to remedy the problems represented "a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the
Constitution.1,5 Without granting the legal point, the
school board accepted the petition and promised to schedule
a meeting.

Alexander Tureaud then met with school

officials on 25 July 1946 to discuss the petition.

School

officials continued to stress their commitment to solve the
problems but claimed a lack of adequate revenues hindered
their attempts.6
Over the next several years (1946-1951) Lionel J.
Bourgeois served as superintendent of the school system and
attempted to address some of the inequities in black and
white education.7 After a meeting with Tureaud and other
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black leaders, Bourgeois asked Tureaud to "bear with me a
little longer and give your fullest cooperation in my
attempts to better facilites for Negro youth and to advance
the total program of education in this city."8 A school
board report in December 1947 revealed the enormity of the
task Bourgeois faced.

It disclosed "that the number of

classrooms available for the accommodation of the Negro
school population is entirely inadequate, and that adequate
provisions never have been made in the past for this school
population."

In addition, "numerous old school buildings

previously used for the white population have been
converted into Negro schools and have not yet been kept in
a good state of repair."9 Assessing the problem, however,
proved easier than finding solutions that satisfied the
black community.
The critical issues remained a lack of classroom
space, the poor condition of existing facilities, and an
insufficient number of teachers.

To address the problem of

inadequate classroom space, school officials considered a
program called consolidation and conversion.

Under such a

policy, the student body at white schools with low
enrollment would be consolidated and the schools no longer
needed for whites would be converted for use by blacks.
The plan, which on the surface appeared sound, encountered
stiff opposition from whites and, for different reasons,
criticism from blacks.10
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Comments by the leader of a parent group concerning
the conversion of HcDonogh 16 typified the reaction of the
white community.

The parent group presented school

officials with a petition signed by 1,782 persons opposed
to the conversion.

Its spokesperson argued that the

proposed conversion would force white students to cross too
many busy streets.

If school officials continued to pursue

the conversion, the group threatened to sue.

School

Superintendent Lionel Bourgeois informed the petitioners
that black leaders had placed increased pressure on school
officials to equalize facilities.

Bourgeois added that

blacks also had threatened to sue.

Doubtlessly,

Bourgeois

viewed the threatened suit by blacks with graver concern
than one by the white group.

Bourgeois told the white

group that if school officials failed to equalize school
facilities, the courts would compel school officials to
admit blacks into white schools.

The spokesperson informed

Bourgeois that the group "certainly did not intend that
Negroes should be housed" at white schools.11
Following the group from McDonogh No. 16, Mrs. H .J .
Smith, president of the William 0. Rogers Parents' Club,
spoke in opposition to the conversion of that elementary
school.

Bourgeois, aware of a possible suit by blacks and

fearful of a court mandated solution to the school
equalization issue, told the white protestors "that the
board has the humanitarian and legal obligation to provide
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school facilities for children regardless of race...."

He

considered his plan reasonable though implementing it would
"require a great deal of courage" by the school board and
white groups.12 Bourgeois appealed to the white groups for
support and again reminded them of the possibility of a
court mandated solution that whites would prefer much less
than his own plan of consolidation and conversion.
Despite Bourgeois' assessment, school board members
assured the Rogers delegation that they would consider the
petition and the group would have another opportunity to
speak before the board reached a decision.

Buoyed by the

board's responses to the Rogers and McDonogh No. 16
delegations, other groups attempted to prevent the
consolidation and conversion of their schools.

On 18 March

1948 a large number of whites attended a special meeting of
the school board to protest the possible conversion of
several schools, including two vacant white elementary
schools, Zachary Taylor and Edward White.

Bourgeois

offered to withdraw his controversial plan if whites helped
to campaign for a millage increase to build additional
black schools and dropped their objections to the
conversion of the two vacant schools.

13

Concessions to whites invariably brought angry
protests from blacks.

Attorney Alexander P. Tureaud, who

along with Thurgood Marshall had successfully litigated the
teacher equalization suit, appeared before the school board
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in Hay 1948.

Tureaud charged that the board had not done

enough to equalize school facilities and that the
educational demands outlined in the 1946 petition, which
had alluded to the Fourteenth Amendment, had not yet been
met.

In his opinion, blacks were entitled to additional

facilities.

Tureaud reminded the board of a case in which

the Supreme Court ruled against a school board in Virginia
and mandated the equalization of black and white school
facilities.

In addition, Tureaud made it clear that blacks

did not want dilapidated, "hand-me-down" buildings unfit
for school use.

He threatened to sue unless school

officials took steps to improve school facilities for black
New Orleanians.

School board members assured Tureaud that

they were aware of the problems and planned to raise forty
million dollars with the major portion dedicated to black
school facilities.14
That same month, over sixteen hundred blacks had
gathered at the Booker T. Washington Auditorium and heard a
refutation of the Washingtonian philosophy of the
separation of the races in non-economic pursuits.

The

featured speaker, Thurgood Marshall, told the crowd "the
issue is not for separate but equal facilites, the real
fight is against segregated schools."15 Yet less than a
month later Tureaud filed suit against the school board
asking for equalization of facilities.

Tureaud's actions

appeared in direct conflict with Marshall's speech, and
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(since Marshall spoke as a representative of the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund) to the NAACP

position as well.

In

fact, the suit represented an integral part of the NAACP's
strategy to initially undermine "separate but equal" and
then to attack it directly.16 Although the national NAACP
office provided legal expertise, direction, and
encouragement, the equalization and desegregation suits
depended on local initiatives and conditions.

Marshall's

speech in May 1948 outlined the basic philosophy; Tureaud's
suit signaled the beginning of its implementation.
Since the filing of the May 1946 petition to the
school board, the destiny of black education in New Orleans
was linked to the local branch of the NAACP.

By 1946

blacks had decided to use the courts if protest and
petititon failed to produce equality.

The Colored

Educational Alliance, the New Orleans Federation of Civic
Leagues, and the various ward

based organizations

willingly passed the mantle to the NAACP.

For nearly half

a century those organizations had served the black
community well.

Using protest, petitions, and constant

agitation, their efforts produced improvements in black
education.

The transition from offering protests and

petitions to seeking judicial redress occurred without
friction, animosity, or any noticeable splits within the
community's black leadership.17 This was so because the
NAACP was an inclusive organization which drew its
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membership from throughout the city.

In addition, the new

strategy was more evolutionary than revolutionary.

Black

New Orleanians had used the federal courts in the past to
eliminate discrimination.

With ties to a national

organization, the local NAACP branch had access to the best
civil rights attorneys in the country.

The success of the

NAACP in integrating professional and graduate schools, as
well as success in the teacher equalization suits, brought
prestige and members into the fold.

Daniel Byrd and others

knew, though, that the members would remain in the fold
only if the NAACP supplied aggressive leadership and a
constant attack on segregation and discrimination.
Daniel Byrd, a native of Arkansas, moved to New
Orleans at the age of 27 and quickly emerged as one of the
city's leading civil rights activists.

He joined the New

Orleans NAACP, helped to organize the state chapter, and
later became president of the NAACP State Conferences of
Branches.

Byrd possessed enormous energy, intelligence,

and courage and established the tone for an aggressive
NAACP.

At a school board meeting on 12 August 1949, Byrd

expressed the mood of the new leadership.

He questioned

the board's decision to spend hundreds of thousands of
dollars on improving white schools when black children
still attended school part-time because of overcrowding.
He wanted to know "if the members of the board realized
that if a parent of a colored pupil living in the district
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of an overcrowded school took a child to a white school and
asked for admission, that in accordance with the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution local discrimination statues
would not apply...."

Noting the refusal of the school

board to convert many of the underutilized white schools to
black use, because of white opposition, Byrd wanted it
known that "if the school board reacts to pressure and
antagonism, then we are ready, and ready now, to start our
antagonism; and pressure."

Byrd reminded the school board

members that talking with representatives of the NAACP was
"not the same as talking to groups of black principals and
teachers."18
Byrd, along with local and national black leaders,
realized the difficulties associated with a legal assault
on segregated elementary and secondary schools and
proceeded cautiously as they built support within the black
community.

In this connection the organizational structure

of the NAACP became important.

Unlike the other groups

that had fought for improved schools, the NAACP held
regular monthly meetings, had officials elected by the
community at large, and boasted a dues-paying membership.
The monthly meetings provided a forum in which to discuss
issues related to education and the appropriate strategy to
win improvement.

The NAACP kept the members informed about

the activities of other communities and the proposals and
strategies recommended by the NAACP National Office.
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Additionally, the monthly meetings provided the opportunity
for the regular members to voice their views on school
equalization and desegregation.
Seventy-five years of broken promises and the general
hostility of the white community to equal educational
opportunities for blacks led many blacks, especially those
in the NAACP, to conclude that the federal courts offered
the only solution.

As early as 1945 several black parents

had asked the local NAACP branch to sue to compel the board
to equalize black and white education.

Partly because of

the efforts of Bourgeois to allocate more money to the
black schools, black leaders delayed the suit.19 As fall
1947 approached, however, several leaders had become
restive and wanted an equalization suit filed.

Among those

advocating filing was Daniel Byrd, who by 1947 had become a
NAACP Assistant Field Secretary.20 Byrd acknowledged
Superintendent Bourgeois' good intentions but made it clear
to Tureaud that he thought "some action should be
forthcoming."21 Much of Bourgeois' plan to improve black
schools depended on the passage of a bond issue to finance
the construciton of new schools, Byrd believed.

But "the

proposed Twenty Million Dollar Bond issue is something
which may not materialize unless some action is taken to
aid the

Superintendent in what he terms his willingness to

equalize the educational system."22
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Byrd soon became incensed with the apparent reluctance
of the local NAACP leadership to file suit.

He confided to

Tureaud "that too much effort and sweat has been put into
the New Orleans Branch by both of us to permit weak
leadership [to] kill the branch.

And we both know that the

[membership] campaign this year was not properly organized
and the only possible way it can be pulled out of the hole
is by some issue being attacked."23 Simple logic convinced
Byrd that a suit against the school board would provide the
needed issue.

Byrd's experience had convinced him that

blacks' guest for full equality would necessitate a resort
to the judicial system and that the NAACP had to take the
lead.

A suit against the board would perform a dual

purpose— focus attention on and win support for the NAACP
and address inequality in education.
Like Byrd, Superintendent Bourgeois favored an
equalization suit but for different reasons.

Would white

voters go to the polls and increase taxes, especially if
the majority of it was dedicated to black schools, in the
absence of a crisis?

Bourgeois thought not.

White schools

were not overcrowded; indeed, many of the elementary
schools were underutilized.

If the bond issue failed,

white education would suffer slightly— if at all.

On the

other hand, improvements in black education depended on the
passage of the bond issue.
equalization suit

Bourgeois hoped that an

would spur white voters to reasses their
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position and support the bond issue.

Bourgeois made it

clear on several occasions that the failure to move forward
on educational equalization would result in black demands
for integrated schools.24 He outlined the choices in stark
terms:

vote for increased taxes or prepare for

integration.

Bourgeois' efforts did not go unappreciated

by the black community.
lived in

"During the fifteen years I have

New Orleans," Byrd observed, "no other

superintendent has ever approached the problem of public
education on such a determined and fair basis.1,25 But
Bourgeois attempted to bring school officials and white New
Orleans to a place they were as yet unprepared to go.
Tureaud made one last attempt at a direct appeal to
the board before he filed suit.

On 20 Hay 1948 Tureaud

forwarded a letter to the school board listing ten areas of
discrimination.

He reiterated the complaints contained in

the May 1946 petition and warned the board that "unless
these inequalities are immediately removed, we shall be
compelled to take such legal action as may be
Of%
warranted....1
Board members told Tureaud that they
shared his belief that tax dollars should be spent equally
among black and white students.27 Nevertheless, hoping to
put pressure on school officals and the white community,
Tureaud filed the equalization suit against the school
board on 2 June 1948.

The board responded with a

declaration of commitment to the principle of educational
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equality and endorsed several proposals to upgrade black
education.

Board members also agreed to ask the

legislature for additional money to improve black schools.
Nonetheless, school officals failed to grapple with the
urgency of the situation.

Perhaps fearful of racial

tension and white hostility, they continued to refuse to
convert underutilized white schools to black use.28
Instead, they adopted the unrealistic approach of trying to
solve the problem by the construction of new schools.
School board members had neither sufficient money nor time
to pursue such a strategy.

A building plan of sufficient

scope to address existing inequities would cost millions of
dollars and take approximately a decade to complete.

They

should have realized that black patience had just about run
out.
The equalization suit filed on behalf of Wilfred
Aubert and other black parents was based on concrete needs
as well as abstract principles.

Few black children in New

Orleans realized they suffered from some of the many
behavioral maladies the noted black psychologist Kenneth
Clark would later assign them during arguments in the Brown
case.

They did know, as their parents did even more, that

they attended overcrowded schools, and many did that on
only a part-time basis.

Many of them also knew that their

small legs often grew weary before reaching schools miles
from their homes.

Kindergarten classes, a fixture in the
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white schools, existed in only nine of the black schools.
When black leaders evoked the abstract principles contained
in the Fourteenth Amendment they did so to address concrete
needs.
A century of exclusion or segregation had produced
educational inequalities which affected all phases of black
education.

Inadequate school buildings, overcrowding, and

high pupil-teacher ratios were just three of the many
problems black leaders had attempted to solve.

Only during

the brief period of political empowerment during
Congressional Reconstruction had blacks received an
equitable share of the city's educational revenues.

Since

then, black leaders and parents had formed many
organizations to fight for improved schools.

Their

strategy of protest and petition had yielded significant
gains.

But black educational interests and needs continued

to surpass available opportunities within the public school
system.

School officials and the white community appeared

unwilling to make a final effort to equalize black and
white educational opportunities.

Blacks hoped to gain,

through the federal courts, the educational parity that had
eluded them using the tactic of protest and petition.
Since the 1920s overcrowding had been the major
complaint of the black community.

During the 1946-1947

school year, some black elementary schools had a pupil to
teacher ratio of sixty to one.

At the high school level,
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the ratio was thirty to one.

In contrast, white elementary

schools enjoyed a pupil to teacher ratio of thirty to one
and white high schools, twenty-one to one.

Moreover,

fifteen of the fifty white elementary schools had less than
53 percent utilization.

For example, Allen School built

for 1,085 students had an enrollment of 381, or 35 percent
of capacity.

Kruttschnitt School had 201 students enrolled

and a capacity of 630, a utilization percentage of 32
percent.

One of the largest white elementary schools, Live

Oak, had a utilization percentage of 44 percent.

At the

close of the 1947-1948 school year, blacks could only
attend three high schools, McDonogh No. 35, Booker T.
Washington, and L. B. Landry.29
In an attempt to eliminate some of the inequities in
black and white schools, in 1948 the board appealed to the
voters of the state to approve a three mill tax increase
for New Orleans.

Bourgeois made over one hundred and sixty

speeches in behalf of passage of this millage proposal.If
voters approved the measure, school officials planned to
use approximately sixty-five percent of the money on black
schools.

Whether that fact persuaded New Orleanians to

vote against the tax is unclear.

The outcome in the city,

however, was clear— on 2 November 1948 New Orleans voters
rejected the millage increase by a majority of 24,000.
Voters throughout the state proved more cooperative and the
measure passed statewide.

Thus, even though the increase
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failed in New Orleans, its passage statewide made it
possible for the school board to levy the extra millage.
But, the November election also brought two new members to
the New Orleans Board; both had run on a platform opposing
the millage increase.

Consequently, they

thought it was

their moral obligation to continue to oppose the tax
hike.30 Superintendent Bourgeois often reminded them of
another moral obligation— providing adequate school
facilities to all school children.31 Over the next few
years the board assessed part of the three mill tax, but
did not link the millage to a comprehensive building plan.
An analysis of the consolidation and conversion plan
to equalize black and white education revealed mixed
results.

School officials often yielded to pressure to

prevent the closing of white schools.

Moreover, white

leaders went beyond mere rhetoric and petitions.

They

turned to the courts and area legislators for help.
Senator Arthur O'Keefe of New Orleans sponsored a bill to
prohibit the conversion of a school from white to black use
without the consent of seventy percent of the property
owners in the area.

The bill, Act 463, passed the

legislature and Governor Earl K. Long signed it into law in
July 1948.32
Armed with Act 463 white leaders hoped to block any
additional closings and conversions.

Undeterred, school

board members voted on 30 November 1948 to convert the
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Edward White School from white to black use.
opposed to the plan reacted swiftly.

White leaders

Attorneys for Mrs.

Marie Theard, a white parent, filed suit to halt the
planned conversion.

Their judicial pleadings fell on

unsympathetic ears; the court ruled Legislative Act 463
unconstitutional.

It issued its decision on 28 February

1949, and school officials immediately proceeded with the
conversion plan. Another suit filed by patrons of
Kruttschnitt School suffered a similar fate.

These two

conversions did not mean school officials had abandoned the
interests of the white community.

Indeed, on several other

occasions whites successfully prevented the closing and
conversion of their schools by protesting to the school
board.33
Since blacks had begun to shift from their goals from
that of equalization to integration, no amount of parity
under a segregated system proved acceptable.

Between the

filing of the equalization suit in 1948 and the suit to
desegregate four years later, school officials, especially
Superintendent Bourgeois, believed equalization would
satisfy the black community.

Racial segregation hindered

the formation of a consistent dialogue between blacks and
whites.

White leaders failed to grasp the changing mood of

the black population.

As a result, Bourgeois frantically

attempted to raise school revenues to finance a massive
building program.

He was also the architect and main
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proponent of consolidation and conversion.

Bourgeois'

motives were clear— he wanted to equalize facilities before
local blacks decided to sue for desegregation.
Despite Bourgeois' sincere attempts to equalize black
and white school facilities, his efforts failed.

The board

refused to provide the strong leadership Bourgeois thought
the situation warranted.

Even after blacks filed suit,

Bourgeois advised the board members that if they displayed
a good faith effort in working towards equalization, blacks
would not press the suit.

He cautioned the board that

blacks were determined to achieve equal opportunity in
education and pointed to the increasing number of blacks
attempting to register to vote.

Law suits and voter

registration aside, Bourgeois thought school officials
"should be motivated by the moral values involved in the
board's policy promulgated only a few months ago which
states boldly that it stands for equality of educational
opportunity for the children of New Orleans regardless of
race or color."
Throughout his tenure as Superintendent, Bourgeois
remained committed to the idea "that all men of every race,
condition and age have an inalienable right of
«JC

education."

Pursuing that goal occasionally placed him

at odds with the white community as well as with the school
board members.

The quick-tempered Bourgeois, who had an

unshakeable sense of right and wrong, and school board
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members disagreed on many issues besides the consolidation
and conversion plan.

Over a matter not related to his

stance on improving black education, board members Clarence
Scheps and William C. Fletcher led a successful movement to
remove Bourgeois from office.

During his travails with the

board, teachers, parent groups, and organizations wrote to
express their support.
from blacks.

Many of the communications came

The president of the L. B. Landry Parent-

Teacher Organization "heartily endorse[d] the
Administration of Superintendent Lionel J. Bourgeois and
requeste[d] that he be retained as superintendent."36
After months of harassment and charges of incompetence
stemming from the purchase of substandard meat, Bourgeois
resigned in May 1951.

The board appointed 0. Perry Walker

interim superintendent and started a search for a permanent
replacement. 37

Walker served for nearly two years before

the board named James Redmond as the permanent
superintendent.

By the time Dr. Redmond assumed the

position, the educational demands of the black commmunity
had changed.
When the school year started in 1951, black leaders
had made the commitment to desegregation.
the next ten years working toward that end.

They would spend
In September

of that year when Marshall and Byrd discussed various
strategies they would employ, Byrd stressed the need for
providing the community with as much detailed information
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as possible.

Byrd wanted to ensure that the black

population fully understood and supported the new
initiative.38 On 12 November Tureaud presented another
petition to the school board— as he and other blacks had
done for over three quarters of a century.

Tureaud's

petition again detailed the substantial inequalities in the
educational opportunities available to blacks and whites.
Declaring that his petition "represented the sentiments of
the entire Negro citizenry," Tureaud demanded the
integration of the New Orleans Public Schools.

The

president of the board, Dr. Clarence Scheps, thought
Tureaud had raised "a very grave question" and promised to
"study the petition and prepare an answer in due time."39
Two weeks later the board issued a unanimous response.
"After careful study of the petition," the resolution
began, "the board is of the firm opinion that such a
radical change of policy could not, at this time, serve the
best interests of the system.
that

The board believes, rather,

such a departure from tradition and custom, quite

apart from the fact that such action by the board would be
illegal, could result in chaos and confusion and further,
quite possibly cause a very serious worsening of race
relationships in the community as a whole."40 The school
board's statement did not come as a surprise to Tureaud; by
the time he submitted the petition, he was formulating
desegregation strategy with Robert Carter and Thurgood
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Marshall.

Why did Tureaud present a petition he knew the

board would reject?

Tureaud could not sue for desegregtion

without first attempting to desegregate the schools.

The

petition to desegregate and the subsequent resolution
rejecting the request enabled him to pursue a judicial
remedy.
By 1952 the school board operated twenty-eight black
and forty-six white elementary schools.

At the secondary

level the disparity continued— eleven schools for whites
and six for blacks.

Still faced with overcrowded,

unsanitary, and generally insufficient school facilites,
Mew Orleans black leaders again sought judicial relief.
This time, however, they were not only seeking physical
parity, but something more.

Earl Benjamin Bush, and

several other parents, on behalf of their children and
through their attorney Alexander P. Tureaud, filed suit
against the Orleans Parish School Board on 5 September
1952.

The sponsors of the suit requested complete

integration of the New Orleans Public

Schools.

At the

next school board meeting, the board members ordered
Superintendent Walker to forward the suit to the State
Attorney General.

They also "approve[d] the recommendation

for additional platooning [at several black schools]
necessary to reduce the pupil to teacher ratio below fortyfive, with an expression of profound regret that a
situation existed which called for such action."42 Such
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decisions served to reinforce black claims that it was
easier to discriminate against them in a segregated system
theui in an integrated one.
The Bush desegragation suit was one of several

filed

under the auspices of the national office of the NAACP.
Three months earlier, the Supreme Court had agreed to hear
two similar cases that originated in Kansas and South
Carolina.

In October and November of 1952, the Supreme

Court justices added three more cases from Virginia,
Washington, D.C., and Delaware.

The justices would use

those five cases, consolidated as Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka. Kansas, to rule on the continued
legality of segregated elementaryand secondary schools, or
in a larger senseon "whether the white people of the
United States might continue to treat the black people as
their subjects.',44
Neither the filing of the Bush suit nor the decision
by the Supreme Court to hear the five desegregation cases
affected the manner in which New Orleans school officials
administerd the schools.
tradition, and

Segregation represented law,

custom, and the school board remained

determined to uphold the status quo.

The commitment to

desegregation, however, created a dilemma for the black
community.

What should they do in the interim between

filing suit and a favorable court decision?

Should they

press for improvements under the present segregated system
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as they awaited court action?

To do so, might undermine

their position on desegregation.

On the other hand, to

take no action in the face of persistent, inequalities in
black and white education seemed unconscionable.

In 1950

the NAACP National Office recommended not continuing
efforts to equalize separate facilities.

To individuals

like Byrd who had set their sights on high principles as
well as immediate needs, improvements had to be sacrificed
to the ultimate and more important goal of integration.
Responding to a request for assistance from a black leader
in the central part of the state, Byrd made his views
clear.

"I understand your problem but I can do nothing to

assist you in asking for an increase for a segregated
school... as long as schools are segregated, inequalities
will exist.1,45 Other black leaders remained wedded to
Byrd's unerring principles but at the same time sought an
increase in school facilities under the segregated system.
The outcome of the school desegregation cases was unclear,
and blacks still needed an education.

Again, pragmatism

and principle continued to exist side by side.
On 17 May 1954,
members of the United

in a unanimous decision the nine
States Supreme Court ruled "thatin

the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but
equal1 has no place.Separate educational facilities

are

inherently unequal.,|46Blacks throughout America were
predictably pleased with the Supreme Court decision.
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Tureaud called It "a very momentous decision and one which
will go down in the annals of our American
jurisprudence...."

Another local black attorney considered

the decision a "victory for Negroes in particular, and
Americans in general."47 Both men believed the Brown
decision would facilitate school desegregation in New
Orleans.

But the guardians of racial separation remained

determined to keep the intent of the Brown decree out of
"the city that care forgot."
Within days of the Brown decision, the intransigency
which would characterize the white South's response to
40

Brown began to appear.

All elements within the white

community voiced dissatisfaction with the Brown decree.
Governor Robert F. Kennon vowed to maintain segregated
schools and noted that "Louisiana has done a great deal in
the past few years to develop a good parallel school
system."49 Louisiana congressman F. Edward Hebert assailed
the decision and joined the forces of resistance.

Members

of the Louisiana House of Representatives voted 84 to 3
"that the abolition of segregation would be intolerable to
both the white and Negro citizens of Louisiana...."
letter to a New Orleans

In a

paper, one white citizen claimed

that "the Negro in America has not evolved to a point where
he is entitled to some of the considerations that some of
their aggressive agitators are trying to make them
believe."50 Another condemned the Court's action as
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"vicious despotism" and endorsed non-compliance.51
After the Brown decision, the Louisiana legislature
became an active ally of the school board and soon assumed
the dominant role in the fight against desegregated
schools.

The newly created Joint Legislative Committee on

Segregation, chaired by Senator William M. Rainach of
Summerfield, coordinated the assault.

The school board's

and state's adherence to the so-called strategy of
"legislate and litigate" effectively prevented the
desegregation of New Orleans public schools for six years.
Before the year ended, the legislature had passed several
bills designed to keep the schools segregated.

Acts 555

and 556 served as the centerpieces of the legislative
initiative.

Act 555 prohibited local school systems from

establishing desegregated schools.

Failure to comply with

the law would result in the loss of accreditation and
funding.

Act 556 established a pupil placement law

designed to prevent desegregation.

A proposed

constitutional amendment also would allow the state to
exercise its police power to operate segregated schools.52
Acts 555, 556, and the proposed constitutional
amendment represented the first legislative attempts to
maintain segregation. Letters to the editors and the public
pronouncements of politicians are not always the best
indicators of public opinion, but when the legislature
submitted the segregation amendment to the people for
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approval, Louisianians had an opportunity to express their
sentiments directly.

On 2 November 1954, they did so:

217,992 voted in favor of the amendment and only 46,929
against it.

The amendment passed in every parish,

including Orleans, where the vote was 54,728 to 16,467.
Pleased, Senator Rainach announced the "election certainly
show[ed] what the people of Louisiana want and I think
they're going to get it.

Blacks in New Orleans, on the

other hand, could only take solace from the refusal of the
city's legislative delegation to formally endorse the
amendment.

Mayor deLesseps S. Morrison also took a neutral

stand on the Amendment.54
The New Orleans School Board endorsed and encouraged
the state's segregation legislation.

School Superintendent

James Redmond expressed the opinion that segregation was a
state and local issue and questioned the propriety of
federal intervention.

After the Brown decision he asked

the school board to provide "some further direction on how
to proceed in preparing the budget."

Board member

Celestine Besse noted the recent decision failed to provide
methods or guidelines for implementation and in fact gave
the parties involved in the case until November 1954 to
present information concerning implementation.

Given that

schedule, Besse expected no specific demands would be made
by the court until the next spring or summer.

Therefore,

he "moved that the board instruct the Superintendent and
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the staff to prepare all preliminary budgets and plans for
organization of the 1954- 1955 school year on the basis of
the same kind of organization and programs as the board was
currently operating...."

Theodore Shepard seconded the

motion and it passed without opposition, but not before the
board made it clear "that by this action the Superintendent
would be directed to operate schools on a segregated
basis."55 Later in the year school board president Dr.
Clarence Scheps announced that he favored continued
segregation and said that he believed "rapid integration in
the public school system would do irreparable damage to the
children of both races."

Scheps wanted to see integration

"postponed for another 50 years."56
The Supreme Court's 31 May 1955 decision on
implementation led to another flurry of activity.

The

Court's ruling that desegration should proceed "with all
deliberate speed" gave all the interested groups reason for
optimism.

The extreme segregationists saw it as a sign of

judicial retreat and moderates interpreted it as a mandate
to desegregate the schools gradually.

The President pro

tempore of the Louisiana Senate, Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr.
of New Orleans, recognized as much and "welcome[d] the new
orders mild tone which furnishes us an opportunity to
examine local conditions and act accordingly to get our
house in order."

On the other hand, state representative

John Garrett saw the decision as a victory for the
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segregationists.

Garrett

"firmly believe[d] the justices

realized that they had made a mistake...and this was their
easiest way out, putting it back on the local level."
Leander Perez charged that the decree represented "a
disgrace to the country."

Tureaud also expressed some

disappointment because he "expected the Supreme Court to
put a time schedule beyond which local school boards may
not delay in carrying out the

decree.,l57

As the state marshalled its resources to prevent
desegregation, the black community, marshalled its own
resources.

On 22 and 23 May 1954, Daniel Byrd attended a

NAACP meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, comprised of
representatives from the seventeen states and the District
of Columbia still operating legally segregated school
systems.

When the meeting concluded, the participants

issued a statement known as the "Atlanta Declaration."
Though brief, only one page long, the document indicated
that black leaders were determined to see Brown
implemented.

They urged all Americans to support the Brown

decision and took encouragement from "the pledges of
support and compliance by governors, attorney generals,
mayors, and education officials...."

They offered "to wcrk

with other law abiding citizens who are anxious to
translate this decision into a program of action to
eradicate racial segregation in public education as
speedily as possible."

They asked local black communities
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and NAACP branches "to petition their local school boards
to abolish segregation without delay and to assist these
agencies in working out ways and means of implementing the
court's ruling." They expressed their commitment to "resist
the use of any tactics contrived for the sole purpose of
delaying desegregation."

But the ninety-two conference

participants were experienced civil rights activists; they
realized that even as they met vitriolic white opposition
had crystallized.58
Over the next several years blacks in New Orleans had
to counter many tactics designed to prevent the
desegregation of the schools. Even as they did so, New
Orleans black leaders pursued three objectives.

First and

foremost, they continued to litigate the Bush suit.

The

1954 Brown decision and the 1955 implementation decree,
coupled with the state legislative resistance, led to a
costly and time consuming legal battle.

The school board

refused to pursue any desegregation plan; black leaders had
to sue to force compliance with the Brown decision.
The second and third objectives were related to the
first.

At the local level blacks needed to display enough

militancy and aggressiveness to keep the desegregation
effort going forward.

Blacks responded by submitting

petitions and filing applications for admission into white
schools.

They also raised money to help pay for the

litigation.

Individuals, along with social, fraternal, and
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professional organizations contributed to the effort.
Finally, black leaders attempted to win support from
elements within the white community.

That proved difficult

because almost immediately staunch segregationists had
gained the ascendancy.

Except for the Bureau of

Governmental Affairs, a private civic group which
investigated and lobbied for improved government
efficiency, integrity, and accountability, and high
officials within the Catholic Church, notably Archbishop
Francis Rummel, sustained white support proved difficult to
find.59
On 27 June 1955 Tureaud filed with the school board
another petition seeking desegregation.

In part it stated

that "the May 31 ruling means that the time for delay,
evasion, or procrastination is passed, and it is the duty
of the school board to seek a solution in accordance with
the law of the land."

Board members refused to act,

claiming in the words of their

vice president, Celestine

Besse, that they were "responsible to the state government,
and our state laws do not allow integration."

Tureaud

had no choice but to continue litigation in the Bush suit,
which was scheduled for a hearing in September.

Tureaud

had to amend the suit to include arguments against Acts 555
and 556 of 1954.

Shortly before the scheduled hearing,

Judge J. Skelly Wright requested that a three judge panel
hear the suit because the case involved the
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constitutionality of state law.

Herbert W. Christenberry

and Wayne G. Borah joined Wright in hearing the case.61
In the meantime the legislature, under the growing
influence of William Rainach and the Joint Legislative
Committee on Segregation, received a $100,000 dollar
appropriation from the Board of Liquidation of the State
Debt to hire special counsel to assist in the legal attack
against the Brown decision.

"The state should step in and

assist local school boards everywhere," Rainach charged,
"in defending themselves against suits by the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored

People seeking

to destroy our policy of separation of the races."

The

Attorney General's Office administered the fund, and the
Orleans Parish School Board received some of the money to
pay part of the salary of its special counsel, Gerard
Rault.62
Meeting in New Orleans, the three federal judges heard
arguments on the constitutional issues from Robert Carter
of the NAACP Legal Defense staff and Alexander Tureaud for
the plaintiff and Gerard Rault and W. Scott Wilkinson,
representing the school board.

Tureaud and Carter

continued the original argument in the Bush suit that
school segregation by race was unconstitutional.

They also

charged that the Brown decision rendered Acts 555 and 556
unconstitutional as well.

Rault and Wilkinson countered

that the entire matter rested outside federal jurisdiction
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and argued the state had acted within its "police power" to
maintain health, safety and educational standards.

They

produced witnesses who supported their claim that health
and education problems would result from integrated
schools.

After hearing both sides, the judges took the

case under advisement and issued their ruling in February
1956.63
Judges Borah and Christenbery removed themselves from
the case after ruling Acts 555 and 556 unconstitutional and
noting the case posed "no serious constitutional
questions....1,64 Their withdrawal again left Wright as the
sole presiding judge; he issued the court's opinion on the
specific issue of desegregation.

Judge Wright recounted

the facts of the case and noted the several petitions
blacks had submitted asking the board to desegregate the
schools.

Clearly the board had demonstrated its

unwillingness to grant relief.

Wright acknowledged the

difficulties associated with desegregation and thought the
problems were "considerably more serious than generally
appreciated in some sections of our country."

To solve the

problem "will require the utmost patience, understanding,
generosity, and forbearance from all of us, of whatever
race."

Nonetheless, "the magnitude of the problem may not

nullify the principle.

And that principle is that we are,

all of us, freeborn Americans, with a right to make our
way, unfettered by sanctions imposed by man because of the
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work of God.1

Citing the Brown decision, Judge Wright

ruled the Orleans Parish School Board's practice of
assigning children to schools based on race
unconstitutional.

After sixty years black New Orleanians

had removed the onerous burden of Plessy.
Reaction in New Orleans and around the state varied,
but generally the forces of resistance were the most
outspoken.

Celestine Besse, who had become president of

the school board, vowed to appeal Judge Wright's ruling and
reiterated the board's commitment "to use every legal and
honorable means to preserve segregation."66 The newly
elected governor, Earl K. Long, refused to reaffirm his
campaign pledge that he would close the schools before
allowing integration.

He did, however, assert that the

South needed racial separation.

Rainach, along with Perez,

remained the chief spokesman for the segregationists.
Rainach planned to adopt a different strategy featuring the
doctrine of interposition and the placing of all local
school systems under the jurisdiction of the state.

With

tacit approval from Governor Long, Rainach easily guided an
interposition resolution through the legislature without
recorded opposition.

The

House voted 82 to 0 for approval

and the Senate 37 to 0.67
The interposition resolution attempted to revive the
untenable position of state sovereignty in areas "not
CO
specifically enumerated to the federal government."
For
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the purpose of the present crisis, the legislators
maintained that Louisiana had retained its right to
administer its public schools.

As a result, the

desegregation decisions violated the state and United
States constitutions.

The resort to interposition, despite

the bellicose rhetoric to the contrary, revealed the legal
weakness of Louisiana's position.

The Brown decision and

Judge Wright's ruling left little doubt that neither
legislative subterfuge nor outright defiance could prevent
implementation.

Interposition was at best a delaying

tactic, but delay no matter how brief seemed more palatable
to most whites than integration.

Then, too, many

Louisianians may have shared Senator Harry F. Byrd's view
that, "if we can organize the Southern states for massive
resistance to this order I think that in time the rest of
the country will realize integration is not going to be
accepted in the South.

In interposition the South has a

perfectly legal means of appeal from the Supreme Court
order."69
Over the next four years blacks remained resolute, the
federal courts refused to retreat, and desegregated
education slowly became a reality in parts of the South.
To forestall desegregation in New Orleans, the legislature
continued to pass segregation laws, but blacks continued to
challenge them in court, and the federal courts continued
to declare them unconstitutional.70
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New Orleans' resistance to desegregation extended
beyond the polemics of public officials like William
Rainach and John Garrett, the segregationist leader in the
State House of Representatives.

The rapid rise of white

citizens' councils attested to the depth of segregationist
sentiment.

The initial Louisiana Chapter organized in

Rainach's home parish of Claiborne in April 1955, a second
chapter formed in New Orleans in September under the
leadership of Louis Porterie, Jackson Ricau, and Dr. Emmett
Lee Irwin.

The three council leaders were professionals—

Dr. Irwin was a respected surgeon and former president of
the Louisiana Medical Association, Ricau was a former
public school tecacher, and Porterie was a member of a
prominent New Orleans family.71
Spokesmen for the council quickly made their presence
and ideology known.

Appearing at a 26 September 1955

school board meeting, Porterie produced a petition with
nearly 15,000 signatures "requesting that the board not
abandon segregation in the schools."

Porterie assured the

board that if necessary the council could have secured even
more signatures.72 Several months later, on 20 March 1956,
over 8,000 whites attended a pro-segregationist rally at
the Municipal Auditorium to protect Archbishop Joseph F.
Rummel's urging acceptance of integration.

73

The Council

followed that with a 17 May parade and rally at which over
4,000 whties "gustily cheered what sounded to most like a
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call to re-fight the Civil War before submitting to
integration.1,74 The Greater New Orleans Citizens' Council
predicted it would enroll over 50,000 members.75
The growth of citizens' councils coincided with
efforts to undermine or eliminate the NAACP from the
desegregation fight.

Rainach had earlier lashed out at the

"arrogant, alien NAACP and its hirelings, who woulld
completely destroy the friendly relations now existing
between our races."

He "deeply resent[ed] the carpetbag

NAACP so cynically exploiting our colored people only as an
instrument to an end to be discarded when their ignoble
purpose is served."76 Governor Earl Long insisted that
"our colored people will get a square deal without the
NAACP.

We don't need it."77 Louisiana ironically invoked

a 1924 state law, originally enacted to curtail the
activities of the Ku Klux Klan, to suspend
operations within the state.

NAACP

The law required most

organizations, with the exceptions of churches and the
National Guard, to file their membership list with the
state.

When the NAACP refused to submit its membership

list the Attorney General filed suit against the
organization.

As a result, a state court prohibited the

NAACP from operating until it filed a list of its
members.78
The state court order against the branches presented
NAACP leaders with a dilemma.

They could not defy the law
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in the midst of a legal and moral campaign to force the
South to adhere to the letter and spirit of the Brown
decison.

Although condemning the ruling as "illegal and

unjust," Roy Wilkins, the executive secretary, ordered the
NAACP branches in Louisiana to suspend all activities.
Clarence Laws, the state field secretary, expressed
confidence higher courts would overturn the ruling.
Tureaud attempted to have the case transferred to federal
court where he anticipated a more favorable ruling.

In the

absence of an order to overturn the ban, State Attorney
General Jack Gremillion stated his intention to prosecute
any member who met in defiance of the ban.79 A
confrontation almost developed in December 1956 when the
NAACP held two meetings, one in Alexandria and the other in
New Orleans. Enough legal ambiguity existed, however, to
prevent the arrest of the persons attending the meetings.
The case proceeded in both the federal and state courts,
and lawyers for the state and the NAACP had a difficult
time comprehending the status of the case.80 Nonetheless,
the NAACP branches remained banned until February 1960 when
a three judge federal court ruled against the state.81
The legal attempt to reduce the NAACP's effectiveness
was accompanied by a strident campaign to brand the
organization and its members communists.
subversive and un- American became

The terms

"buzz" words used to

discredit NAACP members and white moderates.

The threat of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

220
being labelled a communist prevented many whites from
speaking out in favor of even gradual or token integration.
The success and widespread acceptance of the anti-communist
campagin also forced most black leaders to distance
themselves from any person or groups suspected of communist
or socialist sympathies.

Beginning in 1954, segregationist

leaders labeled "communist" on most groups supporting
desegregation.
In the main, white New Orleans opposed desegregation
with the same force and conviction as its supposedly less
cosmopolitan neighbors.

But some anti-segregation elements

did exist in the white community, and they increased as the
state exhausted its legislative and legal options.

It is

significant, however, that throughout most of the period,
no political figure in the city advocated compliance with
the Brown decision.

The moderates, to the extent that they

mobilized, had to rely on businessmen and professionals
rather than politicians and did little to influence the
segregation struggle.

It was not that they were feeble or

insincere in their efforts; they were simply too few in
number and too far outside the white mainstream's views on
race relations.

For example, on the same day that

approximately four hundred persons attended a meeting in
favor of desegregation, 8,000 whites gathered in support of
segregation.82 In September 1955, a group of moderates
presented the school board a petition favoring
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desegregation, with 179 signatures.

Two weeks later,

however, the segregationists countered with a petition in
support of the status quo signed by 14,962 people.83 Under
the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that white
moderates failed to accomplish much.
The same force that started the fight against
desegregation in the schools sustained it throughout the
crisis— the black community.

When asked where the NAACP

would get the money to litigate thousands of cases
throughout the nation, Thurgood Marshall answered, from the
0 ,1

black community.

He spoke the truth.

An indication of

the black community's commitment to school desegregation
and the principle of equality was provided by the Louisiana
Education Association, the state's black teachers'
organization.

ae

Even the most optimistic supporters of

school desegregation acknowledged that black educators
would suffer job losses and demotions.

Indeed, as early as

1953, the NAACP recognized the need to assist black
educators during the transition to a unitary system and
later created the Department of Teacher Information and
Security to do so.

For several years Daniel Byrd served as

Assistant Director of the new agency.

86

Yet despite the prospect of economic and professional
injury the Louisiana Education Association, which, of
course,

included teachers from New Orleans, provided

leadership and financial support to the desegregation
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effort.87 Between 1942 and 1955, J. K. Haynes of Ruston
served as president and worked closely with Byrd, Tureaud,
and the NAACP.

The LEA, like the NAACP, depended on

membership dues and contributions to sustain its
operations.

Haynes' active support of desegregation

occasionally drew criticism from some LEA members.

"I am

especially concerned about Louisiana," Byrd disclosed to
Marshall, "because it seems that some 'rednecks' must have
reached certain conservative Negroes in the LEA and they
have started a campaign...against Haynes."

Byrd feared

that the conservatives would attempt to replace Haynes at
the next LEA convention scheduled for November 1953.88 But
Haynes retained his post, and the LEA remained in the
OQ

desegregation struggle.
The persistence of the NAACP, the LEA, and other
segments of the black community helped to make
desegregation a reality in New Orleans.

After three

unsuccessful attempts at reversals in the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals and twice in the United States Supreme
Court, New Orleans by the end of 1958 still refused to obey
Judge Wright's order to desegregate the schools "with all
deliberate speed."90 Board members apparently believed
that if they ignored the court order it would go away.
Tureaud's frequent trips to federal court should have
convinced them otherwise.

On 18 June 1959, Tureaud again

asked Judge Wright to compel the school board to devise a
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desegregation plan consistent with his previous ruling on
15 February 1956.

Judge Wright scheduled arguments on the

issue for the following month.91 In a decision finally
issued that July, Wright abandoned the vagueness of "with
all deliberate speed" and ordered the school board "to
prepare, present and file in the record of this case by
March 1, 1960, an overall plan covering the complete
desegregation of the public schools in this city."

He

anticipated white response by suggesting that "the board
consider a plan under which the first grade would be
desegregated the first year, the first and second grades
the second year, and so on until all grades have been
covered by the plan."92
Judge Wright hoped that the "responsible influences on
our community life will take their places, as they have in
the past, on the side of law and order," but the school
board ignored Wright's request for a desegregation plan,
board president Matthew Sutherland took refuge in the
myriad state laws designed to create a legal buffer between
the board and federal judicial authority.

Another board

member, Emile Wagner, a member of the White Citizens'
Council and a virulent Catholic critic of the
integrationist pronouncements of Archbiship Rummel, spoke
more directly.

Wagner preferred to see the public schools

closed and segregated private schools established and
financed by the state rather than allow any type of
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integration.93 All of the five board members in i960, and
those who preceded them, adhered to the staunch
segregationist view.

Wagner differed from his colleagues

only in his active association with the Greater New Orleans
Citizens' Council and his willingness to close the schools
as the last effort to prevent desegregation.
Judge Wright extended his deadline for the submission
of a desegregation plan, but the board still refused to
comply.

Through its special council, Gerard Rault, the

board tried to get the order set aside.94 School officials
also mailed a questionnaire to parents seeking to ascertain
whether they wanted the schools closed or opened if the
court forced the school system to integrate.

It

instructed parents to indicate their preference for one of
the following: "I would like to see the schools kept open
even though a small amount of integration is necessary.

I

would like to see the schools closed rather than be
integrated even in small numbers.”95 Parents returned
slightly more than 27,000 of the 70,000 that were
distributed, and they voted 14,114 to 12,978 to keep the
schools open.

Less than a week after announcing the

results, school board president Lloyd Rittiner stated he
would disregard the survey because 11,407 of the 14,114
parents who voted to keep the schools open were black.
Among whites 12,229 had voted to close the schools and only
2,707 to keep them open in the event of integration.

By

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

225
contrast, black parents voted overwhelmingly (11,407 to
679) to keep the schools open.

Considering the racial

composition of the vote, Rittiner felt justified in his
position "because whites are the people who support the
system.1,97
Having granted the school system an inordinate amount
of time to formulate a desegregation plan, Judge Wright
issued his own in May 1960.

Following his earlier

suggestion to the school board, Wright called for the
gradual desegregation of the schools starting with the
first grade when schools reopened for the 1960-1961 school
year.

School board members reacted to Wright's modest

proposal with defiance.

The board again vowed to resist

desegregation and declared its intention "to fight this
order in the courts of the land and... use every legal
means known to it to preserve a segregated school system."
Board members also met with Governor Jimmie Davis and
received his commitment to help preserve segregation in the
»

city's schools.

98

The 1959-1960 school year came to an end

amid the possiblity that the regular school vacation might
exceed well beyond the usual three months.
In June the United States Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals refused to grant relief from Judge Wright's order.
With that avenue closed, the board voted four to one to
"call upon the Governor of Louisiana to interpose himself
between the federal court and the school board and keep the
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public schools of New Orleans open on their present
segregated basis."

Wagner voted against the resolution

because he believed the board had some legal options
remaining and interposition should be used only as a last
resort.

Matthew Sutherland pointed out that six years of

litigation had produced delays but no legal victories.

In

the absence of interpostion, Sutherland warned the
community to prepare for either desegregated schools or no
schools at all.99
The NAACP, operating again after the federal court
lifted the ban, wasted little time in attacking the school
board's position.

In a letter to the board, branch

president Allison Chapital strongly denounced its actions
and questioned the propriety of elected officials openly
advocating disrespect for the law.

During this time,

however, the New Orleans NAACP did far more than write
letters.

Under the direction of Chapital, the branch held

meetings designed to keep the black community informed
about the integration effort.

Furthermore, the NAACP

coordinated the effort of black parents who planned to send
their six year old children to schools that did not want
them.100
During June the branch held more than ten meetings,
often conducting two or three on the same day in different
parts of the city.

For example, on 6 June a meeting to

"clarify the issues for the parents" was held at Law Street

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

227

Baptist Church and at the Central Congregational Church.
Others were held at Shaw Temple Methodist Church, 8 June;
St. Augustine High School, 10 and 20 June; St. John
Institutional Missionary Baptist Church, 10 June; and
Carver-Desire Baptist Church, 15 June.

At all of these

gatherings, NAACP representatives stressed the importance
of the desegregation effort and reminded parents that the
court's victory was not complete until blacks actually
attended the schools of their choice.101 For most black
children that day remained in the distant future, but
events unfolded which placed the opportunity to attend the
school of their choice within reach of a few of them.
During the summer recess, four of the school board
members— Lloyd Rittiner, Louis Riecke, Theodore Shepard,
Jr., and Matthew Sutherland— started a slow retreat from
their previous refusal to consider desegregation.

The

other board member, Emile Wagner, Jr., continued to
champion segregation at all cost.102 What caused the four
board members to change their opinion and move the school
system toward desegregation?

The increased visibility of

the white moderates and repeated losses in court influenced
their decison.

They also began to fear the uncertainty and

dislocation associated with closing the schools to prevent
desegregation.

Moreover, they labored without compensation

and served on the board because they believed they could
make a contribution to public education.

Another
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compelling reason, and possibly the most important, Judge
Wright's grade-a-year plan, assured only a very gradual
increase in the number of blacks into white schools.
Faced with either closed schools or token
desegregation, white moderates finally entered the
desegregation struggle.

103

The board's new position, and

that of the white moderates, found institutional expression
in Save Our Schools.

S.O.S. organizers refused to endorse

desegregation, and made it clear they wanted to keep the
schools open.

In May 1960 they opened their public

campaign and painted a bleak picture of the consequences of
school closure.

"The closings of public schools inevitably

means an increase in juvenile delinquency," the group
maintained, "as thousands of youngsters are left to their
own devices."

Taxes would increase because of a loss of

federal funds and children would be deprived of the
school's "health protecting services" if the schools
closed.

In addition, the economy would suffer "because new

industries refuse to move into an area in which the public
schools have been closed,"104 The moderate activists, like
the radical racists, conducted a negative campaign— the
evils of school closure were worse them the evils of
desegregation.

Few moderates took a stand on the lofty

heights of equality.

Archbiship Joseph Rummel, however,

was one of the few exceptions.
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Many south Louisianians were Catholic and most took
their religion seriously.

Archbishop Rummel attempted to

use the power of the pulpit to convince his fellow
Catholics that racial segregation contradicted the teaching
of Christianity and, therefore, was morally wrong.

Rummel

explained that "the Church will continue to declare and
maintain the correctness from the spiritual and moral
standpoint of integration in principle in the various human
relationships where enforced segregation is now imposed,
notwithstanding our profession of faith in democracy."105
In June 1960 he appealed to the school board to keep the
schools open and "accept the moderate form of gradual
integration proposed by Judge Wright as a sound, temperate
interpretation of the American way of life...."

New

Orleans Catholics, however, not only refused to embrace
Rummel's position but successfully opposed his attempts to
desegregate the parochial schools.107
Although the board rejected the moral stance of
Archbiship Rummel, it continued to move towards the
pragmatism of the groups opposed to closing the schools and
began to formulate a desegregation plan.

The

segregationist forces, however, retained control of the
state legislature.

With a more energetic ally in newly

elected Governor Jimmie Davis, its members continued the
offensive against desegregation.

In a last desperate

effort to prevent school desegregation in New Orleans, the
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legislature passed numerous segregation bills in 1960.

The

most important of these, Act 496, gave the governor the
power to assume administrative control of any school
districts under a court order to desegregate.

On 17 August

Davis exercised that power and placed Superintendent
Redmond in charge of the New Orleans schools.

Davis

directed Redmond to open the schools on 7 September and
outlined a lengthy registration process.

The NAACP and a

group of 31 white parents filed suits in federal court to
prevent Governor Davis and Attorney General Jack Gremillion
from assuming control of the schools.108
A three judge panel acted quickly and on 27 August
ruled "that all Louisiana statutes which would directly or
indirectly require segregation of the races in the public
schools for the Parish of Orleans, or authorize the closure
of such schools, or deny them public funds because they are
desegregated, are unconstitutional...."

The ruling

returned the schools to the authority of the school board
and kept in place Judge Wright's desegregation order
requiring the opening of school in September.

Redmond,

seeking "to eliminate as much confusion [as possible] for
everyone concerned," met with the school board members to
1QQ

assess and respond to the most recent court order.
At a special meeting held on 29 August attended by
Superintendent Redmond, special council Gerard Rault, and
all of the board members except Emile Wagner, the board

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

231

members discussed its options.

Gremillion had already

indicated the state would appeal directly to the United
States Supreme Court, and Rault said the board could join
in the appeal.
unlikely.

He admitted, however,

success was

The board members postponed a decision on

whether to appeal and authorized Rittiner to see if Judge
Wright could meet with them or their attorney.

"If the

conference is granted," Reicke stated, the board should
attend in good faith without any mental reservations."110
Despite the discussion of an appeal, the board had finally
accepted the inevitability of desegregation.111 They then
moved to minimize its effect.
The board wanted to meet with Judge Wright in order to
impress upon him the need to delay his ruling for a year.
With schools scheduled to open in less than two weeks, the
board members once again sought more time.

They pursued

their new strategy without Emile Wagner who remained "so
convinced that integration as required by the court's order
would be an evil far worse than closing the school" that he
announced he was "going to advocate shutting down the
public school system."112 Wagner refused to attend the
meeting held on 30 August between the board and Judge
Wright.

Over the protest of Tureaud, Judge Wright granted

the school board a delay, until 14 November 1960, in
beginning desegregation.

It had asked for a year, and

expected to receive at least 4 1/2 months, but gladly

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

232

accepted any respite that pushed the order beyond the
opening of school.

The delay enabled the board to

institute a pupil placement plan that further reduced the
number of blacks admitted to white schools.113
In 1960 the legislature had approved Act 492, which
gave local school boards the authority to assign students
to district schools.

The board's pupil placement plan

conformed to state law and the guidelines contained in
Judge Wright's desegregation order.

Superintendent Redmond

recommended retaining the existing school districts; those
students wanting to attend a school outside of their
district had to request a transfer.

All students had to

start school in their district and could only apply for a
transfer during a brief period between 27 September and 7
October I960.114
During that time school officials received 208
requests for transfers.

They automatically rejected nine

of the applications, eight because they arrived after the
deadline and one because it contained inadequate
information.

The remaining 199 applications included 137

from blacks requesting transfer to white schools, 15 from
blacks asking to change to another black school, 46 from
whites seeking a new white school, and one from a white
wanting to go to a black school.

To protect the safety of

the students and their families, school officials did not
release the names of the students applying for transfers.
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The board established a four-step procedure to screen the
199 applications.
It prepared guidelines for each step shoving who would make
the decision and on what basis:
1. The first step by:
First Assistant Superintendent
Two Assistant Superintendents in Charge of .
Districts, Director, Research, Census and Planning
Consider:
Verifications
Proper age (birth certificate)
Nearness of school to child's home
Request or consent of parent and reasons
assigned thereto
Available room and teaching capacity of
schools
Availabillity of
transportation.
Procedure:
After considering the above factors, the
applications will be referred to the
second group.
2. Second step by:
Acting Director, Guidance and Testing
Psychologists
Psychometrists
Consider:
Scholastic aptitude
Intelligence or ability
Results of Metropolitan Readiness or
Achievement Tests already administered.
Procedure:
Secure available test records
Administer necesary group and/or individual
tests.
Refer all information compiled about each
applicant to the third screening group.
3. Third step by:
Assistant Superintendent, Instruction
Director of Special Services
Director of Kindergarten-Primary Education
Psychologists
Visiting Teachers
Consider:
Effect of new pupil upon academic program
Suitability of established curricula for
pupil
(in terms of grouping within the class)
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Adequacy of pupil's academic preparation or
readiness for admission to school or
curricula
Psychological qualification of pupil for
type of teaching and associations
Effect upon academic programs of other
students
Effect upon prevailing academic standards
Psychological effect upon the pupil
Home environment of the pupil
Maintenance or severance of social and
psychological relationships with pupils
and teachers.
Procedure:
Review tests results and other information
on child
Arrange home visits and/or interview
Review to Medical Department where necessary
Refer to administrative review team all
applications. Each application to be
marked either "recommended" or "not
recommended."
4. Final step by:
Administrative Review Team
The Superintendent
The First Assistant Superintendent
The Assistant Superintendent, Instrution
Consider:
All information previously collected on each
applicant
Choice of and interest of pupil
Possibility of threat or friction or
disorder among other pupils
Possibility of breach of peace or ill will
or retaliation within community.
Procedure:
Review all information and formulate
recommendations to be presented to the
Orleans Parish School Board.
Four of the parents— three blacks and one white— chose
to withdraw their applications rather than run this
administrative gauntlet.

Two of the withdrawals came from

blacks seeking admission to white schools.

After the

exhaustive administrative review, school officials approved
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only five of the remaining 135 applications.116 The five
black students approved for transfers to white schools were
all females, one of whom withdrew before the 14 November
transfer date.117 Therefore, in the end, four six year old
girls stood poised to do what no black New Orleanian had
legally done since 1877— attend a desegregated school.
They did not stand alone.
Despite the last minute maneuvers of Governor Jimmie
Davis, State Attorney General Jack Gremillion, and the
state legislature, four black students— Tessie, Leona,
Gail, and Ruby— entered the previously all white William
Frantz and McDonogh 19 schools on 14 November 1960.

They

entered accompanied by their parents and escorted by armed
federal marshalls.

In addition to the marshalls, local

police stood guard at each school.

The presence of law

enforcement officials, however, did not prevent mobs of
whites from shouting obscenities and racist remarks at the
four students.

Police officers did prevent the students

from suffering physical harm, but did nothing to disperse
the unruly and hostile crowds.118
After the students received their classroom
assignments white "mothers clad in slacks and pedal pushers
arrived to take their children home."

Shouting the "south

will rise again" and "two, four, six, eight, we don't want
to integrate," large crowds remained at the two
desegregated schools the entire day but dispersed without
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•

violence.

119

On the second day, a crowd of hundreds of

teen-agers attempted to force their way past police to
enter McDonogh No. 19.

Police made arrests at both schools

and Police Chief Joseph Giarrusso sent additional officers
to the schools.
•

Over the next several days mob action and

•

•

interracial violence occurred throughout the city.

lift

New

Orleans at last reaped, in lawlessness and negative
national publicity, what six years of defiance and racist
»

rhetoric had sown.

121

With the legal battle for desegregated public schools
virtually won, the New Orleans NAACP started to concentrate
on the task of ensuring that the four students were not
harmed physically or psychologically.

Under the direction

of branch president Allison Chapital, the NAACP conducted a
massive campaign to obtain moral support for the students.
In order to shield the children and their parents as much
as possible, the branch requested that all correspondence
to the children be sent to Chapital at the NAACP office.
The response to the NAACP's effort was overwhelming.
Cards, letters, and small donations began arriving almost
immediately.

Typical was a letter from Mrs. A. J. Shaw of

Brookline, Massachusetts, who sent five dollars for "candy
for the children."

A Parent Teacher Association group from

New York City sent a resolution indicating its support of
•

•

integrated schools m

New Orleans.

122

A letter from Chester

W. Hartman of Cambridge, Massachusetts epitomized the
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response the NAACP attempted to generate.

Hartman thought

the girl's "daily anguish must be so great that it was very
important to try to offset this with some expression of
friendliness."

He therefore collected several thousand

signatures, including that of noted economist John Kenneth
Galbraith, on a "huge greeting card" and sent it to the
four girls.

Hartman pledged that he and a group of friends

would also publicize the need to send additional letters of
123

encouragement.

Why did the parents of the four little girls agree to
send their children to schools that had been previously all
white?

Why did Arthur Chapital, Sr., a postal worker for

forty hours a week and a civil rights leader during the
remaining hours, expose himself to death threats and hate
mail?

Why did the black attorney, Alexander P. Tureaud,

file thirty-eight suits to force the end of segregated
schools, often to the neglect of his private practice?
And, finally, why did the black community support the drive
for integrated education?

Part of the answer to those

questions could be found in the persistent inequality of
black schools on the eve of limited desegregation.
In the 1959-1960 school year, 50,135 blacks and 41,191
whites attended the public schools.

The school board

operated forty elementary schools for blacks and fortyeight for whites.

The number of white junior and senior

high schools stood at sixteen; blacks had twelve such
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schools.

The lack of adequate schools forced many black

students to attend overcrowded schools.

Yet the students

attending overcrowded classes fared better than the ones
who only attended class three or four hours a day because
of massive overcrowding.

During the 1957-1958 school year,

9,695 blacks attended school on a part-time basis.

The

number declined to 2,165 in 1958-1959 and 1,687 in 19591960.

During the 1959-1960 school year, no white students

attended school part-time.

School officials managed to

reduce the number of black students on part-time by
increasing class sizes.124
Class size had concerned black parents throughout the
twentieth century.

Statistics for the 1958-1959 school

year revealed that only 5.4 percent of black children
attended classes with fewer than thirty students per class.
By contrast, 38.7 percent of white classes had fewer them
thirty students per class.

Moreover, 30.7 percent of black

classes had over forty students per class; only 1 percent
of white classes did.
51 students each.

Indeed, ten black classes had over

It was not unusual for black students to

walk long distances to attend overcrowded black schools,
although living a stone's throw from white schools that
were often utilized less than 70 percent of capacity.

The

school board's five year construction plan, unveiled in
March 1958, offered no relief for the overcrowded
conditions of black schools.

Black leaders believed
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complete school desegregation provided the only solution to
a long festering problem for black students.
That only four black students attended white schools
in November portended how slow the pace of desegregation
would be in New Orleans.

The black community, again led by

the NAACP, continued to monitor the desegregation process.
Black leaders assisted parents attempting to enroll their
children in previously white schools and pressured school
officials to accelerate the desegregation.

During the

1962-1963 school year, only 107 blacks attended twenty
white schools.
to 347.

When school opened in 1963 the number rose

School officials did not remove the last vestiges

of segregated education until the 1968-1969 school year.
Moreover, desegregation gave rise to new problems—
charges of discrimination by black students and accelerated
white flight to private and parochial schools.

The new

problems, however, did not lessen the importance of
desegregation.

Desegregated schools transcended the

quantitative count of buildings, textbooks, and the number
of students actually attending mixed schools.

The campaign

for school desegregation was a fight for full inclusion
into American society, free from legislative
discrimination.

No matter how slow the pace, black New

Orleanians had again embarked on the Reconstruction goal of
a nation of "one people."
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Conclusion

For nearly a century New Orleans' blacks linked the
development of their community to improvements in public
education.

To assist in their campaign for better

education blacks formed many community organizations.

The

loss of suffrage in the 1890s, however, forced them to rely
on protest and petition to win concessions from school
officials.

This strategy produced a few positive results,

and only because black leaders and parents had remained
persistent to their efforts.

Each decade brought an

increase in their commitment.

Escalating black school

enrollment placed such a strain on the educational
facilities that school officials often remedied deplorable
conditions.

As a result, white board members made

concessions that undermined their own policy of limited
black education.

Nevertheless, black school facilities

continued to lag far behind those for whites.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, only
slightly more than five thousand blacks attended public
schools in New Orleans, with less than four hundred
enrolled beyond the third grade.

In fact, school officials

did not provide black education beyond the fifth grade
until 1908, and the first black high school did not open
until 1917.

Blacks complained continually about the

240
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inadequacies of their high school facilities.

Despite

protests by black leaders, school officials refused to
provide blacks with better secondary school facilities
until the 1940s.

The doctrine of separate but equal

remained just that:

a doctrine, but in practice separation

without equality.
The campaign for expanded educational opportunity
indicated that blacks never willingly accepted the role of
second class citizens.

They viewed education as a means of

sharing fully in the American ideal of equality.

From the

beginning, black leaders had advocated education for the
masses, not just for the black elite.

Education became a

community goal pursued by individuals regardless of whether
they had children within the public school system.

From

Louis Roudanez and P. B. S. Pinchback to Alexander Tureaud
and Daniel Byrd, and many black leaders in between,
education reform remained an important goal.

The fight for

improved education produced a degree of continuity from one
generation of leaders to the next.

In the twentieth

century each generation of leaders brought the black
community a little closer to educational equality.
In the 1940s the pace for improved education quickened
considerably; in fact, by the end of the decade blacks had
changed their demands from mere equal facilities to total
desegregation.

In less than three decades, America had

fought two world wars and a cold war in which it extolled
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democracy and freedom in contrast to Russian tyranny.

But

black leaders thought the time had come to extend the
benefits of freedom and democracy to black Americans.
Separate facilities no matter how equal were unacceptable,
and in 1952 black New Orleanians filed suit to desegregate
the public schools.

Eight years would pass, however,

before the first black student attended a desegregated
school.

In the interim, blacks had extended the assault on

Jim Crow to include transportation and public facilities.
Later the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 further transformed race relations and the
black community.
The Voting Rights Act produced unparalleled black
advances in politics and civic involvement.

In 1968 New

Orleans sent the first black to the state legislature in
the twentieth century.

During the 1970s the rising black

vote contributed to a marked increase in the number of
black elected officials.

Dr. Mack Spears, a black former

teacher and principal, won a seat on the school board,
which gave the black community a voice in formulating and
implementing school policy.

Protest, petition, and

judicial redress for enhanced black education now were
augmented by coalition politics.
When the four little black girls entered McDonogh No.
19 and Frantz elementary schools on 14 November 1960, they
had unknowingly set in motion an eventual end to an era in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

243
black New Orleans.

The effort for educational equality and

desegregation was a part of the larger black struggle for
equality in America.

Inadequate schools within a

segregated school system represented only one of the most
glaring consequences of discrimination and segregation.
Another major consequence, perhaps less discernible, but
not less real, was the apparent solidarity of the black
community throughout the period of Jim Crow.

Shared civil,

economic, political, and social disabilities produced a
commonality of purpose— the fight for full citizenship.
That struggle joined the wealthy with the poor, the
educated with the illiterate, the Creoles with the blacks,
and the "downtowners'' with the "uptowners.”

The NAACP and

other black organizations received spiritual and financial
support from all segments of the black community— from
custodians to physicians.

The Brown decision and the civil

rights gains that followed, however, highlighted class,
differences that eventually fractured much of the unity of
the New Orleans black community.

Political empowerment and

the increase in the size of the black middle class
undermined, to some extent, a community agenda that focused
exclusively on racism to explain the status and dynamics of
the black community.

The prosperity of some blacks existed

next to the poverty of others.

As housing became more

accessible to blacks, they, too, fled the inner-city.
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Middle class blacks found common cause, through
professional, political, and civic involvement, with
members of the white middle class.

The struggle for black

inclusion that occurred between 1900 and 1960 gave away to
the pursuit of specific individual or group goals.

The

fullest expression of middle class black and white
coalitions first occurred during the administration of
Mayor Moon Landrieu.

Landrieu involved blacks at all

levels in his campaign and in his administration, which at
one time included the city's first black chief
administrative officer.

The high profile of blacks in

Landrieu's administration and an increase in black voters
helped Ernest Morial to become New Orleans' first black
mayor.

Morial's election indicated that the transition

from a purely race conscious society in New Orleans to a
class and race conscious society had occurred.

Morial

shrewdly ran a race-specific campaign within most of the
black community.

Nevertheless, he appealed to and won

support from some of the white middle class.

In fact, his

campaign stressed typical middle class political values
such as government efficiency and business expansion.
Whites held many important positions in his administration,
including the head of the police and fire departments.
Many lower class blacks were just as unrepresented with
Morial as mayor as they had been with his white
predecessors.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

245
The emergence of a seemingly permanent black
underclass led to a reassessment of the civil rights
effort, including the effort to desegregate the schools.
Some critics of school desegregation actually charged that
black educational attainment declined in the aftermath of
Brown.

They defended their claims by pointing to the

number of black students suspended from school, the high
failure rate, and the number of drop-outs.

The

quantitative gains alone, however, appear to justify the
fight for school desegregation.

Black students no longer

had to pass by schools located only a few blocks from their
homes to attend school miles away solely because of the
color of their skin.

When school officials made plans

regarding the maintenance and repair of school buildings,
decisions reflected need rather than the prejudicial whims
of racism.

Many black children finally had access to the

best education the public schools could provide.

Race was

no longer the main determinant in the quest for a quality
education.

The struggle that had started as a question of

race had become one of race and class.

The struggle

continues still.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Notes
I.

Education and the Politics of Race, 1862-1877

1New Orleans, Daily Picayune. 27 April 1862.
2 Eric Foner, Free Soil. Free Labor. Free Men; The
Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 40, 50-52.
3Ibid., pp.

46-47.

*New Orleans, La., Second District School Board
Meeting Minutes, 2 February 1863. Orleans Parish School
Board Collection, Archives and Manuscripts/Special
Collections Department, University of New Orleans. In July
1864 the board was reorganized as the Board of School
Directors of New Orleans and maintained that name or a
variation of it until 1916. In that year the name was
changed to the Orleans Parish School Board. Hereinafter
references to minutes generated by the various boards will
be cited as OPSB Minutes, and unless otherwise noted are in
the Archives and Manuscripts/Special Collections
Department, University of New Orleans.
5H. E. Sterkx, The Free Negro in Anti-Bellum Louisiana
(Rutherford, New Jersey: Farleigh Dickinson University
Press, 1972), p. 268.
®Betty Porter, "The History of Negro Education in
Louisiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly 25 (July 1942):
732; C. Peter Ripley, Slaves and Freedmen in Civil War
Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1976), pp. 126-127; Sterkx, Free Negro, pp. 269, 271, 273.
7Charles B. Rousseve, The Negro in Louisiana (New
Orleans: Xavier University Press, 1937), pp. 43-44; John
Blassingame, Black New Orleans. 1860-1880 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 107-108; Rodolphe
L . Desdunes, Our People and Our History, trans. and ed.,
Dorothea 0. McCants (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1973), pp. 21-24.
®Blassingame, Black New Orleans, pp. 2-9.
Q
Thomas L. Webber, Deep Like the Rivers: Education in
the Slave Quarter Community. 1831-1865 (New York: W. W.
Norton and Co., Inc., 1978), p. 131; Eugene D. Genovese,
Roll. Jordan. Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York:
Vintage Books, 1976), p. 563.

246

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

247

10Blassingmane, Black New Orleans, p. 107.
11Porter, "History of Negro Education," pp. 730-731.
12Blassingame, Black New Orleans, pp. 108-109.
13Robert C. Morris, Reading. 'Ritino. and
Reconstruction: The Education of Freedmen in the South
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 23;
James D. Anderson, The Education of Blacks in the South.
1860-1935 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1988), p. 9; Elizabeth Doyle, "Nurseries of Treason:
Schools in Occupied New Orleans," Journal of Southern
History 26 (May, 1960): p. 176; Blassingame, Black New
Orleans. p. 109.
14B. Bush Plumly to G. N. Taylor, 21 September 1864,
Records of the Superintendent of Education for the State of
Louisiana, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned
Lands, 1864-1869, Record Group 105 (National Archives
Microforms Publications, M1026). Hereinafter cited as LA
BRFAL.
15Blassingame, Black New Orleans, p. 109.
16Mortimer Warren, "Monthly Report, 30 October 1865,"
LA., BRFAL.
17Ibid.
18

Blassingame, Black New Orleans, p. 109-110.

19J. H. Ford, "Weekly Report, 29 July 1864," LA BRFAL.
^Ford, "Weekly Report, 29 July 1864, 12 August, 1864"
21

Howard A. White, The Freedmen's Bureau in Louisiana
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), p.
173.
22 Ford, "Weekly Report, 19 August 1864," LA BRFAL.
^Ford, "Report of the First Examination of the
Colored Schools, 24 September 1864," LA., BRFAL.
24Ibid.
^Ibid.
^hite, Freedmen's Bureau in Louisiana, p. 8.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

248
^Warren, "Monthly Report, 30 October 1864," LA BRFAL.
^hite, Freedmen 's Bureau in Louisiana, p. 170;
Warren, "Monthly Report, 30 October 1865," LA BRFAL.
barren, "Monthly Report, 30 October 1865," LA BRFAL.
gn
Blassingame, Black New Orleans, p. 111; Leon Odum
Beasley, "A History of Louisiana During the Reconstruction
Period, 1862-1877" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State
University, 1957), p. 106.
31Warren to H. R. Pease, 13 and 31 January 1866, LA.,
BRFAL; White, Freedmen's Bureau in Louisiana, p. 176.
^hite, Freedmen's Bureau in Louisiana, p. 170.
William F. Messner, Freedmen and the Ideology of
Free Labor: Louisiana 1862-1865 (Lafayette: University of
Southwestern Louisiana Press, 1978), p. 173.
^M. Wright, Jr., "Monthly Report, 2 February 1866,"
LA., BRFAL.
^dmonia Highgate, "Monthly Report, 25 June 1866,"
LA., BRFAL.
^Blasb'ngame, Black New Orleans, p. 111.
^Blassingame, Black New Orleans, pp. 111-112; Porter,
"History of Negro Education," p. 743.
^OPSB

Minutes, 2 February 1863, 4 May 1863.

^OPSB Minutes, 8 July 1865, 29 August, 11 July 1866.
^OPSB Minutes, 13 September 1862, 29 September 1862.
41Marcus Christian Papers, "History of the Negro in
Louisiana," Archives and Manuscripts/Special Collections
Department, University of New Orleans.
42OPSB

Minutes, 25 September 1865, 7 November 1865.

David Rankin, "The Forgotten People: Free People of
Color in New Orleans, 1850-1870" (Ph.D. dissertation, John
Hopkins University, 1976), pp. 212, 220.
^Quoted in Rankin, "Forgotten People," p. 233.
^hite, Freedmen's Bureau in Louisiana, p. 179.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

249
b o u i s R. Harlan, "Desegregation In New Orleans
Public Schools During Reconstruction," American Historical
Review 67 (April 1962): 663-675; OPSB Minutes, 3 April
1867; Christian, "A History of the Negro," p. 13; Beasley,
"A History of Education," p. 107.
47Christian, "History of the Negro," p. 13.
b e w Orleans Times. 31 July 1867.
bPSB

Minutes, 28 August 1867.

b p S B Minutes, 4 September 1867.
51OPSB Minutes, 16 September 1867.
b P S B Minutes, 16 September 1867.
b P S B Minutes, 16 September 1867.
b h e committee members did not report on all of the
black schools in the city as evidenced by the later
inclusion of at least three Bureau schools not contained in
the report.
“ op sb Minutes, 16 September 1867.
“ o p s b Minutes, 2 October 1867.
b P S B Minutes, 4 December 1867.
“ OPSB Minutes, 4 December 1867.
b P S B Minutes, 21 May 1868.
“ OPSB Minutes, 10 January 1868.
61New Orleans Tribune. 12 Mav 1867.
blassingame, Black New Orleans, p. 112.
63

Joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed. 1863-1877
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), p.
147; Ted Tunnell, Crucible of Reconstruction: War.
Radicalism, and Race in Louisiana. 1862-1877 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1984), pp. 113-114.
b o g e r A. Fischer, The Segregation Struggle in
Louisiana. 1862-1877 (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1974), pp. 48, 55.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

250
65
Charles Vincent, Black Legislators in Louisiana
During Reconstruction (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1976), p. 49.

^Fischer, Segregation Struggle, pp. 48, 55; Taylor,
Louisiana Reconstructed, p. 147.
^Fischer, Segregation Struggle, pp. 48-49.
Charles Vincent, "Negro Leadership and Programs in
the Louisiana Constitutional Conventions of 1868,"
Louisiana History 10 (1969): 343-345; Journal of the
Convention for the Framing of a .Constitution for the State
of Louisiana (New Orleans, 1867-1868), pp. 3-4; Taylor,
Louisiana Reconstructed, p. 150.
^Vincent, "Leadership and Programs," p. 350.
70Journal of the Convention, p. 13; Taylor, Louisiana
Reconstructed. pp. 151-152; Vincent, "Leadership and
Programs," p, 342.
71Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, p. 136.
^ l l a Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana after 1868
(New York: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1918), p. 11; White,
Freedmen's Bureau in Louisiana, p. 148.
^Tribune. 27 December 1867.
74Ibid.. 18 June 1867, 23 October 1867, 27 October
1867, 28 November 1867.
75Ibid., 27 October 1867.
76

Journal of the Convention, pp. 16-17.

^Article two sought primacy of state law over local
law and Article three defined the power of a State
Superintendent of Public Education. The fourth article
sought state regulation, through licensing, of private
schools. Article five attempted to make English the
language of instruction. Article six set the salary, term
and method for selecting a Superintendent. The seventh and
eighth articles addressed the issue of funding and the
disposal of federal lands for education. Article nine
prohibited the allocation of state funds to private
schools. Finally, Article ten sought to establish a state
university in New Orleans without regard to race and
Article eleven extended the prohibition to include all
schools of higher learning chartered by the state. Journal
of the Convention, p. 17.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

251

78
Journal of the Convention, p. 17.

^Ibid.. p. 60,
^Ibid.. pp. 60-61.
81Tribune, 31 July 1867.
82

Journal of the Convention, pp. 200-201.

^Tunnell, Crucible of Reconstruction, pp. 233-237;
Journal of the Convention, p. 201.
^Journal of the Convention, p. 201; Tunnell, Crucible
of Reconstruction, pp. 233-237.
85

Journal of the Convention, p. 201; Tunnell, Crucible
of Reconstruction, pp. 125, 126, 236.
^Tribune. 31 July 1867.
87

The delegates adopted the Constitution by a vote of
seventy-one to six. William H. Cooley, Thomas S. Crawford,
George W. Dearing, Jr., George Ferguson, Thomas Harrison,
and John Vandergriff voted against adoption. Three
delegates voted for adoption but issued a statement of
protest against the idea of mixed schools.
88

Fischer, Segregation Struggle, p. 59.

^Tribune. 12 December 1867.
Vincent, Black Legislators, pp. 68-69; Fischer,
Segregation Struggle, p. 57; Taylor, Louisiana
Reconstructed. pp. 156-157.
91

Harlan, "Desegregation in New Orleans Schools," p.

665.
^ e w Orleans Times. 1 September 1867.
^Ibid.. 19 September 1867.
^hite, Freedmen's Bureau in Louisiana, pp. 8, 19;
Fischer, Segregation Struggle, pp. 57-59; Tunnell, Crucible
of Reconstruction, p. 169.
95

Louisiana, Annual Report of the State Superintendent
of Public Education, 1869, p. 12. (New Orleans: A. E.
Lee, 1870), Between 1862 and 1900 various companies,
located in New Orleans or Baton Rouge, published the annual

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

252
(and beginning in 1880, biennial) reports. Hereinafter
cited as LA Annual Report with corresponding year.
" l a Annual Report, 1869.
97Never reconciled to the denial of suffrage by the
delegates at the 1864 Constitutional Convention, black
leaders and their white allies attempted to reconvene the
convention on 30 July 1866. A white mob, threatened and
angered by the mere discussion of black suffrage, attacked
the "conventioners" and their supporters. When the carnage
ended 34 blacks had been killed and 119 wounded. The total
number of persons killed and wounded stood at 38 and 146
respectively. See, Donald E. Reynolds, "The New Orleans
Riot of 1866, Reconsidered," Louisiana History 5 (Winter
1964): 5-27.
Fischer, Segregation Struggle, pp. 113-114; LA
Annual Report, 1871.
"Blassingame, Black New Orleans, pp. 118-122; Harlan,
"Desegregation in New Orleans Schools," p. 665.
10CNew Orleans Southwestern Christian Advocate. 18 June
1874, 23 September 1875.
101New Orleans Weekly Louisianian. 15 February 1875.
102LA Annual Report, 1870; Weekly Louisianian. 19
January 1871.
103Harlan, "Desegregation in New Orleans Schools," p.
666 .

104Ibid.
10SLA Annual Report, 1872.
106Dale Somers, "Black and White in New Orleans: A
Study in Urban Race Relations, 1865-1900," Journal of
Southern History 40 (February, 1974): 37.
107Harlan, "Desegregation in New Orleans Schools," p.
669.
T. Harry Williams, "The Louisiana Unification
Movement of 1873," Journal of Southern History 11 (August,
1945): 350.
10Q

Williams, "Louisiana Unification Movement," p. 350;
Times. 29 March 1873.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

253
110Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, p. 277; New Orleans
Times. 17 June 1873; New Orleans Daily Picayune 16 June
1873.
111Times. 17 June 1873.
112Ibid.
113New Orleans Republican. 28 May, 1 June, and 4 June
1873.
114Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, p. 277; Williams,
"Louisiana Unification Movement," p. 356.
115Times. 17 June 1873.
116Williams, "Louisiana Unification Movement," p. 359.
117Vincent, Black Legislators, p. 167.
118

Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, p. 278; Williams,
"Louisiana Unification Movement," p. 363.
119Williams, "Louisiana Unification Movement," p. 364,
367; Vincent, Black Legislators, p. 167; Taylor, Louisiana
Reconstructed. pp. 278-279; New Orleans Times. 16 July
1873; Daily Picayune. 16 July 1873.
120Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed. pp. 241-248;
Tunnell, Crucible of Reconstruction, pp. 170-171.
121Weeklv Louisianian. 22 August 1874; Daily Picayune.
8, 13 September 1874.
122Weeklv Louisianian. 26 September 1874; Daily
Picayune 15, 16, 18 September 1874.
123Pailv Picayune. 10, 11, 14 December 1874.
124Blassingame, Black New Orleans, pp. 116-117; LA
Annual Report, 1874; Daily Picayune. 15, 16 Decemberr 1874.
125Pailv Picayune. 16, 17 December 1874.
126Ibid. 18 December 1874.
127Ibid.
128Weeklv Louisianian. 26 December 1874; Daily
Picayune. 18, 19 December 1874; OPSB Minutes, 9 January
1875.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

254
129OPSB Minutes, 7 April 1875.
130

Blassingame, Black New Orleans, p. 120.

131Harlan, "Desegregation in New Orleans Schools," p.
668.
132Henry A. Bullock, A History of Negro Education in
the South. From 1619 to the Present (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1967), pp. 56-57.
133Horace Mann Bond, The Education of the Negro in the
American Social Order (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1934), p.
72.
134LA Annual Report, 1870.
13SWeeklv Louisianian. 25 May 1871.
136LA Annual Report, 1872.
137Ibid.. 1873.
138LA Annual Report(s), 1867-1877.
139Ibid.. 1873.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Notes
II. Education and the Struggle for Blacks' Proper Place,
1877-1900

1C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction: The
Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction (New York:
Little, Brown, and Co., 1951; Revised ed., Garden City, New
York: Doubleday & Co., 1956), pp. 235-241; Kenneth M.
Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction. 1865-1877 (New York:
Vintage Books, 1965), pp. 186-215.
2Joseph G. Dawson, III, Army Generals and
Reconstruction: Louisiana. 1862-1877 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1982), pp. 140-260;
Ronald E. Butchart, Northern Schools. Southern Blacks, and
Reconstruction: Freedmen's Education. 1862-1875 (Westport,
CN: Greenwood Press, 1980), pp. 181-195; Fischer,
Segregation Struggle in Louisiana, pp. 133-146; Taylor,
Louisiana Reconstructed, pp. 480-505.
3Carl V. Harris, "Stability and Change in
Discrimination Against Black Public Schools: Birmingham,
Alabama, 1871-1931," Journal of Southern History 51 (August
1985): 376-378.
4Beasley, "History of Education in Louisiana," pp.
185-187.
®LA Annual Report, 1877.
6Fischer, Segregation Struggle p. 135.
7LA Annual Report, 1877.
8Ibid.
9Ibid.
10Ibid.
11In defense of his practice of appointing blacks to
minor offices Nicholls stated he "appointed a number of
them to small offices sandwiching them on boards between
white men where...they were powerless to do harm," Quoted
in William Ivy Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest:
Louisiana Politics 18777-1900 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1975), p. 22.
120PSB Minutes, 4, 18, April 1877.
130PSB Minutes, 6 June 1877.
255

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

256
14OPSB Minutes, 22 June 1877.
15Ibid.
16Ibid.
17A contemporary later reflected that Mary "believed
in upholding our rights, the rights of all Louisianians,
and he aided the cause with generous donations. For
example, he would assume the responsibility for a lawsuit
and would defray its expenses," Desdunes, Our People and
Our History, pp. 93-94.
18Pailv Picayune. 27 June 1877; Fischer,
Struggle, p. 140.

Segregation

190PSB Minutes, 3 July 1877.
b h e proposal to abolish the high schools met with
less success. Instead of Mitchell's recommendation not to
fund the high schools, the board decided to preserve the
high schools but reduce expenses "within reasonable
limits," OPSB Minutes, 3 July 1877.
21Fischer, Segregation Struggle, p. 142.
22

Craig's fellow board members asked for and received
his resignation in December 1878 when he appeared at a
meeting inebriated. OPSB Minutes 6 December 1878.
blassingame, Black New Orleans, pp. 173-210.
OA

Weekly Louisianian. 9 September 1877.

b p S B Minutes, 3 October 1877.
b a i l v Picayune. 24 October 1877; Fischer, The
Segregation Struggle, pp. 140-141.
bincent, Black Legislators, p. 226; Rankin, "The
Forgotten People," p. 300.
bischer, Segregation Struggle, p. 141.
bair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, pp. 24-26.
30

Quoted in Weekly Louisianian. 6 October 1878.

31Ibid.
b a i l v Picayune. 20 February 1879.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

257
“ibid.
“Tribune. 26 April 1867.
“ ibid.
“Henry C. Dethloff and Robert R. Jones, "Race
Relations in Louisiana, 1877-98."Louisiana History 9 (Fall
1968): 308-311.
37C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow.
3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 3637; Paul Kunkel, "Modifications in Louisiana Negro Legal
Status Under Louisiana Constitutions, 1812-1957," Journal
of Negro History 44 (January, 1959): 14-15.
“Dethloff and Jones, "Race Relatios in Louisiana,"
pp. 316-323.
40Ibid.
4lLouisiana, Constitution (1879), Art. 231.
42Desdunes, Our People and Our History, pp. 136-138.
43Weeklv Louisianian. 11 June 1881.
44Desdunes, Our People and Our History, pp. 136-137.
45Ibid., p. 138.
“ t o reduce expenses school officials restructed the
high schools, designating them as "Academic Departments."
Each one contained a maximum of four teachers, including
the principal. The school assigned to blacks had two
teachers because of the small enrollment.
47LA Annual Report, 1877.
"“New Orleans, Leland, and Straight Universities were
affiliated with religious organizations— Methodist,
Baptist, and Congregationalist, respectively.
49

t

•

Porter, "The History of Negro Education," pp. 775-

784.
50Marie De Jan, "Education for Negroes in New Orleans
Prior to 1915" (M.A. thesis, Xavier University, 1941), p.
91; OPSB Minutes, 1 October 1884, 12 November 1884, 4
February 1885.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

258
51There is also no evidence to suggest that the school
board had continued the tuition subsidy.
52Bullock, History of Negro Education in the South,
pp. 160-166; Anderson, Education of Blacks in the South,
pp. 243-278.
53Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, pp. 119-127.
54LA Annual Report, 1878.
5SIbid., 1879.
S7LA Annual Report, 1877.
S8Louisiana Biennial Report(s) of the State
Superintendent of Public Education, 1882-1883, 1886-1887,
Hereinafter cited as LA Biennial Report; LA Annual
Report(s), 1874, 1877.
59LA Annual Report, 1882-1883.
“OPSB Minutes, 4 January 1879, 3 March 1880, 28 May
1880, 7 February 1883.
61Joy J. Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Ace:
Politics and Urban Progress. 1880-1896 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1969), pp. 145-169.
62OPSB Minutes, 2 December 1886, 10 August 1887, 8
Septamber 1887, 9 January 1888, 9 November 1888, 16
November 1888, and 8 May 1891.
^Blassingame, Black New Orleans, pp. 48-77, 139-171.
“Black public school enrollment actually declined in
the 1880s.
“LA Annual Report, 1878.
“ibid.
67Report of the Public Schools, 1887.
Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, pp. 31-65.
69This is not to suggest, however, that white leaders
wanted black education to serve as a basis for blacks to
ultimately gain civil equality, and economic and political
empowerment.
70Report of the Public Schools, 1882-1883.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

259
71LA Annual Report, 1877.
Report of the Public Schools, 1877.
73LA Annual Report(s), 1878, 1898-1899.
74LA Annual Report(s), 1877-1879; LA Biennial
Report(s), 1880-1900.
75Ibid., 1878.
76Report of the Public Schools, 1887.
^Ibid.
^OPSB Minutes, 8 May 1896, 12 June 1896.
^Ibid., 12 June 1896.
80

Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, p. 170.

81

Rayford W. Logan, The Betrayal of the Negro from
Rutherford B. Haves to Woodrow Wilson, new enl. ed.,
originally published as The Neoro in American Life and
Thought: The Nadir. 1877-1901 (New York: CollierMacMillan, 1972), pp. 195-217.
“ Dethloff and Jones, "Race Relations in Louisiana,"
315-316; Somers, "Black and White in New Orleans: A Study
in Urban Race Relations," pp. 38-42.
83

Desdunes, Our People and Our History, p. 141.

04

Arthe A. Anthony, "The Negro Creole Community in New
Orleans, 1880-1920: An Oral History," (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of California, Irving, 1978), pp. 50-52.
85

Desdunes used the term to describe blacks "who had
never compromised,...who remained faithful to the
principles of justice and of equality," Our People and Our
History, p. 140.
86

Reprinted in Otto H. Olsen, ed., The Thin Disguise:
Turning Point in Negro History. Plessv v. Ferguson (New
York: Humanities Press, 1967), pp. 47-48.
^Ibid., p. 49.
“ ibid., pp. 52-53.
“ ibid., p. 54.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

260
“ ibid., p. 55.
91Fischer, The Segregation Struggle, p. 153.
^esdunes, Our People and Our History, p. 141.
“ Reprinted in Olsen, The Thin Disouiqe. p. 112.
“ Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, pp. 237-241.
“ Philip D. Uzee, "The Republican Party in the
Louisiana Election of 1896," Louisiana History 2 (Summer
1961): 343-344.
“ Henry C. Dethloff, "The Alliance and the Lottery:
Farmers Try For the Sweepstakes," Louisiana History 6
(Spring 1965): 158-159.
^Official Journal of the Proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention of the State of Louisiana. 1898
(New Orleans: H.J. Hearsey, 1898), pp.9-10.
“ OPSB Minutes,
99

J. Paul Mitchell, ed., Race Riots in Black and White
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 22-37.
100OPSB Minutes, 9 March 1900.
101OPSB Minutes, 29 June

1900.

102OPSB Minutes, 29 June

1900.

103Donald Spivey, Schooling For the New Slavery: Black
Industrial Education. 1868-1915 (Westport, CN: Greenwood
Press, 1978), pp. 71-101.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

III.

Notes
Education and the Making of a Protest Tradition

1The four black colleges were Leland, Straight, New
Orleans, and Southern Universitiesi
^he board rented six buildings for school purposes in
the 1909-1910 school year. New Orleans Annual Report of
the Superintendent of the Public Schools of the Parish of
Orleans 1909-1910. Orleans Parish School Board Collection,
Archives and Manuscripts/Special Collections Department,
University of New Orleans hereinafter cited as N.O. Annual
Report.
3OPSB Minutes, 14 January 1910, 14 October 1910, and
11 November 1910.
4OPSB Minutes, 12 January 1914.
50PSB Minutes, 16 February 1914.
160PSB Minutes, 1 April 1914, 14 May 1914, 15 June
1914, and 9 July 1914.
7New Orleans Times Picayune. 30 September.
8Times Picayune. 1, 2 October 1915; OPSB Minutes, 21
September 1914, 4 October 1915, 11 November 1915, 23 March
1917.
90PSB Minutes, 28 July 1922.
10OPSB Minutes, 12 January 1923.
11Ten years earlier school officials had considered
converting the school. Whites opposed the idea as
strenuously as they opposed the Bayou Road School. Indeed,
Charles Colton, a member of the board at that time,
interrupted his convalescence to write a lengthy letter of
protest. OPSB Minutes, 13 July 1913, 12 January 1923.
12OPSB Minutes, 12 January 1923.
13Roger L. Rice, "Residential Segregation by Law,
1910-1917," Journal of Southern History 34 (May 1968): 189199.
14OPSB Minutes, 12 January 1923.
15OPSB Minutes, 12 January 1923.
160PSB Minutes, 18 January 1923.
261

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

262
17Ibid., 26 January 1923.
18Times Picayune. 27 January 1923.
19Ibid, 27 January 1923, 9 February 1923.
^Ibid., 10 February
21OPSB Minutes, 9 February 1923.
^I. A. Newby, Jim Crow's Defense: Anti-Negro Thought
in America. 1900-1930 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1965), pp. 3-16.
^OPSB Minutes, 9 February 1923.
24Warren Easton, named after a former superintendent
of schools, was a college preparatory school located on
Canal Street and drew students from throughout the city.
OPSB Minutes, 9 February 1923.
^Robert R. Moton, What the Nearo Thinks (New York:
Doubleday Doran & Co., 1940), pp. 5-9.
^OPSB Minutes, 9 February 1923.
^OPSB Minutes, 9 Februay 1923.
During the frantic attempt to upgrade black schools
after World War II school officials converted Craig School
back to black use.
OQ

Meyer Weinberg, A Chance to Learn: The History of
Race and Education in the United States. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 1-7.
30
31

Anderson, Education of Blacks in the South , p. 80.
Anderson, Education of Blacks in the South, pp.

80-81.
^Ibid., p. 80.
^OPSB Minutes, 29 June 1900.
^OPSB Minutes, 6 January 1916.
^OPSB Minutes, 12 January 1923.
^ . O . Annual Report(s), 1900-1910.
^OPSB Minutes, 13 January 1911.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

263
“ OPSB Minutes, 26 January 1923.
“ n .O. Annual Report, 1911-1912.
^OPSB Minutes, 10 November 1925.
41Louisiana Weekly. 9 April 1927.
^ond, Education of the Negro, pp. 225-226; OPSB
Minutes, 10 November 1911, 17 April 1911, 26 September
1913, 10 February 1928, 8 May 1936, 9 January 1937, 12 May
1939.
John McDonogh, a wealthy antebellum merchant and
real estate investor, willed a share of his fortune to
sponsor public education in New Orleans. Throughout much
of the nineteenth century, funds from his bequest financed
school construction in New Orleans.
“ OPSB Minutes, 14 April 1905.
bullock, History of Negro Education in the South,
p. 150.
“ OPSB Minutes, 14 September 1906.
47OPSB Minutes, 12 January 1923.
^OPSB Minutes, 12 January 1923.
^OPSB Minutes, 17 April 1917.
50

Dunn-Landry Papers, Amistad Research Center, New
Orleans, Louisiana.
51National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, New Orlens Branch Collection, Archives and
Manuscripts/Special Collections Department, University of
New Orleans.
“ Mary F. Berry and John W. Blassingame, Long Memory:
The Black Experience in America (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982), pp. 369-371.
“ New Orleans Herald, 19 September 1925.
^Louisiana Weekly. 25 December 1926.
“ ibid., 9 April 1927.
“ ibid., 23 October 1926.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

264
^Louisiana Weekly. 30 October 1926.
“ ibid., 18 January 1930.
“ ibid., 19 March 1927.
“ ibid., 13 August 1938.
Carter G. Woodson, The Nearo Professional Man and
the Community. (The Association for the Study of Negro
Life and History, Inc., 1938; reprint ed., New York: Negro
University Press, 1969), p. 122.
“ ibid., pp. 124-126.
“ ibid., p. 126.
Joseph L. Hardin Papers.
New Orleans, LA.

Amistad Research Center,

“ Louisiana Weekly. 24 December 1927, 17 January 1931;
Archie Perkins, Who's Who in Colored Louisiana (Baton
Rouge: Douglas Loan Company, 1930), p. 113.
“ woodson, Negro Professional Man and the Community,
p. 126.
“ Nida H. Vital, "Dr. Rivers Frederick and the History
of Black Medicine in New Orleans" (M.A. thesis, University
of New Orleans, 1978), pp. 83-84.
“ ibid., pp. 78-83.
“ ibid., pp. 40-45.
70Ibid., pp. 51, 61.
71Louisiana Weekly. 7 October 1933, 19 November 1933,
27 January 1934; Perkins, Who's Who, pp. 96, 101, 102,
136.
^Perkins, Who's Who, p. 113.
Vincent DeSantis, Republicans Face the Southern
Question. The New Departure Years. 1877-1897 (Baltimore:
John Hopkins Press, 1959), pp. 189-195; Philip D. Uzee,
"Republican Politics in Louisiana," (Ph.D. dissertation,
Louisiana State University Press, 1950), pp. 170-171.
74Quoted in Richard B. Sherman, The Republican Party
and Black America From McKinley to Hoover. 1896-1933
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973),
p. 9

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

265
75Biographical information based on reading of the
Hardin Papers.
76Biographical information based on reading of the
Dunn-Landry Papers and Robert Elijah Jones Papers, Amistad
Research Center, New Orleans, Louisiana.
^New Orleans Southwestern Christrian Advocate. 15
January 1903.
^Ibid., 9 November 1911.
^Ibid., 4 August 1910, 21 September 1916.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Motes
IV.

Black Education During the Jim Crow Era, 1900-1945

’OPSB Minutes, 9 October 1936, 13 September 1940.
2Charles Vincent, A Centennial History of Southern
University and A & M College (Baton Rouge: Southern
University, 1981), pp. 63-72.
3OPSB Minutes, 2 July 1913, 8 August 1913, 26 January
1915.
“Anderson, Education of Blacks in the South, pp. 186187? Bond, Education of the Nearo. pp. 114-115; Louis R.
Harlan, Separate and Unequal Public School Campaigns and
Racism in the Southern Seaboard States 1901-1915 (New York:
Atheneum, 1968), pp. 264-265.
s0PSB Minutes, 11 June 1909, 8 October 1909, 12 May
1911, 9 February 1917.
^N.O. Annual Report, 1912-1913, 1914-1915.
7Thomas Sowell, Education: Assumption Versus History
(Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1986),
pp. 9, 18-21; OPSB Minutes, 24 August 1917, 14 September
1917.
8OPSB Minutes, 13 August 1914.
90PSB Minutes, 28 September 1917.
10N .0. Annual Report, 1917-1918.
uIbid.
12Ibid.
13N.O. Annual Report, 1920-1921.
14Louisiana Weekly. 19 March 1927.
15N.O. Annual Report, 1917-1918.
160PSB Minutes, 14 September 1923, 22 August 1924.
Statistical Report of the New Orleans Public Schools
of the Parish of Orleans. 1929-1930, 1930-1931. Orleans
Parish School Board Collection, Archives and
Manuscripts/Special Collections Department, University of
New Orleans, hereinafter cited as N.O. Statistical Report.
266

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

267
18N.O. Annual Report, 1920-1921; N.O. Statistical
Report(s) 1924-1925 to 1939-1940.
19

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census,
Abstract of the Fourteenth Census of the United States.
1920 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923).
^OPSB Minutes, 10 July 1903, 3 November 1903, 13 May
1904, 10 November 1905, 14 August 1908, 13 October 1911;
N.O. Annual Report, 1903-1904, 1905-1906, 1911-1912.
21Advocate. 9 January 1908.
“ OPSB Minutes, 13 November 1908.
^Ibid., 11 September 1908, 10 September1909, 8
October 1909, 10 November 1911, 14 March 1913,
15 October
1913, 11 May 1917.
24Advocate. 9 November 1911.
Lawrence A. Cremin, American Education: The
Metropolitan Experience. 1876-1980 (New York: Harper and
Row, 1988), p. 231.
^ . 0 . Annual Report, 1918-1919, 1920-1921; OPSB
Minutes, 22 November 1918; Myrtle Banks, "The Education of
the Negro in New Orleans" (M.A. thesis, Xavier University,
1935), pp. 280-281.
^N.O. Annual Report, 1918-1919 to 1920-1921; N.O.
Statistical Report, 1924-1925 to 1939-1940.
^August Meier, Negro Thought in America. 1880-1915:
Racial Ideologies in the Age of Booker T. Washington (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1978), pp. 161-255;
W.E.B. DuBois, The Education of Black People: Ten
Critigues. 1906-1960. ed. Herbert Aptheker (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1973), pp.5-15.
^OPSB Minutes, 12 January 1900.
^Ibid., 8 March 1907, 13 May 1910, 14 May 1914.
31N.O. Annual Report, 1904-1905; OPSB Minutes, 14 June
1901 .
^OPSB Minutes, 9 June 1905.
^Ibid., 13 May 1910.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

^Advocate. 4 September 1902.
^U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Fourteenth Census of the United States. 1920_:__Pgpylfr.t.ipn,
vol. 4 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923).
^U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
U.S. Census of Population: 1950. Detailed Characteristics.
Louisiana (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952).
37N.O. Annual Report, 1911-1912, 1913-1914.
38 OPSB Minutes, 13 April 1916, 19 June 1916.
^OPSB Minutes, 1 November 1918, 27 December 1918.
^Louisiana Weekly. 19 March 1927, 9 April 1927, 16
April 1927, 23 April 1927.
410PSB Minutes, 26 January 1923.
42Louisiana Weekly. 22 February 1930; OPSB Minutes, 12
February 1930.
^ Louisiana Weekly. 22 February 1930.
“ ibid.
^ Louisiana Weekly. 7 February 1931.
'“ibid.
47Daniel Rosenberg, New Orleans Dockworkers: Labor,
and Unionism. 1892-1923 (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1988), pp. 175-184; Jim Stodder and David
Wells, "A Short History of New Orleans Dockworkers,"
Radical America 10 (January-February, 1976): 55.
^ Times-Picavune. 1 February 1931.
49Louisiana Weekly. 26 September 1931.
^Ibid., 3 November 1934.
510PSB Minutes, 16 November 1934, 12 March 1937, 12
May 1939; Louisiana Weekly. 13 August 1938.
^OPSB Minutes, 9 October 1936, 13 September 1940.
Louisiana Weekly. 5 March 1927.
^OPSB Minutes, 9 March 1900.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

269
ssOPSB Minutes, 20 April 1900, 9 August 1901, 28 April
1913.
S6OPSB Minutes, 24 May 1917.
57Rules and By-Laws of the Orleans Parish School Board
and Rules and Regulations of the Public Schools of the
Parish of Orleans, July 1917; Rules and Regulations of the
Orleans Parish School Board and the Mew Orleans Public
Schools, 1930, Orleans Parish School Board Collection,
Archives and Manuscripts/Special Collections Department,
University of New Orleans.
58The Course of Study for the Elementary Grades of the
Public Schools, 1909, Orleans Parish School Board
Collection, Archives and Manuscripts/Special Collections
Department, University of New Orleans.
59Ibid., 1916.
"ibid.,

1927.

filN.O. Annual Report, 1914-1915.
62Minns S. Robertson, Public Education in Louisiana
After 1898 (Baton Rouge: Bureau of Educational Materials
and Research, 1952), pp. 187-192. Othel Lovell, Jr.,
"Crucial Issues in Louisiana Public Education as Reflected
in Selected Louisiana Newspapers, 1898-1956," (Ph.D.
dissertaion, Louisiana State University, 1961), pp. 1, 101105, 122-123, 154.
"Bond, Education of the Negro, pp. 114-115; Harlan,
Separate and Unequal, pp. 248-269.
m N.O.

Annual Report, 1910-1911.

"ibid.,

1920-1921.

“OPSB Minutes, 13 March 1903.
67N.O. Statistical Report(s) 1921-1940.
"For a representative sample see, OPSB Minutes for 1
February 1907, 17 April 1911, 11 July 1913, 13 August 1914,
11 May 1923, 22 August 1924, 16 November 1934, and 9
January 1937.
6Ullin W. Leavell, Philantrophv in Nearo Education
(Nashville: Cullon and Ghertner Co., 1930), pp. 80-82;
Bullock, History of Negro Education in the South, pp. 158159.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

270
^Louisiana Weekly. 18 February 1928.
71OPSB Minutes, 14 February 1913, 3 June 1913, 12
September 1913.
Louisiana Weekly. 8 May 1926.
73Ibid., 23 April 1927.
74OPSB Minutes, 13 January 1928; Louisiana Weekly. 21
January 1928.
75OPSB Minutes, 7 August 1928.
76Louisiana Weekly. 2 November 1929.
^Ibid.
78N.O. Annual Report, 1912-1913.
^N.O. Annual Report(s) 1900-1920; N.O. Annual
Statistical Report(s) 1921-1940.
“ OPSB Minutes, 12 April 1907, 11 November 1910, 9
November 1916.
810PSB Minutes, 14 November 1913, 28 September 1923, 9
October 1931, 14 October 1938; Louisiana Weekly. 28 October
1933.
“ OPSB Minutes, 11 March 1915, 27 October 1922.
“ OPSB Minutes, 13 January 1928, 9 October 1931.
Louisiana Weekly. 2 April 1927.
“ ibid., 9 April 1927.
“ ibid., 16 April 1927.
870PSB Minutes, 12 September 1890.
“ woodson, Nearo Professional Man. pp. 43-48;
Anderson, Education of Blacks in the South, p p . 110-114;
Bond, Education of the Negro, pp. 264-268; Bullock, History
of Negro Education in the South, pp. 183-184.
“ OPSB Minutes, 29 June 1906.
“ Advocate. 9 February 1911; N.O. Annual Report, 19031904; OPSB Minutes, 14 December 1900, 11 March 1904, 12

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

271

August 1904, 9 August 1907, 11 October 1907, 8 July 1910,
12 Agust 1910, 19 September 1910.
91Ibid., 11 January 1907, 11 October 1907.
"Advocate. 9 February 1911; OPSB Minutes, 8 August
19133, 2 August 1915, 14 September 1916.
"Banks, "The Education of the Negro in New Orleans,"
p. 267.
^In 1950 teachers accounted for 276 of the 1034 black
professionals in the city. U.S. Census of Population;
195_<h_Detailed .Characteristics. Louisiana.
"OPSB Minutes, 8 April 1915, 26 April 1915, 13 May
1915, 24 June 1915, 13 January 1916, 25 June 1919.
"OPSB Minutes, 28 September 1900.
970PSB Minutes, 27 September 1920.
"Bond, Education of the Negro, pp. 267-274.
"Bullock, History of Negro Education in the South.
p. 216.
100Ibid., p. 217.
101Louisiana Weekly. 28 August 1937.
102Raphael Cassimere, Jr., "Equalizing Teachers' Pay in
Louisiana," Inteorateducation (July-August, 1977): 5; Mark
V. Tushnet, The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated
Education. 1925-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1987), pp. 97-99; Louisiana Weekly. 8
October 1938.
103

The Voice. November 1938, copy in Alexander P.
Tureaud Papers, Amistad Research Center, New Orleans,
Louisiana.
104Cassimere, "Equalizing Teachers' Pay," p. 5.
105Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of
Brown v. Board of Education and Black Amreica's Struggle
for Equality (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), pp. 179181, 197.
Cassimere, "Equalizing Teachers' Pay," p. 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

272
107Bullock, History of Negro Education in the South,
p. 219.
4AQ

Cassimere, "Equalizing Teachers' Pay," p. 5;
Tushnet, NAACP's Legal Strategy, pp. 98-99.
109

Bond, Education of the Neoro. pp. 88-115.

110OPSB Minutes, 9 May 1941.
111Ibid., 17 June 1941.
119

Alexander P. Tureaud to Thurgood Marshall, 4
September 1941, Tureaud Papers.
113Marshall to Tureaud, 8 September 1941, Tureaud
Papers.
115The Board was also under pressure from non-degree
teachers to place their salaries on a par with teachers who
had a degree.
^Tureaud to Marshall, 14 June 1942, Tureaud Papers.
117Marshall to

Tureaud, 19 June 1942, Tureaud Papers.

118Tureaud to Marshall, 3 July 1942, Tureaud Papers.
119

Marshall to Tureaud, 6 July 1942, Tureaud Papers.

120Ibid.
191

OPSE Minutes, 11 September 1942; Cassimere,
"Equalizing Teachers' Pay," 6; Tushnet, NAACP's Legal
Strategy, p. 98.
122Louisiana Weekly. 3 October 1942.
123Ibid., 4 November 1939.
124Aionzo G. Grace, Tomorrow's Citizens: A Study and
Program for the Improvement of the New Orleans Public
Schools (New Orleans: Citizen's Planning Committee, 1939),
p. 53.
125Ibid., P- 55.
to
in

126Ibid., P-

127Ibid., P- 57.
128Ibid., pp. 337

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

273
129Ibid., pp.348-349.
130Ibid., p. 253.
131Samson P. Bordelon, "The New Orleans Public Schools
Under the Superintendency of Lionel J. Bourgeois" (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Southern Mississippi, 1966), 67.
132With poetic force W.E.B. DuBois at the turn of the
century captured the African American's dilemma: "One ever
feels his twoness— an American, a Negro, two souls, two
thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in
one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from
being torn asunder." W.E.B. DuBois, Souls of Black Folk
(New York: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1961), p. 17.
133Louisiana Weekly. 11 October 1941.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

NOTES
V.

Education and the Pursuit of the Golden Fleece

1Richard Kluger, Simple Justice; The History of
Brown v. Board of Education and Black.America's Struggle
for Equality (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), pp.
136-137.
2John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom: A
History of Negro Americans. 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1980), p. 409.
30PSB Minutes, 16 January 1945.
40PSB Minutes, 9 March 1945, 15 March 1946, 10 May
1946.
5Petition dated 3 May 1946 in Box 43, Alexander P.
Tureaud Papers, Amistad Research Center, New Orleans,
Louisiana.
®0PSB to Daniel Byrd, 9 May, 16 June 1946, Byrd to
OPSB, 10 July, 15 August 1946, Tureaud Papers.
7Samson P. Bordelon, "The New Orleans Public Schools
Under the Superintendency of Lionel John Bourgeois" (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Southern Mississippi, 1966),
pp. 7, 89-95, 236.
®Bourgeosis to Tureaud, 30 September 1947, Tureaud
Papers.
90PSB Minutes, 12 December 1947.
10OPSB Minutes, 12 March 1948, 7 June 1948.
11OPSB Minutes, 12 March 1948.
120PSB Minutes, 12 March 1948.
Bordelon, "Superintendency of Lionel J. Bourgeois
pp. 94-95, 156-157; OPSB Minutes, 12 March 1948, 18 March
1948.
140PSB Minutes, 21 May 1948, 7 June 1948, 11 June
1948.
15New Orleans Louisiana Weekly. 15 May 1948

274

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

275
16Mark V. Tushnet, The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against
Segregated Education, 1925-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1987), pp. 108-109.
17For example, the president of the Colored
Educational Alliance, Dr. Percy P. Cruezot, informed the
Board on one occasion that his petition for improvements
under a segregated system did not indicate a lack of
support for the NAACP's commitment to desegregation, but a
recognition that "immediate relief was needed." OPSB
Minutes, 12 November 1951.
18OPSB Minutes, 12 August 1949.
19Byrd to Bourgeois, 21 April 1948, Tureaud Papers.
^Daniel E. Byrd Papers, Box 1, Folders 1 and 2,
Amistad Research Center, New Orleans, Louisiana.
21Byrd to Tureaud, 6 October 1947, Tureaud Papers.
^Ibid.
^Byrd to Tureaud, 24 April 1948.
OA
Bourgeois to Byrd, 23 April 1948, Tureaud Papers.
25

Byrd to Bourgeois, 26 April 1948, Tureaud Papers.

^Tureaud to OPSB, 20 May 1948, Tureaud Papers.
^OPSB Minutes, 21 May 1948.
^OPSB Minutes, 7 June 1948, 11 June 1948.
^Proposed Program for the Improvement of the Public
Schools of New Orleans, 1948, Orleans Parish School Board
Collection, Archives and Manuscripts/Special Collections
Department, University of New Orleans.
on
Mary Lee Muller,"The Orleans Parish School Board
and Negro Education, 1940-1960" (M.A. thesis, University of
New Orleans, 1975), pp. 18-19.
310PSB Minutes, 14 July 1949, 17 October 1949.
duller, "OPSB and Negro Education," p.20.
duller,"OPSB and Negro Education," pp. 21-22; OPSB
Minutes, 30 November 1948.
^OPSB Minutes, 14 July 1948.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

276
Bordelon, "Superintendency of Lionel J. Borgeois,"
p. 57
^OPSB Minutes, 21 December 1951.
Bordelon, "Superintendency of Lionel J. Bourgeois,"
pp.194-241.
^Byrd to Thurgood Marshall, 12 September 1951, Byrd
Papers.
^OPSB Minutes, 12 November 1951.
40

Board resolution, dated 26 November 1951 in Box 43
Tureaud Papers.
41

Tureaud to Marshall, 13 November 1951, Tureaud
Papers.
42OPSB Minutes, 12 September 1952.
^Tushnet, NAACP's Legal Strategy, pp. 138-143;
Kluger, Simple Justice, p.540.
^Kluger, Simple Justice, p. 540.
^Byrd to Robert Richmond, 16 December 1953, Byrd
Papers
Quoted in Kluger, Simple Justice, p.782.
47Louisiana Weekly. 22 May 1954.
48Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance:
Race and Politics in the South During the 1950's (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), pp.97-103.
49

New Orleans

Times

Picayune.

^Times Picayune.

21 May1954.

S1Times Picayune.

25 May1954.

20May 1954.

Louisiana, Acts
of the State Legislature, Regular
Session, 1954, Acts 555, 556.
Nashville Southern School News. 1 December 1954.
54

Southern School News. 1 December 1954.

^OPSB Minutes, 31 May 1954.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

277
“ southern School News. 1 December 1954.
“ ibid., 8 June 1955.
eo

A copy of the "Declaration" can be found in Box 1,
Byrd Papers; Times Picayune. 24 May 1954.
“ southern School News. 4 November 1954, 1 December
1954.
“ ibid., 6 July 1955.
61Ibid., September 1955, October 1955, November 1955,
December 1955.
62

Ibid., 6 July, August, September 1955.

“ ibid., January 1956.
64

Earl Beniamin Bush et. al. v. Orleans Parish
School Board et. al.. 138 Federal Supplement, p. 336.
65

Bush v. OPSB. 138 Federal Supplement, pp. 341-342.

66

Southern School News. March 1956.

“ ibid., June 1956.
“ ibid.
69

Quoted in Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance.
pp.144-145.
70Earlean Mary McCarrick, "Louisiana's Official
Resistance To Segregation" (Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt
University, 1964), pp.26-44, 105-131.
71Neil McMillen, The Citizens' Council: Organized
Resistance to the Second Reconstruction. 1954-64 (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1971), pp. 59, 64, 67.
^OPSB Minutes 26 September 1955.
73

Southern School News. April 1956.

74Ibid., June 1956.
75McMillen, The Citizens' Council, p.66.
76

Southern School News. 4 November 1954.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

278

^During the same discussion Long added: "As for the
Citizens' Councils, x guess tney are axx right, hut they've
got a lot of hotheads, too." Southern School News. June
1956.
^Southern School News. May 1956.
^Ibid., June 1956, November 1956, December 1956.
“ ibid., January 1957.
81

Roy Wilkens to Doretha A. Combre, 15 February 1960,
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
New Orleans Branch Collection, Archives and
Manuscripts/Special Collections Department, University of
New Orleans, hereinafter cited as NAACP Papers.
82

Southern School News. April 1956.

“ OPSB Minutes, 12 September 1955, 26 September 1955.
84

Southern School News. September 1955.

85

In 1947 the members voted to change the name from
the Louisiana Colored Teachers' Association to the
Louisiana Education Association. LCTA dated back to 1901.
See, Ernest J. Middleton, History of the Louisiana
Education Association (Washington, D.C.: National Education
Association, 1984), pp.46, 53-56, 82.
Marshall to Byrd, 20 December 1954, Byrd Papers.
87Middleton, History of the LEA, pp.53, 89.
“ Byrd to Marshall, 24 September 1953, Byrd Papers.
“ Middleton, History of the LEA, pp. 89-99.
“ southern School News. July 1959.
91Ibid.
“ ibid., August 1959.
“ ibid., September 1959.
William G. McCall, "School Desegregation in
Louisiana: An Analysis of the Constitutional Issues" (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Tennessee, 1973), p. 56;
Southern School News. May 1960.
“ Southern School News. May 1960.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

279
wuiaicxto Weekly. 7 May 1960, 14 May 1960.
^Ibid.
“ OPSB Minutes, 24 May 1960.
"OPSB Minutes, 20 June 1960.
100NAACP Papers, Box 70.
101See, for example, Allison Chapital to Reverend E. B.
Scott, 20 June 1960, Chapital to Reverend Morris Burrell,
21 June 1960, and Chapital to Reverend J. J. Carter, 21
June 1960, NAACP Papers.
1N o rton Inger, Politics and Reality in an American
City: The New Orleans School Crisis of 1960 (New York:
Center for Urban Education, 1969), pp. 22-30; McCarrick,
"Official Resistance to Desegregation," pp. 125-126.
103

Inger, Politics and Reality, pp. 29-30; Times
Picayune. 5 August 1960; Southern School News. July 1960.
104

The New Orleans School Crisis. Report of the
Louisiana State Advisory Committee to the United States
Commission on Civil Rights (Wasington, D.C. U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1961), p. 6.
105

Southern School News. August 1959.

106

OPSB Minutes, 20 June 1960; Southern School News.
July 1960.
107The Catholic schools were not desegregated until
1962. For a less flattering portrait of Rummel see Inger,
Politics and Reality, pp. 22-24.
108

Times Picayune. 18, 21, 26 August 1960.

109Ibid., 28 August 1960.
110OPSB Minutes, 29 August 1960.
111Times Picayune. 29 August 1960.
112Idid.
113

Louisiana Weekly. 3 September 1960.

114

Southern School News. August 1960; OPSB Minutes, 24
October 1960, 10 November 1960.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

280

115OPSB Minutes, 10 November 1960.
116Louisiana Weekly. 5 November 1960; OPSB Minutes, 10
November 1960.
117Alan Wieder, "The New Orleans School Crisis of 1960:
Causes and Consequences," Phvlon 48 (June 1987): 129;
Louisiana Weekly. 5 November 1960.
118Times Picayune. 15 November 1960; Louisiana Weekly.
19 November 1960.
119

Times Picayune. 15 November 1960.

190

Louisiana Weekly. 19, 26, November 1960; Times
Picayune. 16, 18, 19, November 1960.
121

Southern School News. December 1960.

122Responses are filed in Box 71, NAACP Papers.
123Hartman to Chapital, 17, 18 November 1960, NAACP
Papers. 124. New Orleans, Louisiana, Superintendent's
Annual Report(s) New Orleans Public Schools, 1957-1958,
1958-1959, 1959-1960, Archives and Manuscripts/Special
Collections Department, University of New Orleans.
125New Orleans, Annual Report of the Orleans Parish
School Board and of the Superintendent of Schools,
1961-1962; Annual Report of the New Orleans Public Schools,
1962-1963, 1963-1964; Triennial Report of the New Orleans
Public Schools, 1965-1968, Orleans Parish School Board
Collection, Archives and Manuscripts/Special Collections
Department, University of New Orleans.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Manuscripts and Archival Material

Amistad Research Center. New Orleans, Louisiana.
Byrd, Daniel E. Papers.
Dunn-Landry Papers.
Frederick, Rivers Papers.
Hardin, Joseph Papers.
Jones, Robert Papers.
Longe, George, Jr. Papers.
Tureaud, Alexander P. Papers.
Archives and Manuscripts/Special Collections Department,
University of New Orleans.
Christian, Marcus Papers.
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
New Orleans Branch Collection.
Orleans Parish School Board Collection.
Government Documents
Annual Report of the State Superintendent of Public
Education. 1867. 1868. New Orleans: A.E. Lee, 1869.
Annual Report of the State Superintendent of Public
Education. 1869. New Orleans: A.E. Lee, 1870.
Annual Report of the State Superintendent of Public
Education. 1870. New Orleans: A.E. Lee, 1871.
Annual Report of the State Superintendent of Public
Education. 1871. New Orleans: Republican, 1872.
Annual Report of the State Superintendent of Public
Education. 1872. New Orleans: Republican, 1873.
Annual Report of the State Superintendent of Public
Education. 1873. New Orleans: Republican, 1874.
281

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

282

Annual Report of the State Superintendent of Public
Education, 1874. New Orleans: Republican, 1875.
Annual Report of the State Superintendent of Public
Education. 1875. New Orleans: Republican, 1876.
Annual Report of the State Superintendent of Public
Education. 1877. New Orleans: Democrat, 1878.
Annual Report of the State Superintendent of Public
Education. 1878. New Orleans: Democrat, 1879.
Annual Report of the State Superintendent of Public
Education. 1879. New Orleans: Picayune Publishing
Co., 1880.
Biennial Report of the State Superintendent of Public
Education, 1880-1881. Baton Rouge: Leon Jastremski,
1882.
Biennial Report of the State Superintendent of Public
Education, 1882-1883. Baton Rouge: Leon Jastremski,
1884.
Biennial Report of the State Superintendent of Public
Education, 1884-1885. Baton Rouge: Leon Jastremski,
1886.
Biennial Report of the State Superintendent of Public
Education, 1886-1887. Baton Rouge: Leon Jastremski,
1888.
Biennial Report of the State Superintendent of Public
Education. 1888-1889. New Orlearns: Ernest Marchand,
1890.
Biennial Report of the State Superintendent of Public
Education. 1890-1891. New Orleans: E.P. Brandao,
1892.
Biennial Report of the State Superintendent of Public
Education, 1892-18. Baton Rouge: Advocate, 1894.
Biennial Report of the State Superintendent of Public
Education, 1894-18. Baton Rouge: Advocate, 1896.
Biennial Report of the State Superintendent of Public
Education, 1896-18. Baton Rouge: Advocate, 1898.
Biennial Report of the State Superintendent of Public
Education, 1898-1899. Baton Rouge: Advocate, 1900.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

283
Biennial Report of the state Superintendent of Publlic
Education. 1900-1901. Baton Rouge: Advocate, 1902.
Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention for the
Framing of a Constitution for the State of Louisiana.
New Orleans: J.B. Roudanez, 1867-1868.
Louisiana.

Constitution of 1879.

The New Orleans School Crisis. Report of the Louisiana
State Advisory Committee to the United States
Commission on Civil Rights. 1961.
Official Journal of the Proceedings.of the Constitutional
Convention of the State of Louisiana. 1898.
Records of the Superintendent of Education for the State of
Louisiana. Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned
Lands, 1864-1869. Record Group 105. National Archives
Microforms Publications, M1026.
U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. 1920.
Abstract of the Fourteenth Census of the U.S.
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923.
U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census, 1920:
Population. Vol. 4. Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1923.
U.S.

Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. U.S.
Census of Population: 1950. Detailed Characteristics.
Louisiana. Washington: Government Printing Office,
1952.
Newspapers

Nashville Southern School News. 1954-1962.
New Orleans Daily Picayune. 1862, 1873, 1874, 1877, 1879.
New Orleans Louisiana Weekly. 1925-1964.
New Orleans Weekly Louisianian. 1870-1882.
New Orleans Republican. 1873-1875.
New Orleans Southwestern Christian Advocate. 1873-1926.
New Orleans Times. 1873. 1877.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

284
New Orleans Times Picayune. 1915, 1923, 1929-1932,
1954-1961.
New Orleans Tribune. 1865-1867.
BOOks

Anderson, James D. The Education of Blacks in the South.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988.
Anderson, James D., and Franklin, Vincent P., ed. New
Perspectives on Black Educational History. Boston:
G.K. Hall and Co., 1978.
Ashmore, Harry S. The Neoro and the Schools. Foreword by
Owen J. Roberts. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1954.
Bartley, Numan V. The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and
Politics in the South During the 1950*8. Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1969.
Berry Mary F. and Blassingame John W. Long Memory: The
Black Experience in America. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982.
Blassingame, John W. Black New Orleans. 1860-1880.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973.
Bond, Horace M. The Education of the Nearo in the American
Social Order. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1934.
Bullock, Henry A. A History of Neoro Education in the
South. From 1819 to the Present. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1967.
Butchart, Ronald E. Northern Schools. Southern Blacks, and
Reconstruction: Freedmen's Education. 1862-1875.
Westpoint: Greenwood Press, 1980.
Carter, Hodding, ed. The Past as Prelude: New Orleans
1718-1968. New Orleans: Tulane University, 1968.
Coles, Robert. Children of Crisis: A Study of Courage and
Fear. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967.
Cremin, Lawrence A. American Education: The Metropolitan
Experience. 1876-1980. New York: Harper and Row,
1988.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

285
Dawson, Joseph G. Army Generals and Reconstruction:
Louisiana. 1862-1877. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1982.
DeSantis, Vincent. Republicans Face the Southern Question.
The New Departure Years. 1877-1897. Baltimore: John
Hopkins Press, 1959.
Desdunes, Rodolphe L. Our People and Our History.
Translated and edited by Dorothea 0. McCants. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973.
DuBois, W.E.B. The Education of Black People: Ten
Critiques. 1906-1960. Edited by Herbert Aptheker. New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1973.
_______ . Souls of Black Folk.
Publications, Inc., 1961.

New York: Fawcett

Fischer, Roger A. The_Segregation Struggle in Louisiana.
1862-1877. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974.
Foner, Eric. Free Soil. Free Labor. Free Men: The. Ideology
of the Republican Party Before the Civil War. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1971.
Franklin, John H. From Slavery to Freedom: A History of
Negro Americans. 5th ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1980.
Genovese, Eugene D. Roll. Jordan. Roll: The World the
Slaves Made. New York: Vintage Books, 1976.
Grace, Alonzo G. Tomorrow's Citizens: A Study and Program
for the Improvement of the New Orleans Public Schools.
New Orleans: Citizens' Planning Committee, 1939.
Hair, William I. Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest: Louisiana
Politics. 1877-1900. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1975.
Harding, Vincent. There is a River: The Black Struggle for
Freedom in America. New York: Vintage Books, 1983.
Harlan, Louis R. Separate and Unequal Public School
Campaigns and Racism in the Southern Seaboard States
1901-1915. New York: Atheneum, 1968.
Inger, Morton. Politics and Reality in an American Citv:
The New Orleans Schools Crisis of 1960. New York:
Center for Urban Education, 1969.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

286
Jackson, Joy J. Nev Orleans in the Gilded Age: Politics and
Urban Progress. 1880-1896. Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1969.
Jeansonne, Glen S. Race. Religion, and Politics: The
Louisiana Gubernatorial Elections of_19_59-60_,_
University of Southwestern Louisiana History Series,
no. 10. Lafayette: University of Southwestern
Louis iana, 1977.
Kluger, Richard, simple Justice: The History of Brown v.
Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for
Equalitv. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1976.
Leavell, Ullin W. Philantroohv in Negro Education.
Nashville: Cullon and Ghertner Co., 1930.
Logan, Rayford W. The Betrayal of the Neoro from Rutherford
B. Haves to Woodrow Wilson, rev. and enl. ed.
Originally published as The Neoro in American Life and
Thought: The Nadir. 1877-1901. New York:
Collier-MacMillan, 1972.
Lonn, Ella. Reconstruction in Louisiana after 1868.
York: G.P. Putman's Sons, 1918.

New

Meier, August. Negro Thought in America. 1880-1915: Racial
Ideologies in the Age of Booker T. Washington. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1978.
Messner, William F. Freedmen and the Ideology of Free
Labor: Louisiana. 1862-1865. Lafayette: University
of Southwestern Louisiana Press, 1978.
Middleton, Earnest J. History of the Louisiana Education
Association. Washington, D.C.: National Education
Association, 1984.
Morris, Robert C. Reading. Ritinq. and Reconstruction: The
Education of Freedmen in the South. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1981.
Moton, Robert R. What the Negro Thinks.
Doubleday Doran and Co.

New York:

McMillen, Neil. The Citizens1 Council: Organized Resistance
to the Second Reconstruction. 1954-64. Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1971.
Newby, I.A. Jim Crow's Defense: Anti-Negro Thought in
America. 1900-1930. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1965.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

287
Parker, Joseph B. The Morrison Era: Reform Polities In New
Orleans. Gretna, Louisiana: Pelican Publishing Co.,
1974.
Olsen, Otto, ed. The Thin Disguise: Turning Point in Negro
History, Plessv v. Ferguson. New York: Humanities
Press, 1967.
Perkins, Archie. Who*s Who in Colored Louisiana.
Rouge: Douglas Loan Company, 1930.

Baton

Ripley, C. Peter. Slaves and Freedmen in Civil War
Louisiana. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1976.
Robertson, Minns S. Public Education in Louisiana After
1898. Baton Rouge: Bureau of Educational Materials
and Research, 1952.
Rosenberg, Daniel. New Orleans Dockworkers: Labor and
Unionism. 1892-1923. Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1988.
Rousseve, Charles B. The Negro in Louisiana.
Xavier University Press, 1937.

New Orleans:

Sherman, Richard B. The Republican Party and Black America
From McKinley to Hoover. 1896-1933. Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1973.
Sowell, Thomas. Education: Assumption Versus History.
Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1986.
Spivey, Donald. Schoolino for the New Slavery; Black
Industrial Education. 1868-1915. Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978.
Stampp, Kenneth M. The Era of Reconstruction. 1865-1877.
New York: Vintage Books, 1965.
Sterkx, H.E. The Free Neoro in Ante-Bellum Louisiana.
Rutherford, New Jersey: Farleigh Dickinson University
Press, 1972.
Taylor, Joe G. Louisiana Reconstructed. 1963-1877. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974.
Tunnell, Ted. Crucible of Reconstruction: War. Radicalism,
and Race in Louisiana. 1862-1877. Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1984.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

288
Tushnet, Mark V. The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against
Segregated Education. 1925-1950. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1987.
Vincent, Charles. A Centennial History of Southern
University and A & M College. Baton Rouge: Southern
University, 1981.
_______ . Black Legislators in Louisiana Purina
Reconstruction. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1976.
Webber, Thomas L. Deep Like the Rivers: Education in the
Slave Quarter Community. 1831-1865. New York: W.W.
Norton and Co., Inc., 1978.
Weinberg, Meyer. A Chance to Learn: The History of Race and
Education in the United States. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1977.
White, Howard A. The Freedmen*s Bureau in Louisiana.
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970.

Baton

Woodson, Carter G. The Mis-Education of the Negro. Edited
by Charles H. Wesley and Thelma D. Perry. Washington,
D.C.: Associated Publishers, 1969.
_______ . The Neoro Professional Man and the Community.
The Association for the Study of Negro Life and
History, Inc., 1938; reprint ed., New York: Negro
Univers ity Press,1969.
Woodward, C. Vann. Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of
1877 and the End of Reconstruction, rev. ed., Garden
City, New York: Doubleday 4 Co., 1956.
_______ . The Strange Career of Jim Crow. 3rd ed. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1974.
Articles
Cassimere, Raphael, Jr. "Equalizing Teachers' Pay in
Louisiana." IntecrateducationfJuly-August.1977): 3-8.
Dethloff, Henry C. "The Alliance and the Lottery: Farmers
Try for the Sweepstakes." Louisiana History (Spring
1965): 141-159.
Dethloff, Henry C. and Jones, Robert R. "Race Relations in
Louisiana, 1877-98." Louisiana History 9 (Fall 1968):
301-323.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

289
Harlan, Louis R. "Desegregation in New Orleans Public
Schools During Reconstruction." American Historical
Review 67 (April 1962): 663-675.
Harris, Carl V. "stability and Change in Discrimination
Against Black Public Schools: Birmingham, Alabama,
1871- 1931." Journal of Southern History 51 (August
1985): 375- 416.
Kunkel, Paul. "Modifications in Louisiana Negro Legal
Status Under Louisiana Constitutions, 1812-1957."
Journal of Negro History 44 (January 1959): 1-25.
Porter, Betty. "The History of Negro Education in
Louisiana." Louisiana Historical Quarterly 25 (July
1942): 728-821.
Rice, Roger L. "Residential Segregation by Law, 1910-1917."
Journal of Southern History 34 (May 1968): 179-199.
Somers, Dale. "Black and White in New Orleans: A Study in
Urban Race Relations, 1865-1900." Journal of Southern
History 40 (February 1974): 19-43.
Uzee, Philip D. "The Republican Party in the Louisiana
Election of 1896." Louisiana History 2 (Summer
1961):332-344.
Vincent, Charles. "Negro Leadership and Programs in the
Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1868."
Louisiana History 10 (Fall 1969): 339-351.
Wieder, Alan. "The New Orleans School Crisis of 1960:
Causes and Consequences." Phvlon 48 (June 1987):
122-131.
Williams, T. Harry."The Louisiana Unification Movement of
1873." Journal of Southern Histcrv 11 (August 1945):
349-369.
Theses and Dissertations
Anthony, Arthe A. "The Negro Creole Community in New
Orleans, 1880-1920: An Oral History." Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California, Irving, 1978.
Banks, Myrtle. "The Education of the Negro in New Orleans."
M.A. Thesis, Xavier University, 1935.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

290
Beasley, Leon 0. "A History of Louisiana During the
Reconstruction Period, 1862-1877." Ph.D. dissertation,
Louisiana State University, 1957.
Bordelon, Samson P. "The New Orleans Public Schools Under
the Superintendency of Lionel John Bourgeois." Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Southern Mississippi,
1966.
DeJan, Marie. "Education for Negroes in New Orleans Prior
to 1915." M.A. thesis, Xavier University, 1941.
Lovell, Othel, Jr. "Crucial Issues in Louisiana Public
Education as Reflected in Selected Louisiana
Newspapers, 1898-1956." Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana
State University, 1961.
McCarrick, Earlean M. "Louisiana's Official Resistance to
Segregation." Ph.D.- dissertation, Vanderbilt
University, 1964.
McCall, William G. "School Desegregation in Louisiana: An
Analysis of the Constitutional Issues." Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Tennessee, 1973.
Muller, Mary L. "The Orleans Parish School Board and Negro
Education, 1940-1960." M.A. thesis, Universty of New
Orleans, 1975.
Rankin, David C. "The Forgotten People: Free People of
Color in New Orleans, 1850-1870." Ph.D. dissertation,
John Hopkins University, 1976.
Rogers, Kim L. "Humanity and Desire: Civil Rights Leaders
and the Desegregation of New Orleans, 1954-1966."
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1982.
Subat, Albert P. "The Superintendency of the Public Schools
of Orleans Parish, 1862-1910." M.A. thesis, Tulane
University,1947.
Todd, Lewis. "The Development of Public Secondary Education
in New Orleans, 1914-1941." M.A. thesis, Tulane
University, 1942.
Vital, Nida H. "Dr. Rivers Frederick and the History of
Black Medicine in New Orleans." M.A. thesis,
University of New Orleans, 1978.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Vita

Donald E. DeVore, a native of New Orleans, received a
B.A. degree in secondary education from Southern University
at New Orleans in 1974 and an M.A. degree in history from
the University of New Orleans in 1983.

He currently

teaches at Louisiana State University.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT

Candidate:

D onald E. Devore

Major Field:

H is to r y

Title of Dissertation:

R ate R e la tio n s and Community D evelopm ent: The
E d u c a tio n o f B lack s i n New O rle a n s , 1862-1960

Approved:

M

fvs-l^r ____

Major Professor and Chairman

D e a n of the Graduate Sjfiool1

EXAMINING COM M ITTEE:

Date of Examination:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

